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Introduction to the Portfolio
This portfolio represents a selection of the work carried out in fulfilment of the 
PsychD. in Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology at the University of 
Surrey. It presents the central areas of training: academic papers, therapeutic 
practice and research. As such, it comprises a range of practice related topics 
emphasising the integration of theory, practice and research and the role of ethics 
in governing Counselling Psychology.
Due to the confidential nature of therapeutic practice, related practice material has 
been edited in order to ensure that the anonymity of clients, service contexts and 
research participants has been preserved. The full reports and notes are available 
in the confidential appendix, submitted separately but not publicly available.
Academic Dossier
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Academic Dossier
This dossier contains a selection of papers and one report submitted over the 
duration of the course. One paper from ‘Lifespan Development’ critically 
evaluates how psychological models of the dying process may facilitate 
therapeutic practice with the terminally ill. Two ‘Advanced Theory and Therapy’ 
papers which critically examine the role of theory to practice are also included. 
These explore the means by which therapeutic change occurs through Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and an existential-phenomenological informed 
critique of the psychoanalytic concept. Transference. Finally, one report from 
‘The Context of Counselling Psychology’ discusses the role of personal therapy 
for therapists in training, with reference to recent empirical research and survey 
findings.
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Evaluate whether contemporary psychological 
models of the dying process are sufficiently 
equipped to facilitate therapeutic practice 
with the terminally ill.
Abstract
The present discussion explores the existing literature to determine the degree to 
which current psychological models of the dying process are able to inform 
therapeutic practice with the terminally ill. It briefly outlines the models and 
through identifying their limitations, suggests ways in which a new model may 
enhance both the theory of and practice with, the terminally ill . It concludes that a 
new model needs to address the interaction of contextual variables, 
acknowledging the setting in which both the dying process and therapeutic 
practice occur.
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"Man is the only animal that finds his own existence a 
problem he has to solve and from which he cannot escape. In 
the same sense man is the only animal who knows he must 
die". (Fromm, 1955, p. 5).
This discussion begins with the above quotation 
because it characterises the essence of the 'human 
condition’ as well as the substantive topic of this essay. 
More importantly, it also reflects a largely Western view 
of how both death and dying are perceived. This in turn, 
has implications not only for how the terminally ill are 
perceived and treated within our society (partly due to 
models of the dying process formulated by psychologists 
which, in themselves, are a reflection of Western culture) 
but also, for the manner in which these individuals are 
able to manage and negotiate the dying process. These are 
issues that shall be discussed throughout with reference to 
psychological models, empirical findings and their 
subsequent impact (or otherwise) upon the efficacy of 
therapeutic practice with the terminally ill.
However, in order to achieve a more comprehensive 
understanding of the issues involved, it is necessary to 
begin by briefly defining ’terminal illness’. A closer 
examination of this process reveals that it may not be as
conceptually straightforward as might have been previously 
envisaged. A discussion and evaluation of Kubler Ross’s 
(1969) ’Stages of Dying’, and Pattison’s (1977) ’Living-
Dying Interval’ shall follow, before drawing conclusions 
and proposing suggestions for features which may be 
incorporated into future psychological models of the dying 
process. It is interesting to note however, that the two 
models to be evaluated are at least both twenty years old 
and yet, continue to dominate the literature in this field. 
This in itself may be reflective of the fact that the 
spectacular advances made in the medical sciences have, by 
their very nature, pathologised the dying process by 
’’regarding death as a medical failure’’ (Laungani & Young, 
1997, p. 219). By extension, perhaps the lack of more 
contemporary psychological models reflects a similar 
resistance to death within academic and applied psychology.
According to Schulz (1978) the ’terminal phase of 
life’ begins when an individual with a chronic disease 
receives the prognosis of a constant and swift 
deterioration, with death expected within a limited time 
frame. This is associated with sudden, m.arked declines in 
scores on mental and psychomotor tests, suggesting 
deterioration of the central nervous system and a loss of 
reasonable hope of recovery (Schulz, 1978). However, due to 
advances in modern medical technology, the dying process of
the terminally ill may now be prolonged for periods lasting 
up to several years (Pattison, 1977). Nonetheless, Schulz 
(1978) only considers the last decline from which there 
will be no major remission to be ’the’ terminal phase of 
terminal illness. Thus, although the terms ’terminal 
illness’ and the ’terminal phase of life’ may be used 
interchangeably, they are not necessarily synonymous. 
Moreover, a terminal prognosis implies a shift in emphasis 
of the treatment strategy, i.e. whether to focus on 
alleviating pain and discomfort or prolonging life because 
these treatment goals are often mutually exclusive (Schulz, 
1978). Thus, Schulz’s (1978) definition implies that the 
terminally ill have a conscious awareness of their 
condition and as a result, adopt differing cognitive and 
emotional coping styles. It also recognises the temporal 
dimension of terminal illness and the inherent 
uncertainties and implications of making a terminal 
prognosis. However, as much research has found (notably 
Kubler Ross, 1969 and more recently Richman, 1995) it is 
often difficult to distinguish between what the terminally 
ill individual knows and what he or she is willing to 
accept. As such, there is the role of the individual’s 
psychological defences to consider and the role they play 
in assisting the terminally ill to reduce tension, manage 
anxiety and regulate self-esteem.
In her seminal (1969) publication ’On Death and 
Dying’, Elisabeth Kubler Ross proposed a five stage model 
of the dying process based on observations of 200 
terminally ill persons of which, she believes, 197 
completed all stages prior to death. The stages (to be 
discussed below in greater detail) are as follows: Denial 
and Isolation; Anger; Bargaining; Depression; and 
Acceptance.
The individual’s initial reaction to the awareness of 
their terminal illness is often one of ’Denial and 
Isolation’ due to a temporary state of shock. This is found 
not only in those who are told immediately of their 
terminal prognosis, but also in those who learn of their 
condition much later on in the terminal phase. It is 
usually only a temporary defense which will be gradually 
replaced by partial acceptance as the individual is 
confronted with financial matters, unfinished business and 
the worry of surviving family members. Thus, denial 
possesses an adaptive function serving as a buffer by 
allowing the individual time to collect his/her thoughts 
before dealing with other ’practical’ issues. It is usually 
much later that the individual uses isolation more than 
denial. However, Kubler Ross (1969) does not explicitly 
discuss ’Isolation’ per se and the two (denial and 
isolation) are discussed as a unitary concept in terms of
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’denial’only.
Having realised that denial can no longer be 
maintained, it is replaced predominantly by feelings of 
’Anger’, (the second stage) which is often accompanied by 
rage, resentment and envy. In contrast to the first stage, 
this period is more difficult to cope with for the family 
or hospital staff because the individual’s anger becomes 
displaced and is projected almost randomly onto anyone who 
happens to be within their environment. The individual’s 
realisation of loss is great and those nearby who symbolize 
life, energy and adaptive functioning are particularly 
salient targets of the dying individual’s anger, resentment 
and hostility.
Having been angry with and resentful of others, the 
individual now enters the third stage (’Bargaining’) where 
it is hoped that death can somehow be postponed through a 
process of negotiation, often with ’God’. The individual 
will offer some form of ’good behaviour’ (often religious 
or philanthropic in nature) in return for a few more days, 
weeks, months of life. However, once a specific ’deadline’ 
is reached, the individual begins the bargaining process 
again asking for more time.
’Depression’ is the fourth stage and is the point at
which the individual comes to accept the certainty of their
death. It can be regarded in terms of a preparatory grief,
i.e. the depression acts as a tool for the individual to
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prepare for the loss of all love objects and to help 
disconnect him/her self from these objects. It is during 
this stage that too much interference from visitors trying 
to cheer up the individual (perhaps in an attempt to 
relieve their own anxiety and sense of helplessness) will 
hinder his/her emotional preparation rather than enhance 
it.
Having successfully negotiated the previous stages, 
the fifth and final stage ’Acceptance’, is where the 
individual develops a sense of peace, where he/she is 
neither depressed nor angry about his/her ’fate’. In this 
stage feelings and physical pain may be virtually absent 
and in many cases the person may desire to be left alone.
Kubler Ross (1969) describes this stage as the end of the
dying struggle, the final resting stage before death.
Before evaluating the therapeutic potential of the 
above model, a discussion of Pattison’s (1977) ’Living- 
Dying Interval’ shall follow. As shall be highlighted, 
there are several similarities between the two models and 
conversely, similar limitations. For this reason the two 
models will be evaluated ’side by side’ in a comparative
style, allowing for the potential therapeutic efficacy of
each to be more readily explored and examined.
As with Kubler Ross’s (1969) ’Stages of Dying’,
Pattison’s (1977) ’Living-Dying Interval’ is defined as the
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period between the "crisis knowledge of death” and the 
actual "point of death". This period can be further divided 
into three distinct clinical phases: the ’acute crisis 
phase’; the ’chronic living-dying phase’; and the ’terminal 
phase’.
The ’Acute Phase’ can be understood in terms of the 
"crisis of knowledge of death", and is marked by an 
increase in the individual’s level of anxiety which will 
reach a peak of tolerance (Pattison, 1977, p. 47). 
Therefore, the primary aim during this phase is to reduce 
the level of anxiety through assisting the individual to 
focus upon "reality issues" and provide him/her with 
"appropriate emotional support". If accomplished, the dying 
process of the terminally ill may be "integrated into 
his/her lifestyle and life circumstances". Conversely, "if 
ineffective psychological coping mechanisms are used, a 
disintegrative dying style will follow" (Pattison, 1977, p. 
47). Thus, it is suggested that therapeutic interventions 
based upon the themes of "reality issues" and "appropriate 
emotional support" should assist the terminally ill to 
adopt "appropriate emotional responses" to their living- 
dying phase (Pattison, 1977, p. 48). However, the exact 
nature, manner and timing of these interventions remains 
unclear as well as what precisely is meant by "reality 
issues", "appropriate emotional responses" or even a 
"disintegrative dying style".
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Having passed through the ’Acute Phase’, the 
individual now enters the ’Living-Dying Phase’ where he/she 
faces a number of specific fears concerning their 
terminally ill state. The task is to help the individual in 
separating and resolving each issue as it occurs in order 
to enhance their sense of integrity, dignity and self­
esteem (Pattison, 1977). This may be referred to as 
"healthy dying" (Pattison, 1977, p. 49), Due to the 
parameters of this discussion, it is not possible to 
examine each of the nine specific fears in turn. However, 
this should not detract from the overall understanding and 
conclusions drawn from this discussion, as the nine fears 
are fairly self-explanatory. Nonetheless, for the sake of 
completion and a fuller understanding, the nine fears of 
the ’Living-Dying Phase’ are as follows. The fear of: the 
’Unknown’; ’Loneliness’; ’Sorrow’; ’Loss of
Family/Friends’; ’Loss of Body’; ’Loss of Self Control’;
’Suffering and Pain’; ’Loss of Identity’ and ’Regression’ 
(Pattison, 1977).
The exact onset of the ’Terminal Phase’ of the
’Living-Dying Interval’ is imprecise. However, Pattison
(1977) estimates that it begins when the dying individual
begins to withdraw into him/her self in response to
internal body signals dictating that he/she must now
conserve energy. However, this appears to be a somewhat
circular definition, i.e. the onset of the ’terminal phase’
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is identified by the onset of ’withdrawal’, and the onset 
of ’withdrawal’ identifies the onset of the ’terminal 
phase’. Lastly, the terminal phase is characterised by the 
individual’s transition from maintaining ’expectational 
hope’ (a set of expectations with the possibility for 
fulfillment) to ’desirable hope’ (a desirable thought which 
is no longer expectable) (Stotland, 1969). This seems to 
refer to the point at which the individual’s use of 
psychological defence mechanisms are replaced by a 
realistic acceptance of their terminal condition.
It appears that although Kubler Ross’s (1969) stage 
model has some degree of clinical utility in identifying 
(probable) key psychological, emotional and transitional 
states within the dying process, it provides little 
therapeutic value in terms of proposing how these stages 
can be constructively managed and negotiated via 
therapeutic practice. A further and central limitation is 
its very conceptualisation of a ’stage’ model, of what has 
been explicitly acknowledged as a dying process. Thus, with 
its emphasis upon particular cognitive and emotional 
responses occurring at designated ’stages’ in a purely 
linear fashion, it appears to be a somewhat restricting and 
prescriptive model. Hence, as Schulz and Aderman (1974) 
concluded, patients were not observed to go through stages 
but to adopt a fairly stable pattern of behaviour which
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persisted until death. Furthermore, it assumes that each 
stage is mutually exclusive; e.g. it is not possible to 
have an angry denial or to feel depressed whilst 
bargaining. As Pattison (1977) has pointed out, many 
medical professionals have spoke of people not dying "in 
the right order" or of not reacting in the "right way". 
Thus, such an inflexible framework provided through its 
narrow parameters seems, to some extent, to hinder 
therapeutic practice which arguably may have detrimental 
effects upon the individual’s dying experience.
As stated above, there are several parallels to be 
drawn between the models of Kubler Ross (1969) and Pattison 
(1977). Specifically, in terms of their recognition of the 
temporal dimension of terminal illness, the possible 
resulting cognitive, behavioural and emotional responses 
and not least, the somewhat artificiality of their terminal 
sub-divisions combined with their lack of explicitly 
acknowledging contextual variables. However, it would be 
inaccurate to suggest that Pattison’s ’phases’ are merely 
synon^ a^ns for Kubler Ross’s ’stages’. Pattison’s (1977) 
model is not as prescriptive in that it does not propose a 
definite linear sequence of resultant cognitions and 
emotions but rather, is presented more as a general 
framework through which to understand the terminally ill 
and facilitate therapeutic practice. However, it also needs
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to be acknowledged that Kubler Ross herself feels that she 
has been misread and that she too, recognises the 
importance of individual variation in the dying process 
(Kubler Ross, 1974).
In lending a degree of support to Pattison’s (1977) 
model, it appears that some recent research findings have 
identified common themes and have suggested both styles and 
aims of therapeutic practice. Specifically, Ishimaya’s 
’Meaningful Life Therapy’ (1990) concludes that accepting 
the fear of death, facing reality and refocusing attention 
are all key factors involved in facilitating therapeutic 
practice with the terminally ill. Also, Richman (1995) 
found that enriching the last days of life, dealing with 
unfinished business and increasing family and social 
cohesion serve as a preparation for a truly ’good death’.
In terms of requirements for a new model, Corr (1993)
proposes that it should emphasise fostering empowerment and
participation in shared aspects of coping with dying
between the terminally ill, their family and primary care
givers. As such, Corr (1993) argues that this would help to
bolster the self-esteem, of the terminally ill whilst
reducing their anxiety, as well as providing an emotionally
supportive network for family and care givers where
feelings of loss, grief and helplessness can be expressed
and shared in a containable manner. Similarly, Doka (1995)
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and Sarwer and Crawford (1994) suggest that a new model 
would emphasise that no coping style is inherently 
preferable,reaffirm the individuality of responses and 
recognise the complexity of the terminal illness process. 
However, it remains unclear as to what extent any existing 
’Western’ model of the dying process would facilitate 
therapeutic practice with a non-Western culture or 
religion. For instance, would a Buddhist, whose core 
beliefs centre around the notion of the ’self’ being at the 
root of all suffering, have a fear of loss of ’identity’, 
’body’, or the ’unknown’ as Pattison’s (1977) model 
suggests?
Thus, the dying process is not merely a universally 
homogeneous period of biologically ’winding down’ but 
rather, is a complex multi-faceted transitional period of 
inextricably linked physiological, psychological, 
emotional, social and cultural variables. Cumulatively, 
these variables influence the individual’s perception, 
management and mediation of their terminal illness process. 
As Walter (1997) states, the manner of our dying is 
affected not only by our culture but also by the social 
institutions that process our dying. Therefore, a more 
adaptive, less ethnocentric model is required which could 
be applied cross-culturally, acknowledging the context in 
which both the dying process and therapeutic practice
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occur. Thus, through identifying the salient physiological, 
psychological, social, cultural, and religious/spiritual 
variables, such a ’fluid’ model would explicitly and 
purposely emphasise the phenomenology of the dying process, 
rather than serve as an afterthought to a ’one size fits 
all ’ type m.odel. As such, the meanings given to the 
transition of the dying process and to death itself could 
be clarified and explored further where any assumptions of 
a prescriptive stage model are avoided. Through its 
therapeutic application, such a framework possesses the 
potential to benefit not only the terminally ill but also 
their families and the endeavours of related professions 
through which the understanding of, and care for, the 
terminally ill is provided.
17
References :
Corr, C.A. (1993) "Coping with Dying: Lessons that we 
Should and Should not Learn from the Work of Elisabeth 
Kubler-Ross: Challenges to Death Education and 
Counselling". Death Studies 17, (1) 69-83.
Doka, K.J. (1995) "Coping with Life Threatening Illness: A 
task Model". Omega Journal of Death and Dying 32, (2) 111-
122.
Fromm, E. (1955) ” The Same Society”. New York; Fawcett.
Ishimaya, I.F. (1990) "Meaningful Life Therapy: Use of 
Morita Therapy Principles in Treating Patients with Cancer 
and Intractable Diseases”. International Bulletin of Morita 
Therapy 3, (2) 77-84.
Kubler-Ross, E. (1969) "On Death and Dying”. London; 
Tavistock Publications.
Kubler-Ross, E. (1974) "Questions and Answers on Death and 
Dying". London; MacMillan.
18
Laungani, P. & Young, B. (1997) "Conclusions: Implications 
for Practice and Policy". In C. Murray Partes, P. Laungani, 
B. Young (Eds.) Death and Bereavement Across Cultures, 
London; Routledge.
Pattison, E.M. (1977) "The Experience of Dying", London; 
Prentice-Hall International.
Richman, J. (1995) "From Despair to Integrity: An 
Eriksonian Approach to Psychotherapy for the Terminally 
111". Psychotherapy 32, (2) 317-322.
Sarwer, D.B. and Crawford, I. (1994) "Therapeutic 
Considerations for Work with Persons with HIV Disease". 
Psychotherapy 31, (2) 262-269.
Schulz, R. (1978) "The Psychology of Deaths Dying^ and 
Bereavement". London; Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
Schulz, R. and Aderman, D. (1974) "Clinical Research and 
the Stages of Dying". Omega Journal of Death and Dying 5, 
137-143.
Stotland, E. (1969) "The Psychology of Hope", San 
Francisco; Jossey-Bass.
19
Walter, T. (1997) "Secularization” in C. Murray Parkes, P 
Laungani, B. Youfig (Eds.) Death and Bereavement Across 
Cultures, London; Routledge.
20
In cognitive therapy, therapeutic change is not 
dependent upon the therapeutic system of 
delivery but on the active components which 
directly challenge the client’s faulty 
appraisals
Abstract
This paper discusses how the exploration of meaning within CBT is central to 
therapeutic change. It briefly outlines the model, its underlying epistemology and 
the nature of the therapeutic relationship and interventions. It concludes that 
therapeutic change occurs through a mutually facultative interaction of its “system 
of delivery” and its “active components” through challenging the meanings which 
serve to reinforce an individual’s distress.
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"Men are not moved by things, but by the views they take of 
them". - Epictetus, lAD.
The profundity of the above quotation made by the 
Stoic moralist Epictetus nearly two thousand years ago, 
lies not only in its universality but in its capturing the 
very essence of what underpins and reinforces all human 
emotions, cognitions and behaviour and in turn, all 
theoretical frameworks, paradigms and modalities of psycho­
logical therapy, i.e. the centrality of meaning within all 
human activities, processes and experiences. It is found 
within and ranges from the everyday to the extraordinary, 
the lay understanding to the scientific theory, the 
normative to the pathological, the idiographic to the 
nomothetic, the acute to the chronic, etc. In short, people 
are not simply passive stimulus-response mechanisms or 
even, more elaborate information-processing systems but 
rather, driven by affect, they are active constructors of 
meaning (Greenberg & Pascual-Leone, 1997).
All human behaviour is meaningful behaviour, involving 
’active agents’ with intentions and expectations 
communicating and interacting with other equally ’active 
agents’ (Van Langenhove, 1995). This involves an ongoing 
and reciprocal dialectic between a consciously mediated 
conceptualization (reason) and an automatic immediate
22
experiencing (emotion) (Greenberg & Pascual-Leone, 1997) .
In other words, the meaning making process and its end 
results are phenomenological and interpretative in nature 
involving both the ’head and the heart’. As Beck (197 6, p. 
47) states; "meaning provides the richness of life; it 
transforms a simple event into an experience". This notion 
is central to ’Cognitive Behavioural Therapy’ (CBT) which 
is based upon the assumption that emotional reactions are 
mediated through meanings given to experience. Therefore, 
how an individual appraises a situation is ultimately 
deemed to determine how they experience life in both 
behavioural and emotional terms (Corrie & Milton, 2000).
For this reason, emotions are crucial in therapy because 
they highlight a person’s automatic appraisal of themself, 
others and the world around them informing them that an 
important need, goal or value may be achieved or threatened 
in a given situation (Frijda, 1986). In short, it is a 
primary meaning system providing affective feedback on 
states of body and mind (Greenberg & Pascual-Leone, 1997). 
However, "specific disorders and subtypes of distress 
cannot be distinguished on the basis of emotional content; 
they can be differentiated by the type of cognitive 
distortion and its behavioural concomitants" (Corrie & 
Milton, 2000, p. 14).
^ The goal of CBT is to alter maladaptive emotional
responses by transforming dysfunctional meanings to
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adaptive ones as well as the processes that guide them 
(Teasdale, 1997). In other words, the client is helped to 
refashion patterns of meaning that are consistently biased 
in ways that reinforce their distress. As such, the client 
is assisted to identify and modify their interpretative 
biases, empowering them to explore new ways of ’being-in- 
the-world’ (Corrie & Milton, 2000). However, CBT does not 
propose that cognitive processes ’cause’ distress in any 
simplistic and linear way. Rather, cognitions are believed 
to represent the primary modality of dysfunction in 
distress and, therefore, the most appropriate focus for 
change (Corrie & Milton, 2000). As Callanan (1992) has 
argued, CBT proposes that we learn to think just as we 
learn to behave.
In terms of the present discussion, the question 
concerns whether the goal of CBT is facilitated through the 
’system of delivery’’ (the ’how’) the ’’active components’’ 
(the ’what’) or a combination of both. However, in order to 
fully address this question and place this discussion into 
context, it is necessary to begin by briefly outlining CBT, 
its epistemological assumptions and its proposed methods of 
facilitating therapeutic redress. This will comprise 
discussion of aspects of both the ’how’ and the ’what’ of 
CBT preceding the evaluations and conclusions made.
CBT represents a hybrid or synthesis of models of
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cognitive processes and behavioural strategies with the aim 
of achieving both behavioural and cognitive change (Dobson 
& Block, 1988). It provides the client with the opportunity 
for new adaptive learning, where problem-solving in a 
collaborative fashion forms a central aspect of treatment 
(Hawton et al., 1989). Thus, it provides a framework 
through which clients can learn to identify and challenge 
aspects of their experience previously accepted as 
’absolutes’ (Corrie & Milton, 2000). The strategies and 
techniques employed, aim to relieve overt symptoms, develop 
new coping strategies and modify interpretative biases that 
both alleviate distress in the short-term and lessen the 
risk of future difficulties (Corrie & Milton, 2000).
In terms of its temporal focus, it concentrates 
primarily upon clients’ current issues and difficulties and 
the immediate factors maintaining them, rather than with 
earlier possible aetiological links and processes. Therapy 
is also time limited (usually 8 to 12 sessions) although 
there may be some variations in treatment policies between 
differing service provision contexts. The therapist’s 
interventions have a strong psycho-educational element (at 
least in the earlier stages of therapy) so that specific 
skills can be learned, practiced and then generalised to a 
wider range of contexts in order to meet the client’s 
specific requirements in line with their treatment goals 
identified and agreed upon during the assessment interview 
(Corey, 1991). This is where CBT differs significantly from
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other therapies, i.e. it is action-oriented and is aimed 
directly at altering those particular constellations of 
thoughts and behaviour which are deemed to be maladaptive, 
debilitating and irrational (Davison & Neale, 1974). A full 
cognitive assessment involves linking the following: early 
experience; underlying beliefs and assumptions; critical 
incidents; automatic thoughts, images and memories; 
emotions; physiological reactions and behaviour (Hackmann, 
1997).
Treatment goals may range from the specific such as;
’I would like to drive over the bridge to get to work and 
back’ to the more general such as; ’I would like to feel 
less self-conscious'. However, whatever the nature of the 
treatment goals is, it must be mutually agreed upon between 
therapist and client in order for treatment to commence, 
although they should be made as specific and detailed as 
possible. This has several inherent therapeutic advantages. 
Thus, it facilitates an open and shared agenda, makes 
therapy expectations explicit, emphasises the possibilities 
for change, is optimistic in nature, imposes a treatment 
structure, reinforces the notion of the client’s own self­
empowerment, prepares the client for discharge (usually 
when the goal has been achieved) and finally, provides some 
quantitative measure of change and a means for the 
evaluation of treatment outcomes (Hawton et al., 1989). Now 
that an assessment has been carried out and the client’s
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treatment goal(s) have been identified and agreed upon, how 
does the therapeutic process take place within CBT? This is 
discussed in detail below.
Beck (197 6) suggested that an individual’s internal 
reality is made up of meanings, significances and imagery. 
Greenberger and Padesky (1995) argued that in order to 
understand a person’s strong emotions, their words, images 
and memories which accompany them need to be studied. Thus, 
the examination of clients’ beliefs and biases forms a 
central concern of CBT (Ellis & Whiteley, 1979). This 
process of exploration and clarification comprises both the 
’’system of delivery’ and the ’’active components’’ such as 
the client’s between session ’homework’ assignments. These 
tasks may involve asking the client to record diaries of 
anxiety levels, complete ’antecedent, behaviour, 
consequence’ (ABC) charts or engage in otEen self­
monitoring exercises and/or behavioural experiments. These 
are usually reviewed at the beginning of each session where 
any contextual factors, patterns, themes, links and/or 
processes may be identified and explored further. For 
example, it may be identified that the client who 
experiences panic attacks and overall high levels of 
anxiety may feel increasingly self-conscious and anxious 
when in the company of strangers rather than when he/she is 
with friends or family with whom they are well acquainted. 
Thus, an engagement with such "active components" (set
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within the "system of delivery") may help to narrow and 
focus the scope of psychological inquiry. In turn, this 
will aid the therapeutic process through expanding upon 
both the therapist’s and the client’s understandings of the 
client’s difficulties as well as informing the treatment 
programme which gives a likely indication of possible 
prognosis. As a result, this also has the potential to 
strengthen the therapeutic relationship as well as 
facilitate a greater depth of rapport and the client’s 
belief in the treatment process. Hopefully, this will lead 
to a ’virtuous cycle’ within the treatment process, i.e. 
where any achievement of short term goals bolsters the 
client’s sense of self-esteem and self-efficacy, 
facilitating further therapeutic developments with the 
aim of achieving a successful treatment outcome in terms of 
the specified therapeutic goals.
Within the CBT model, there are thought to be several 
aspects or ’layers’ of meaning which incorporate a person’s 
internal reality. The first layer contains conscious 
thoughts, ’negative automatic thoughts’ (NAT’s) images and 
impressions. An NAT is characterised by the following 
features: they occur spontaneously; are difficult to stop; 
may follow no logical sequence; may not arise from 
reasoning or reflecting upon a situation; are affect laden; 
appear reasonable or plausible; occur despite evidence to 
the contrary and reflect underlying assumptions (Fetch,
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1999). The second layer comprises conditional and 
unconditional underlying assumptions. These are usually 
conditional rules for behaviour which suggest or inform 
strategies for negotiating and managing life in light of 
the individual’s core beliefs (Hackmann, 1997). These often 
take the form of "if - then" rules, e.g. "If I am not 
always friendly then people will reject me’’. Lastly, the 
third layer of meaning contains the traumatic memories 
themselves around which, underlying core beliefs were 
formed or strengthened usually during early childhood 
(Hackmann, 1997). A core belief is an ’absolute’ and 
generalised statement from which conditional and 
unconditional assumptions are formed which in turn, leads 
to the development of NAT’s. For an ’autonomous’ individual 
Beck’s (1976) conceptualisation of a person whose self­
esteem is based around success and control - an example of 
a core belief would be; "I am inadequate’’. For a ’ socio­
tropic ’ individual (a person whose self-esteem is based 
around forming loving relationships) an example would be 
something like; ’I am unattractive”. Using an analogy, 
Greenberger and Padesky (1995) state that the ’surface 
weeds’ (NAT’s and images) and their ’deeper roots’ (under­
lying beliefs and assumptions) of the meanings given to 
events need to be tackled during therapy if any therapeutic 
change is to take place. These different aspects or layers 
of meaning will be explored at different times throughout 
the therapeutic process, usually beginning with the
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conscious thoughts, NAT’s and related images and 
progressing in order to identify deeper meanings in the 
forms of underlying assumptions and core beliefs. A useful 
way in which underlying assumptions and core beliefs can be 
elicited for further exploration is through the ’downward 
arrow technique’ - one means within the "system of 
delivery" (Greenberger & Padesky, 1995). Here, the 
therapist focuses upon an NAT (e.g. "I can’t do anything 
right. I’m a total failure") and then asks questions such 
as; "If that is true, what does that mean for you?" In 
response, the client might say; "then everybody would think 
I’m stupid and make fun out of me" (the underlying 
assumption). Again, the therapist would ask what that would 
mean for the client, to which they might respond "I am 
inadequate" (the core belief). Thus, this exploratory 
process facilitates the identification of meanings within 
meanings allowing the therapist access to the client’s 
world. Through this "system of delivery" the client’s 
experientially construed and negotiated ’reality’ can be 
engaged with in increasing depth, where paradoxes, 
inconsistencies and contradictions in the client’s 
thinking, feeling and behaviour can be accessed and 
explored further.
In pursuit of treatment efficacy, the various 
techniques that the model uses are founded upon an 
’experimentally derived scientific view’ of human
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behaviour. As such, its theory and procedures 
(incorporating both the "system of delivery" and the 
"active components") rely upon experimental data analyses 
in order to confirm or refute their reliability and 
validity (Spinelli, 1994). This is a defining character­
istic of CBT, where the continuing development of 
research, theory and practice are inextricably linked, i.e. 
a specific technique or procedure must show statistically 
significant results and be based within a governing 
theoretical framework. The data produced from such 
experiments and/or clinical practice is used to revise 
existing theories or leads to the development of new ones 
where further empirical research is required.
Paradoxically, whereas the epistemology of CBT has a 
clearly firm empiricist basis, with its emphasis upon data 
collection and analyses (which is almost always 
quantitative in nature) for the continuing development of 
its theory, techniques and procedures, its comparatively 
recent developments have led to the integration of a 
constructivist epistemology. This perspective asserts that 
humans actively create and construe their personal and 
social realities, emphasising the active and interpretative 
aspects of human cognitive processes (Von Glaserfield,
1984). This approach is evident in the CBT model of 
emotional disorders. Here, the key features are as follows; 
individuals actively construct their reality through a 
process of selecting, filtering and interpreting internal
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and external stimuli, leading to the attribution of 
idiosyncratic meanings to events which in turn, results in 
maladaptive emotional and behavioural responses (Fetch, 
1999). Arguably, this epistemological incongruence is due 
in part, to the historical development of CBT, with its 
roots in the behaviourism of B.F. Skinner and J.B. Watson. 
Conversely, there is the political dimension to consider 
and the part it plays in informing research, theory- 
practice links.
Briefly, the notion of a ’proven’ theoretical 
framework of psychological therapy which will hopefully 
lead to a successful treatment outcome, is becoming an 
increasingly important feature in the financing of 
psychological health-care service provision. This is 
especially the case with regards to treatments financed 
through insurance companies where ’evidence-based practice’ 
(EBP) is an ever-present catch-phrase. Thus, due to its 
empiricist basis and its professional standing as the 
’treatment of choice’ for many psychological disorders, CBT 
may appear as the most cost-effective and ’user-friendly’ 
framework of therapy for psychological health-care 
purchasers. Although this political dimension is a separate 
but related issue to all frameworks of therapy, the remit 
of the present discussion does not allow space for its 
further exploration. The next section addresses the 
therapeutic relationship within CBT (one aspect of the
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"system of delivery") and how this may help to facilitate 
therapeutic change.
Within every theoretical framework of therapy, the 
therapeutic relationship above everything else, forms the 
basis upon which any therapeutic change or development can 
take place. Within CBT, the nature of the therapeutic 
relationship and the mode of therapist - client interaction 
and coitmiunication that it fosters, is often referred to as 
’collaborative empiricism’. Put simply, this refers to the 
therapist and client working as a team where the therapist 
facilitates the client in testing their constituted reality 
against the data of their experience (Edwards, 1990) . 
However, the client’s ’distorted’ reality actively focuses 
upon selected excerpts of their total experience where 
certain elements are discounted, minimised or simply 
ignored because they do not mesh with the client’s 
underlying beliefs and assumptions. In short, beliefs are 
maintained over and above experience to the contrary 
possibly because the ’contrary’ elements pose a threat to 
the individual’s sense of identity. Thus, the ’empiricism’ 
which is necessary to challenge such strongly held and 
ingrained beliefs and assumptions, refers to the client’s 
daily experimentation, where they may reflect more fully 
upon their experience and evaluate whether it matches their 
beliefs and their ’reality’ as they previously construed it 
(Edwards, 1990). A key means through which this process of
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meaning transformation works within CBT is called ’Socratic 
Questioning’. It involves the therapist asking the client 
questions about which they have the knowledge to answer, 
but by drawing their attention to significant information 
which is outside of their current range of focus (Hackmann, 
1997). This allows the client to engage in a process of 
’self-challenging’ and re-evaluation in the light of the 
’new’ data. Padesky (1993) asserts that there are two forms 
of Socratic questioning; ’changing minds’ and ’guiding 
discovery’. Using ’changing minds’ involves the use of 
questions to directly produce evidence that will invalidate 
the client’s NAT’s, underlying assumptions and core 
beliefs. By contrast, ’guiding discovery’ is less linear 
and does not focus upon producing evidence to refute the 
irrationality of the client’s beliefs per se. Rather, its 
purpose is for the client themself, to discover wider 
perspectives and diverse meanings to their experiences 
(Padesky, 1993). In order to achieve this, the therapist’s 
questions are framed in a more exploratory manner so that 
the client is helped along to ’think things through’ 
for him/herself in a truly inductive fashion. This has 
increased therapeutic potential as it centres around and 
highlights the client’s capacity for self-empowerment, 
rather than being ’shown’ the selective and biased manner 
of their thinking in a more tutorial and didactic way.
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Implicit in this process of reflection and exploration 
about the ’contents’ of the client’s internal reality, are 
accompanying changes to the client’s metacognition, i.e. 
the beliefs that he/she has about their mental processes 
(Hackmann, 1997). For example, a hypervigilent mother who 
believes that to worry less and become less anxious would 
mean that she did not love her children as much, is a 
metacognition around which other meanings and experiences 
are shaped. Thus, through engaging in a process of 
reflecting upon and evaluating the meanings given to their 
metacognition, the client learns that their thoughts, 
images and beliefs are not facts and as such, do not 
necessarily represent ’reality’ (Hackmann, 1997). However, 
for thope clients with long-standing sedimented beliefs and 
assumptions, to engage in a process where they may lose all 
previous sense of certainty and order (and in a sense their 
notion of ’reality’) may be a very disorienting and
distressing process requiring great skill and sensitivity 
on part of the therapist (Hackmann, 1997). Assisting the 
client in an evaluation of their own metacognitive 
processes is central to the "system of delivery" where the 
meaning that is given to their meaning-making processes and 
how this informs their phenomenology of self, others and 
the world may be accessed, understood and challenged where 
necessary.
To conclude, this discussion has centred around the 
notion that meaning is central to all human experiences,
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behaviours and emotions, that it is phenomenological in 
nature and that CBT is based upon this very premise, i.e. 
that emotional reactions and behaviours are mediated 
through meanings given to experience. In terms of 
facilitating therapeutic change within CBT, it is clear 
that this involves a synthesis of its "system of delivery" 
and its "active components". Specifically, there is a 
complex and reciprocal relationship/interaction between the 
two, i.e. the client’s engagement with the "system of 
delivery" (concerned with metacognition, the meaning making 
process and the resulting phenomenology of self and 
experience) facilitates or assists in their participation 
with the "active components" (concerned with techniques or 
other self-help assignments aimed at furthering the 
exploration and clarification of their meanings, around 
which their difficulties have developed and are 
maintained). In turn, this provides further data to be 
explored via the system of delivery and so on. Lastly, 
through this reciprocal interplay, a therapeutic 
progression develops where meanings may be challenged and 
then transformed resulting in more adaptive and self- 
empowering emotional and behavioural responses. Thus, 
emotion is integrated with reason, providing a more 
balanced response than facilitated by either emotion or 
reason alone (Greenberg & Pascual-Leone, 1997) .
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Critically evaluate the concept of 
‘Transference’ 
in relation to therapeutic practice.
Abstract
This paper outlines the historical development of the term Transference and bases 
its critique upon Freud’s (1912) ‘classical’ definition. It discusses the possible 
implications upon the therapeutic relationship/process when the concept is put to 
use and conversely, when it is abandoned. Finally, it presents an existential- 
phenomenological counter-theory to account for interpersonal phenomena that the 
Transference hypothesis was originally proposed to explain.
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Is this just real life 
or is it phantasy?"
Freddie Mercury (1975)
In terms of questioning the psychoanalytic concept of
transference, the above quotation from the Queen song
’Bohemian Rhapsody’ neatly encapsulates the main theme
presented in this discussion. Thus, is transference ’real’
or if not, is it a cleverly constructed self-serving
phantasy purported and maintained by therapists? Also, how
and in what ways does the transference relationship differ
from the so called ’real’ relationship, how are they to be
readily identified and distinguished and what are the
implications upon therapeutic process/practice when the
concept is put to use? In other words, for whose and what
purposes does the concept serve and what does this mean for
both therapist and client? These are questions which the
present discussion shall endeavour to provide answers to as
well as provide some alternative perspectives. As such,
this critique considers transference in terms of the
relationship between philosophy, theory and therapy
regarding them as inextricably linked. In short, it
concerns an epistemological level of enquiry which goes
beyond the intellectual in acknowledging the possible
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implications upon the therapeutic relationship and process. 
Conversely, it shall briefly consider the implications for 
both client and therapist when the concept is abandoned. 
However, although as with other psychoanalytic concepts, 
there is a fair degree of ’elasticity' in how they are to 
be defined and understood, it is Freud’s final (1912) 
’classical’ definition of transference (see below) that 
will form the basis for discussion and critique. Due to the 
number of psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, psychotherapists, 
psychologists and counsellors employing this term today and 
its frequency of appearing in contemporary therapeutic 
literature and training handbooks, it is a worthwhile 
exercise to consider the concept’s theoretical and 
therapeutic validity and efficacy.
The history of transference is a complex and
fragmented one. It has produced some contentious and
polarised debates amongst psychoanalysts of different
schools capturing the divisiveness inherent to the
profession’s relatively short history as well as its
standing today. Competing psychoanalytic frameworks define
the concept differently emphasising some aspects over
others, with its importance having a greater or lesser
significance within the process of psychoanalysis itself.
For instance, Jung’s concept of transference was inspired
by what he called the ’marriage quaternio’, Buber (1922)
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defined it within the framework of ’I-It' and 'I-Thou’ 
attitudes and Klein (1952) saw it as a process of 
assimilating internal objects and internal object relations 
from infancy to external reality. However, it is through 
the insight and inspired writings of Freud where the 
concept began and where it was defined and re-defined over 
a period of 17 years.
The term ’transference’ (Ubertragung) first appeared 
in 1895 in ’Studies on Hysteria’ (Freud & Breuer, 1895) 
described in terms of a ’false connection’. It next 
appeared in ’The Interpretation of Dreams’ (1900) where it 
is defined as an ’intrapsychic process’ (Smith, 1991). This 
is followed by its appearance in the case presentation of 
Dora (1905) where it is now ’a special class of mental 
structures’ and not a process. Next, it appears in Freud’s 
’Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis’ (1910) where it is 
defined as a process of the client displaying positive 
emotion to the therapist ’which is based on no real 
relation between them’ (Smith, 1991). Finally, in 1912 
Freud’s definition proposed in ’The Dynamics of the 
Transference’ remains what is still today’s readily 
accepted ’classical’ definition.
Briefly, it is defined as the psychological process by
which feelings, attitudes and wishes originally linked with
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important figures in one's earlier life are projected onto 
others who have come to represent them in current life 
(Kreeger, 1970). Thus, a displacement has taken place 
whereby feelings, defences and impulses to a person in the 
past have been 'transferred' onto a person in the present. 
It is a new edition of an old object relationship 
(Greenson,1967). More specifically, it is a hypothetical 
intrapsychic process to explain why clients display strong 
emotional reactions towards their therapists whether these 
are positive (e.g. love) or negative (e.g. hate) in nature. 
It involves repeating instead of remembering and functions 
as a defence against painful feelings, frustrated desires 
and needs (Greenson, 1967). Its central and pivotal role 
within psychoanalytic theory and practice cannot be 
underestimated (Smith, 1991).
Its function within psychoanalysis, is for the
therapist to decypher the meaning of the client's emotional
reactions and through the therapeutic relationship,
"challenge the client's fixed negative interpretations of
early experiences by fostering more positive and accepting
ones" (Spinelli, 1995, p. 271). Thus, the transference
hypothesis asserts that the client's currently experienced
emotions, thoughts and behaviour "may be unconsciously
influenced, coloured and distorted by earlier childhood
experiences especially those with parents" (Holmes &
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Lindley, 1989, p. 116). Most importantly, transference is a 
causal hypothesis to explain a class of phenomenon, it is 
not to be understood as the phenomenon itself. 
Unfortunately, many contemporary therapists have confused 
the distinction between the observed phenomenon and its 
hypothetical cause so that 'transference' has become the 
phenomenon (Smith, 1991). But what exactly is this class of 
phenomenon and how shall it be distinguished from clients' 
non-transferential responses?
In attempting to provide a straightforward definition 
that is both theoretically and therapeutically coherent, 
Greenson (1967) in his text 'The Technique of Psycho­
analysis' proposes that transference is an instance of the 
client's 'inappropriate^ emotional responses towards 
his/her therapist. Conversely, responses that are 'mature', 
'realistic', 'or in accord with the circumstances' are not 
considered transferential and are therefore, 'appropriate' 
(Greenson, 1967). Thus, transference is similar to other 
concepts such as delusion, illusion and phantasy: each is 
defined through a contrast with 'reality' (Szasz, 1963). 
However, as Smith (1991) has discussed, the basis upon 
which transference interpretations are made rests upon a 
prior assumption of unconscious fantasies which in turn, 
are 'proved' by the therapists's transference
interpretations! Therefore, it is a circular theory which
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is self-validating and unfalsifiable (Smith, 1991). This 
'chicken and egg' type scenario now leads the therapist, 
client and the therapeutic process into a theoretical cul- 
de-sac of appropriateness vs. inappropriateness. More 
insidiously perhaps, it is not merely a neutral description 
of the client's emotional responsiveness but rather, the 
therapist's value judgment of the client's in-session 
behaviour (Szasz, 1963). Leaving the implications of this 
last point to one side for a moment, by what processes or 
through which mechanisms is the therapist able to determine 
what is 'appropriate' or 'inappropriate' and therefore what 
is transference and what is not?
It has been suggested that the most obvious means of
determining this is by the therapist's own self-reflective
abilities (Smith, 1991). However, such a seemingly
straightforward claim appears to be a psychoanalytic
double-standard and one which is entirely incongruent with
the theory it purports as 'truth'. In short, Freudian
psychoanalysis maintains that humans are not able to know
their "deepest emotional yearnings directly" (Smith, 1991,
p. 35). Therefore, it seems to be a problematic assertion
that the therapist is able to know his/her deepest fears
and desires through a process of introspection whereas the
client is not (Smith, 1991). However, the psychoanalytic
'party line' to this conundrum is that their own analysis
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whilst in training is the crucial differentiating factor
(Smith, 1991). Unfortunately, this line of argument spirals
the discussion downwards even further. Thus, given that
there are a wide range of differing psychoanalytic schools
of thought, each proposing its own set of 'universal
truths' concerning unconscious mental life, it would be
expected that there should be a high degree of consensus
about some basic psychic processes, structures and
principles (Smith, 1991). Paradoxically, their philosophies
are mutually exclusive and therefore, the notion that a
'fully' analysed analyst knows the full content and nature
of his/her own mind falls apart (Smith, 1991). In other
words, different psychoanalysts such as Freudians,
Jungians, Kohutians and Kleinians all propose different
models of the mind and have different conceptions about how
psychoanalysis 'works'. Therefore, without full agreement
on at least some basic (and supposedly universal) issues
(such as the Oedipus complex) there is certainly no such
thing as a 'fully' analysed analyst. As such, it is a gross
misnomer for a therapist to suggest that he/she can
'objectively' determine transference from non-transference
through a process of his/her own self-reflection. Thus, it
is not possible to know 'a priori' within a Freudian
framework that some emotion is being transferred; "the
procedure is inductive in spirit" (Smith, 1991, p. 45) .
Moreover, Freud himself was unable to distinguish between
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'transference love' and 'genuine love' (Spinelli, 1995).
A number of writers (e.g. Winnicott, 1965; Schlein,
1984; Smith, 1991) have suggested that therapists use the
concept of transference defensively, i.e. to protect
themselves from the anxiety of the emotional impact of the
interaction with the client as well as allowing themselves
to abdicate responsibility for their own in-session
behaviour and its effects upon the client (Handley, 1995).
This value judgment concerning the 'appropriateness' of
clients' emotional responses, heightens an already
established power imbalance which is skewed in favour of
the therapist from the beginning. Schlein (1984, p. 17 6)
states that "for the professional, it is a tradition, a
convenience, a shield, stock-in-trade, a revealed truth
and a habit of thought". In other words, the therapist is
able to conveniently and effectively 'remove' him/herself
from the immediacy of the current therapeutic encounter and
minimise the client's in-session emotional reactions
(Handley, 1995). Furthermore, this may mean that the
therapist is not able to fully engage with the client's
emotions or even his/her own once the concept has been put
to use. As such, the therapist is able to rest in a
detached 'non-relational' limbo where he/she can neither
give nor receive fully. This is why transference
interpretations are so easily and so often used; they
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provide a ready-made opportunity for putting the client at 
arm’s length (Szasz, 1963). As such, it permits the 
therapist to place himself "beyond the reality-testing of 
patients, colleagues or himself" (Szasz, 1963). It has also 
been suggested by Smith (1991) that it places an 
unsustainable burden upon the self-knowledge and integrity 
of the therapist. Along a similar line of discussion, 
Winnicott (1965) states that the therapeutic relationship 
places therapists under a great deal of strain to avoid 
attempting to gratify their clients’ expressed desires.
"One way that therapists can alleviate this strain is by 
interpreting these desires as instances of transference" 
(Winnicott, 1965, p. 72). But what are the implications 
upon the therapeutic process and relationship once the 
therapist ’removes’ him/herself from the intensity of the 
’here and now'? Conversely, how can it be logically assumed 
that an emotional response which duplicates an earlier one 
is necessarily a 'repetition'?
This point has been argued at length by Schlein
(1984). He states that it is a fallacy to assume a causal
connection between a previous response/event and a current
one. A fitting analogy he makes is that a lemon that tastes
sour at age 30 does not taste sour because another lemon
tasted sour at age 10: lemons always taste sour, the first
time and all following times and for the same reason
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(Handley, 1995). By extension, a therapist "is loved for 
what makes him lovable, hated for what makes him hateful 
and all shades in between...but understanding and 
misunderstanding will, I believe, account for the major 
affects of love and hate" (Schlein, 1984, p. 174). Thus, 
Schlein's argument is based firmly within the reciprocal 
interplay between therapist and client in the experiential 
context of the current therapeutic encounter. It is 
relational and experiential and as such, remains open to 
the possibilities of emotion being expressed, shared and 
engaged with by both therapist and client in the 'here and 
now' of therapy. From this perspective, there is nothing to 
be 'transferred' and no difference between a transference 
relationship and a 'real' relationship. This dichotomy 
between repetitions and resonances forms the basis of the 
next section of this critique which will offer an 
alternative view of transference from an existential- 
phenomenological perspective.
Medard Boss (1963) has argued that the central
difficulty to the concept of transference lies in its
implication that there are "some independently existing
affects which can be detached from the mental object-
representation to which they adhered originally" (Boss,
1963, p. 122). In other words, a person's emotional
responses were specific and meaningful for that moment in
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time towards that particular individual or situation and 
are therefore ’non-transferable’. Boss (1963) goes further 
by stating that it implies a Cartesian split between 
therapist and client as separate isolated individuals not 
in relation to each other whereas "relatedness is an 
inescapable aspect of human being-in-the-world" (Boss,
1979, p. 271). Moreover, Boss (1963) refutes the notion 
that a client's feelings toward his/her therapist are not 
genuine but rather, regards it more as a manner of relating 
rather than one of 'appropriateness'. Thus, if a client is 
regarded as behaving in an infantile manner, this does not 
detract from the genuineness of the emotions expressed 
(Boss, 1963). Furthermore, he states that the "child like 
modes of behaviour which sprout for the first time in the 
analysand-analyst relationship" should be viewed as a 
crucial starting point from which therapy can progress 
(Boss, 1963, p. 257). Thus, Boss's argument does not impose 
a value judgment upon the client's manner of relating that 
will impinge upon the therapeutic process but rather, 
regards it as a beginning from which a working alliance can 
be established and developed. Therefore, an existential 
approach remains open to the possibilities of relating 
within the therapeutic encounter and does not impose a 
ready-made and value laden agenda of 'being' .
It is this notion of a psychoanalytic preconceived
52
notion of ’being’ and relating that Binswanger (1962) has
criticised the transference hypothesis for. He argued that
it devalues the immediacy of a genuine therapist-client
encounter and more misleadingly, affirms that the therapist
can obtain the ’objectively real’ past of the client as
he/she originally experienced it (Spinelli, 1995). But just
what is the client’s view of the past, how does he/she
understand it now and what meaning have they given it? It
seems curious that many therapists (especially those with
backgrounds in psychology) seem to negate, minimise or
simply ignore the fact that human memory functions through
filtering processes of selection and interpretation;
memories are neither the product of a static recording
device nor value-free (Baddeley, 1990). As we gain new
experiences and continue to develop and change in subtle or
more overt ways so too does our view of the past;
experience is always perspectival (Handley, 1995).
Therefore, what or ’who’ we were before is in a state of
continual flux being reshaped continually by what we
are now and what we hope to be. As such, to re-experience a
past event through transference exactly as it was perceived
before would be an impossibility (Handley, 1995). For
Binswanger, there is no split between ’reality’ and
’transference’ - the dichotomy is false. Instead, the focus
is upon two co-constituted beings - therapist and client -
who relate and share as whole persons within the frame of
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the therapeutic encounter. This view is also shared by May 
(1961, 1967) who states that relating the client’s 
emotional responses in-session back to past events ’robs’ 
the therapeutic encounter of its experiential reality, as 
well as prevents the client from fully reflecting upon 
his/her thoughts, feelings and behaviour as they occur. By 
proposing a transference interpretation, the therapist 
negates the client’s current presentation as being 
meaningful of the moment, impinges upon their self- 
reflective processes and does not allow him/her the 
possibility of being responsible for their current ’being- 
in-the-world’. As such, an exploration of the client’s 
phenomenology of the present encounter is lost.
Given these theoretical and therapeutic criticisms of 
transference, there is a need to reformulate an explanation 
of interpersonal phenomenon without relying upon the 
transference hypothesis itself. In this endeavour an 
accessible, understandable and meaningful counter-theory 
has been proposed by Spinelli (1995). This is briefly 
outlined below.
Spinelli (1995) proposes that all interactions and
encounters with others contain within them resonances,
similarities or ’echoes’ from earlier ones. Obviously, this
applies as much to the therapeutic relationship as to any
other one. Therefore, with this perspective in mind, the
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therapist should give equal value and significance to these 
resonating elements so that a deeper level of understanding 
can be achieved about the therapist's and client’s current 
experience of each other (Spinelli, 1995). Thus, even 
though the client’s emotional reactions may have resonances 
with previous relationships and encounters, their 
significance lies in that "they clarify the meaning of 
current experience and the current self-construct - not the 
other way around" (Spinelli, 1995, p. 276). In short, any 
resonances are meaningful and significant of the ’here and 
now’; there is no repetition or substitution. Conversely, 
it can even be argued that ’significant others’ from the 
client’s past are being employed to express directly, 
issues within their current relationships - including the 
therapeutic encounter (Spinelli, 1995). To adopt such a 
perspective however, requires that therapists are non­
defensive and respect and accept their clients comments and 
emotions directed towards them so that a depth of mutual 
understanding and relating can be achieved. This approach 
produces a higher degree of parity within the therapeutic 
relationship requiring that therapists look to themselves 
and their clients more closely, rather than reach for the 
relative ’safety blanket’ of a transference interpretation 
when things become too uncomfortable.
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Lastly, this critique has examined transference from 
logical, theoretical and therapeutic perspectives, 
demonstrating the impact of theory upon the therapeutic 
relationship and process for both client and therapist. 
However, it is not to suggest that a therapist who employs 
the term transference and uses it to inform his/her 
practice is not relating therapeutically. Rather, as with 
the whole range of psychoanalytic concepts, theories and 
frameworks and all other models of psychological therapy, 
it is a matter of chosen theoretical orientation and 
personal therapeutic style. However, in relation to the 
phenomenon that the transference hypothesis was originally 
proposed to explain, this critique shall end aptly with an 
ethical note of caution from Freud.
"If the patient declares that she is in love with the 
analyst, so be it..."however, the action-implication of the 
experience is to be emphatically repudiated: the patient’s 
’love’ must be neither gratified nor spurned" (Szasz, 1963, 
p. 442).
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The possible advantages and disadvantages of 
personal psychological therapy whilst in 
training.
Abstract
This report discusses the arguments both for and against receiving personal 
therapy whilst in training as a therapeutic practitioner. It critically evaluates the 
empirical research and surveys undertaken to date which have investigated the 
relationships between receiving personal therapy and clinical practise/therapists’ 
well being. It concludes that the findings produced to date are inconclusive, and 
that a broader realm of research inquiry is needed if an understanding of the 
possible effects upon the trainee (both personally and professionally) is to be 
achieved.
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"But where and how, is the poor wretch to acquire the 
ideal qualifications which he will need in this profession? 
The answer is in an analysis of himself, with which his 
preparation for his future activity begins" - Freud, 1937.
INTRODUCTION
' In providing the ’classical’ viewpoint of the 
importance of personal therapy whilst in training, the 
above Freud (1937) quotation allows this discussion an 
historical perspective and also highlights the (male) 
engendered nature of the power base within psycho­
therapeutic practise some 60 years ago. Bringing this 
discussion up-to-date, there still exists much disagreement 
concerning the personal/therapeutic usefulness and/or 
desirability of personal therapy as a compulsory training 
requirement within the ’helping’ professions. As such, it 
remains a contentious and emotive issue amongst trainees, 
qualified practitioners and training providers which tends 
to vary according to theoretical orientation and personal
beliefs (McNamara, 1986; MacDevitt, 1987; Norcross et al., 
1988).
Within the range of helping professions, personal
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therapy has been used in the training of psychoanalysts, 
other psychodynamic related therapists, family therapists, 
group therapists and clinical and counselling psychologists 
(McEwan & Duncan, 1993). However, much of the divisiveness 
and disagreement about its current status centres around 
the lack of conclusive empirical evidence that personal 
psychological therapy whilst in training (or even when 
qualified) has any measurable effect on client outcome 
(Macran & Shapiro, 1998). Indeed, some clinicians have even 
condemned personal therapy as a form of professional 
indoctrination (e.g. Masson, 1992). Unfortunately, the 
available literature supporting its value is mostly 
prescriptive, anecdotal and descriptive in nature 
(Macaskill, 1988). Thus, despite its general acceptance 
amongst many practising therapists, it continues to be the 
source of much debate but to its possible detriment, very 
little systematic investigation (Macran & Shapiro, 1998). 
Currently, this is made all the more politically 
contentious especially within NHS settings, as the emphasis 
upon therapeutic outcome and effectiveness research 
increases. Thus, it is not just a case of "what works for 
whom?" (Roth & Fonagy, 1996) but also, who pays, how much 
and for which therapy?
Perhaps not surprisingly, regardless of the trainee's
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level of functioning, many therapists working from within a
psychodynamic or insight-oriented framework view it as an
important if not integral aspect of training (Macran &
Shapiro, 1998). Thus, the view here is that personal
therapy is not to be regarded solely in terms of remedial
aims and processes but rather, with trainees’ degrees of
self-awareness, containment and self-empowerment. As such,
Macaskill (1988, p. 219) states that, "the therapist needs
to have an intimate knowledge of himself (sic); he needs to
be aware of his own areas of conflict and how he responds
to others so that his own personality and his own problems
will not unnecessarily intrude on the psychotherapeutic
work with his patients." In supporting this view whilst
foregrounding a slightly different aspect, Spinelli (1995,
p. 6) working from an existential-phenomenological
perspective (with its emphasis upon relationship,
responsibility and meaning) argues that "therapists be
willing to do that which they continually ask of their
clients to do, nothing more nothing less." Furthermore, he
adds that therapists who are unwilling to engage in this
process, should ask themselves what right they have to ask
clients to do the same (Spinelli, 1995). Thus, there
appears to be a fairly widespread and accepted belief that
it is beneficial for the therapist in training as well as
their client but very few empirical findings to state
precisely how and in what ways. Conversely, what are the
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personal and therapeutic implications for both client and 
therapist when it is not undertaken? Thus, as Norcross, 
Dryden, and DeMichele (1992) aptly asked, it presents the 
therapeutic professions with a case of "what’s good for the 
goose?"
The purposes of the present paper are twofold: to 
provide a discussion of the aims, desired outcomes, 
possible advantages and disadvantages of personal therapy 
whilst in training; and to provide a critical overview of 
the (limited) empirical evidence produced to date. In doing 
so, this discussion explicitly emphasises the integration 
of theory, research, practice links in an evaluation of 
whether personal therapy whilst in training does in fact 
make a difference, and if so, in what ways.
DEFINING THE AIMS OF PERSONAL THERAPY FOR TRAINEES & 
RESEARCH INTO ITS EFFECTIVENESS
In order to ’set the scene’ and provide a working 
definition, ’therapy' as used in the present paper is a 
generic term referring to a spectrum of psychological 
interventions ranging from cognitive-behavioural models, to 
comparatively less structured psychodynamic and insight- 
oriented frameworks. Therefore, a 'therapist' is the
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practitioner implementing any of the above. He/she may come 
from a variety of backgrounds and professional training 
schemes although they are usually set within psychotherapy, 
clinical/counselling psychology, counselling, psychiatry, 
social work and nursing (Macran & Shapiro, 1998). In 
expanding the range of therapeutic professions within the 
UK, the division of ’Counselling Psychology’ was 
established within the British Psychological Society (BPS) 
in 1995. This ’new’ branch of professional applied 
psychology may be best described as a synthesis of 
psychological knowledge and theory from the more ’logical 
positivistic’ approach of mainstream psychology, with the 
emphasis upon the therapeutic relationship as identified 
through the practice of psychotherapy and counselling.
Given its engagement with a multiplicity of theory and 
accompanying epistemologies, it may be quite aptly referred 
to as a ’post-modern’ therapeutic profession.
Broadly speaking, the aims of personal therapy can be 
identified as the need to increase therapist effectiveness 
and to maintain therapist well-being (Macran & Shapiro, 
1998). It is intended to expand the trainee’s opportunities 
for increased self-reflection on thoughts, feelings, 
responses and behaviour created by the new experiences of 
becoming a therapist (Johns, 1996). In short, the primary 
purpose of personal therapy during training is, "to enhance
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the trainee’s competence and confidence in working with 
clients" (Johns, 1996, p. 86). Thus, there appears to be a 
belief in a causal relationship between receiving personal 
therapy and both therapeutic efficacy and therapists’
’peace of mind’. Conversely, the implication is that a lack 
of personal therapy will impinge upon aspects of the 
therapist’s professional and personal life through a lack 
of opportunities for engagement in sustained therapeutic 
self-reflection.
In an endeavour to produce empirical evidence 
concerning whether the above aims are met through receiving 
personal therapy, four main research methods have been used 
most of which, have been based upon studies in the USA 
focusing almost exclusively upon personal therapy of a 
psychodynamic nature. Each shall be discussed in turn 
below. The four methods are as follows: (1) surveys of
therapists’ personal therapy evaluations; (2) experimental 
studies assessing therapists’ responses in situations which 
are supposedly designed to be representative of real-life 
therapy; (3) outcome studies comparing clients’ therapeutic 
outcomes between therapists who have and have not received 
therapy; (4) process studies comparing within session 
therapeutic interventions, between those therapists who
have undergone therapy and those who have not (Macran & 
Shapiro, 1998).
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SURVEY STUDIES
In the USA, surveys have found that two-thirds to 
three-quarters of all therapists (especially clinical 
psychologists and psychodynamic and insight-oriented 
therapists) have received some form of personal therapy 
(Garfield & Kurtz, 1976; Guy, Stark & Poelstra, 1988; 
Macaskill & Macaskill, 1992). Most stated that personal 
growth and/or resolving personal difficulties were their 
main goals whilst others viewed therapy as instrumental in 
helping them to cope with the demands and stresses of 
working therapeutically (Guy & Liaboe, 1986). Other 
important effects commonly reported by survey respondents 
were an increased awareness of the importance of the 
therapeutic relationship and issues concerning 
transference/counter-transference, as well as an increased 
capacity for patience, tolerance and empathy (Macaskill & 
Macaskill, 1992; Norcross et al., 1988). However, it may 
equally be the case that therapeutic training and practise 
itself, only serve to intensify an existing tendency to 
be more ’psychologically minded’ which may characterize 
those who choose a therapeutic career (Macran & Shapiro, 
1998).
In the UK, a national survey of psychotherapists-in- 
training conducted by Macaskill and Macaskill (1992), found
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that 87% of those who responded reported a moderate to very
positive effect upon their therapeutic practice and
personal lives. These effects comprised increased self-
awareness (76%), increased self-esteem (47%), and a
reduction in symptoms (43%). The remaining 13% reported
negative effects of family and marital stress. They also
found that financial costs and time constraints were
significant stressors. Other studies (Garfield & Bergin,
1971; Greenberg & Staller, 1981; Strupp, 1958, 1973) have
found that therapeutic skills suffer when trainees are in
personal therapy and practising therapeutically at the same
time. It has been hypothesized that such trainees have
become preoccupied by difficulties which have come to the
fore within their personal therapy (Macran & Shapiro,
1998). Indeed as Phillips (1998, p. 32) concludes,
undergoing personal therapy involves a process of risk
whereby, "as we understand ourselves more we know
ourselves less" thus, "we lose ourselves and in the
process, find someone else." For some trainees, perhaps
such ’desedimentation’ of the ’self’, with an accompanying
self-awareness of previously unrecognised personal
characteristics, traits and behaviours, is particularly
distressing and uncomfortable. Moreover, as Norcross et al.
(1988) have commented, it is uncertain the degree to which
the trainee’s level of self-awareness is translated into
their own therapeutic practice with clients and in what
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ways. Furthermore, even with qualified practitioners there 
is increasing evidence that practising psychotherapy can 
have harmful results for therapists’ well-being, reflected 
in the relatively high rates of suicide and alcohol abuse 
noted amongst psychiatrists and psychotherapists (Farber, 
1983; Guy & Liaboe, 1986; Margison, 1987).
From my own experiences of receiving personal therapy, 
I feel that the self-awareness and insights that I have 
gained (uncomfortable and upsetting as this process may 
have been at times) has been to my increased personal and 
professional/therapeutic development. Given the nature of 
this profession, for me to remain sedimented within an 
inflexible and rigid personal and world view, would be 
particularly un-therapeutic as well as personally ’un­
healthy’, i.e. if I cannot view myself and my life from 
other perspectives, challenge my own paradoxes and 
inconsistencies and consider alternative meanings, then to 
what extent would I be able to assist my clients in doing 
the same? Thus, being in personal therapy reflects the old 
adage that ’there’s no gain without pain.’
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EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
Within the current literature on therapists’ personal
therapy, there are a minority of experimental studies.
These have investigated therapists’ responses to situations
that are supposedly analogous to actual therapeutic
encounters. Strupp (1955, 1958, 1973) presented his
participants (a selection of clinical psychologists,
psychiatrists, and social workers) with a series of client
statements requiring a response. Each participants’
response was subsequently coded and scored according to
whether the participant had received personal therapy or
not. Thus, the assumption here is that there is a
’correct’, ’desired’, and ’specific’ response to each
statement from all participants regardless of their
theoretical orientation, the nature of the therapeutic
relationship established to date, the nature of the
client’s difficulties, the progress of therapy to date, and
the context of therapy (setting, frequency and modality).
Furthermore, the participants were from largely differing
professions with largely differing roles, aims and levels
of training. As such, it appears that these studies are
centrally, epistemologically flawed, i.e. given the above
contextual variables that are not taken into account, just
what exactly has been ’measured’? Thus, the validity and
reliability of this research design is particularly
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questionable. Furthermore, it implicitly assumes that any 
differences in responses between those who have and have 
not received personal therapy are causally related, i.e. 
that having therapy (or not) has made the difference. 
Lastly, an experimental design used to assess and evaluate 
the nature of a relational and experiential therapeutic 
encounter is simply, un-phenomenological and ironically,
'un-scientific'. Thus, it appears to be a gross misnomer 
that the experimental relationship between participant and 
experimenter can be assumed to be analogous to the 
therapeutic relationship established between client and 
therapist. Specifically, they differ in relation to aim, 
context, nature, process, emotional intensity, status and 
power differentials and not least, the meaning that may be 
attributed to these two distinct experiences by the 
individuals co-constituting these two radically different 
types of relationship. Not surprisingly, the above research 
has produced findings which are both contradictory and 
inconclusive.
More recently, MacDevitt (1987) has conducted similar 
research focussing upon the relationship between receiving 
personal therapy and the therapist’s preference for the use 
of self-analytic skills (which MacDevitt termed counter­
transference awareness - ’CA’ ) . However, the limitations
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and criticisms discussed above are equally applicable to 
MacDevitt’s study.
OUTCOME STUDIES
The outcome studies produced to date have also 
suffered from the same problems of inconclusive findings 
and contradictory results (Macran & Shapiro, 1998).
However, this appears to be due more to the very nature of 
defining ’outcome’ itself. This implies a developmental pre 
and post therapeutic experience for the client in terms of 
their presenting difficulties, something which may not be 
as straightforward and readily identifiable as imagined. As 
such, when is an outcome to be considered ’successful’? For 
instance, at the end of an agreed period of therapy, the 
client may leave stating and appearing to feel better, only 
to be re-referred shortly afterwards. Thus, any outcome is 
of a temporal nature. As discussed above, outcome studies 
are currently politically and therapeutically contentious, 
as therapeutic services within the NHS are increasingly 
required to demonstrate their efficacy and effectiveness 
with a range of client populations across a spectrum of 
psychological and emotional difficulties. However, it 
remains arguable whether the therapy in itself has produced 
the positive change in this particular client’s life which
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can be readily determined in a causal, linear fashion. 
Therefore, to determine whether receiving personal therapy 
in training is causally related to later positive client 
outcomes, which is not attributable to other factors, is 
unfalsifiable, i.e. it can be no more refuted than 
verified. The most recent findings by Greenspan and Kulish 
(1985) concluded that therapists who had received personal 
therapy had lower premature termination rates than those 
who had not. However, the therapists’ levels of experience, 
the quality of the therapeutic relationship established to- 
date, the nature of the clients’ presenting difficulties, 
the therapeutic orientation, the context of therapy, sample 
size, and individual differences (of therapist and client) 
are all possible confounding variables to be considered 
when evaluating these findings.
PROCESS STUDIES
Process studies, which have investigated the 
relationship between receiving personal therapy and the 
therapists’ and clients’ ratings of within session 
experience are very few in number (Macran & Shapiro, 1998) 
Once again, the findings are inconclusive and suffer from 
many of the methodological problems discussed above. 
However, there is some limited evidence (Peebles, 1980;
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Lambert & Bergin, 1994; Rogers, 1957) that therapists' 
receiving personal therapy has been significantly 
correlated with those attributes believed to facilitate 
therapeutic change, i.e. empathy, warmth, genuineness and 
acceptance. When regarded in this context, it may appear 
that personal therapy is implicitly involved in therapeutic 
effectiveness and outcome. However, it remains debatable 
whether these attributes can only be learned through 
receiving personal therapy alone. In fact, it has been 
shown that the ability to express empathy, warmth and 
genuineness can be taught to diverse populations of mental- 
health workers (Truax & Carkhuff, 1967; Truax & Mitchell, 
1971; Strupp & Hadley, 1979).
POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES OF PERSONAL THERAPY IN TRAINING
As the above discussions have illustrated, the 
relative value of the relationship between receiving 
personal therapy whilst in training and subsequent 
therapeutic practice remains equivocal. However given such 
uncertainty, both theoretically and empirically, there are 
five recurring mechanisms within the literature that are 
claimed to benefit therapists’ well-being and improve 
clinical practise (Guy, 1987, Norcross et al., 1988; 
Norcross et al., 1992). To summarise, these are as follows
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1) personal therapy improves the emotional and mental well­
being of the therapist - it helps to alleviate some of the 
stresses and strains that are inherent to practicing 
therapy; 2) personal therapy provides the therapist/client 
with a more complete understanding of personal dynamics - 
it helps therapists to conduct treatment with reduced 
counter-transference potential and clearer perceptions; 3) 
personal therapy serves as a profound professional 
socialisation experience - by experiencing how 
psychological therapy/counselling can work, it can increase 
the therapist’s convictions about the validity of 
therapeutic practice and its underlying theory; 4) personal 
therapy places therapists in the role of the client - it 
tightens therapists’ awareness of the relational nature of 
the encounter and increases respect for clients’ struggles; 
5) personal therapy provides a first-hand experiential 
opportunity to observe clinical methods and interventions - 
it provides some form of professional modelling. However, 
the disadvantages identified comprise constraints placed 
upon trainees’ time and finances, a decrease in the level 
of therapeutic skills (as discussed above) and a danger of 
overgeneralisation and projection of trainees’ responses 
onto future clients, i.e. ’its good for everyone because it 
was good for me’ (McEwan & Duncan, 1993).
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CONCLUSIONS
Given the findings produced to date, there remains 
little conclusive evidence for the usefulness of personal 
therapy whilst in training (Macran & Shapiro, 1998). In 
part, this may be attributed to the methodological problems 
discussed above although there is also a general failure of 
research findings to demonstrate that professional training 
in itself, has any positive effect upon client outcome 
(Christensen & Jacobson, 1994).
Unfortunately, it appears as though most if not all of
the studies discussed above have been quantitative in
nature and as such, have not allowed for a more in-depth,
experientially informative type of data, especially given
the divisive, contentious and complex nature of the issues
involved. Within this debate, it seems that much of the
ambiguity and inconclusiveness of these studies centres
around the aims of the research questions themselves, i.e.
what have they wanted to investigate and what methods were
chosen as being the most epistemologically ’fit' to address
that research task? Although client outcome is a central
issue to psychotherapeutic practice across all theoretical
orientations, which individual practitioners and service
providers need to consider, it does not necessarily have
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to become the research focus when considering the range of 
possible effects of personal therapy upon the trainee. This 
seems to be a selectively blinkered level of inquiry which 
may arguably, be more reflective of the current political 
climate with regards to the related issues of financing 
therapeutic services and evidence-based practice. As such, 
receiving personal therapy or not, does not appear to be 
the central issue per se but rather, to what extent does 
the trainee (as client) engage with the therapeutic 
relationship and the processes involved and what is the 
meaning that they have given to this experience? Only 
through addressing these points can a clearer, more 
informed and experiential understanding be achieved. 
Therefore, a more qualitative approach would facilitate a 
richer and more phenomenological data set, something much 
required if we are to investigate the trainee’s 
understanding and meaning given to their experience of 
personal therapy, both in personal and professional terms. 
Such an approach would more readily highlight its possible 
advantages and disadvantages which in turn, may be used to 
inform the nature of current and future training programmes 
for therapeutic practitioners.
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Therapeutic Practice Dossier
The contents of this dossier address those issues concerning practicing counselling 
psychology that arose during the three placements, each of one year duration. The 
nature and experiences of training in diverse service contexts is discussed. An 
essay on the integration of theory, practice and research concludes this dossier.
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Placement Reports
This section comprises a description of the three PsychD. placements and of the 
therapeutic, administrative and educational roles undertaken as part of them.
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First Year Placement: An NHS Adult Psychology and Counselling
Out-Patient Service.
September 1997 to July 1998
During this placement, I was based in an Adult Psychology department set within 
a fairly moderate socio-economic area. Although I saw clients from diverse 
backgrounds, they were predominantly, economically very stable members of a 
single cultural group. In addition to my individual practice, I also worked within 
the family-systemic therapy team as part of the ‘reflecting team’. Clients’ 
presenting difiBculties included: anxiety, panic-disorders, depression, simple 
phobias, relationship issues, alcohol abuse, self-harm and family systemic issues.
My supervisor at this placement was a chartered counselling psychologist. Both 
my practice and supervision were largely informed by an existential- 
phenomenological approach. Further opportunities for involvement with the 
psychology department included: weekly departmental meetings and bi-monthly 
meetings of all the psychology departments comprising the district community 
M IS Trust. I also undertook ‘in-house’ systemic family therapy training, which 
used role-play as a primary training tool.
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Second Year Placement: A Student Psychotherapy/Counselling
Service
September 1998 to July 1999
Based within the primary care setting of a large University’s ‘Health Centre’, this 
placement provided me with an opportunity to work from within a psychodynamic 
framework. Having a large international student population, many of my clients 
were from diverse cultural/ethnic backgrounds. As such, trans-cultural issues were 
often prominent themes. Also, given the comparatively young age of many of my 
clients, lift span/ developmental psychosocial issues were often salient themes 
addressed within the therapeutic process. Clients’ presenting difficulties included: 
sexuality issues, relationship issues (especially with regards to separation/ 
attachment, identity development and renegotiating familial roles) sexual abuse, 
alcohol/drug abuse and self-harm. An additional opportunity for further 
involvement with the team was through the fortnightly clinical meeting, where 
client, practice and service context issues were discussed.
Supervision at this placement was provided by a broadly psychodynamic oriented 
psychotherapist. This included the use of therapy process notes in addition to 
discussion of client issues without their use.
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Third Year Placement: An Out-Patient Department of Clinical 
Psychology and CMHT.
September 1999 to August 2000
In addition to working primarily within the clinical psychology department 
dealing with general adult mental health, I also saw clients at the CMHT who 
were suffering from severe/enduring mental illness. The placement is set within a 
large market town in the Midlands whose population comprises those who belong 
to the very low to the very high socio-economic strata. As such, my clients were 
representative of these differing socio-economic groupings. Clients’ presenting 
difficulties included: Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (CCD), Post-Traumatic 
Stress-Disorder (PTSD), acquired brain injury, agoraphobia, social phobia, 
bulimia-nervosa, complex bereavement, schizophrenia and bi-polar affective 
disorder. As well as my individual client work, I also co-facilitated CBT groups 
for anger management with a clinical psychologist. Further involvement with the 
department included weekly client/service development meetings.
Supervision was provided by a chartered clinical psychologist who was also a 
UKCP registered psychotherapist. Although my predominant mode of formulating 
and working with clients was cognitive-behavioural, this was enhanced by an 
awareness of underlying developmental issues and dynamics, as I worked towards 
a more integrative approach.
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A phenomenologically informed integration of 
theory, research and practice.
Abstract
This essay discusses how my approach to the therapeutic integration of theory, 
research and practice, is based largely within a phenomenological framework 
aimed at clarifying and exploring the client’s meanings and sense of reality. 
Examples from my practice are used throughout in order to illustrate how a 
phenomenological focus may facilitate a therapeutic, integrative stance.
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INTRODUCTION
The move towards therapeutic integration (the act of 
forming or blending into a whole - Webster’s new collegiate 
dictionary, 1981) has a long tradition across and within 
the multiplicity of theories and practices of psychological 
therapy or ’psychotherapy’, dating back to Bollard and 
Miller’s (1950) conceptualisation of psychoanalysis in 
behaviourist-learning theory terms. Paradoxically, given 
the mass of therapeutic literature and the number of 
divergent discourses, the more that integration is 
conceptualised, formulated and re-formulated, the less 
tangible and coherent it appears to be. In other words, 
there are as many ’takes’ on integration as there are 
therapists who describe their practice as integrative. As 
such, any approach to integration is a highly individual 
endeavour (there is no ’right’ or ’wrong’ way) that to a 
greater or lesser extent, develops with the practitioner’s 
life/therapeutic experience. This is not intended to ’muddy 
the waters’ of this discussion but, rather, is aimed at 
clarifying the highly personal, phenomenological and 
temporal nature of the practice of psychotherapy and the 
processes and styles of integration.
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However, integration does not only refer to the 
integration of differing models of psychological therapy 
but, also, to the integration of theory, research and 
practice. In short, it refers to the 'scientist- 
practitioner model’ of the Counselling Psychologist 
according to which, the practitioner forms hypotheses 
guided by psychological knowledge and research which are 
assessed and monitored throughout the therapeutic process 
and reformulated accordingly (Roth, 1990). As such, 
integration is a process comprising reciprocal and 
inextricable links between theory, therapeutic practice and 
research where each informs and is informed by the other.
Within the comparatively short history of Counselling 
Psychology as a distinct branch of professional applied 
psychology in the U.K., the issue of the ’scientist- 
practitioner’ has produced a contentious and polarised 
debate amongst its members as the ’new’ discipline has 
struggled to promote itself and gain recognition and a 
sense of professional identity.
For the purposes of clarity and completion, the
present discussion will address the following inter-related
themes of integration in turn: 1) an overview and rationale
of my theoretical approach to practice; 2) how my chosen
approach influences the therapeutic relationship and
process; 3) the role/significance of psychological
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knowledge and research informing my therapeutic practice 
and 4) my evaluation of practice.
1) OVERVIEW & RATIONALE OF THEORETICAL APPROACH
The divergent range of theoretical models of 
psychological therapy covered in the PsychD. in 
Psychotherapeutic & Counselling Psychology (humanistic, 
existential-phenomenological, psychodynamic, cognitive- 
behavioural and cognitive-analytic to name just a few) 
allows for multiple conceptualisations, meanings, 
understandings and formulations of clients’ difficulties.
As such, although each theory may be applied to each 
client’s problems, the manner in which the client’s 
difficulties are approached in terms of description and 
formulation may differ radically, based upon the theory’s 
underlying epistemologies, beliefs and values. In short, 
the theoretical orientation/approach determines how the 
client’s difficulties, their aetiology, development and 
maintenance are to be understood and which aspects of their 
experience are foregrounded above others and in what ways.
In addition, the theory adopted largely informs the 
practice or style of psychotherapy, i.e. the ’doing’ 
aspects. The equally important ’being’ aspects of the 
therapist (referring loosely to personal qualities,
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characteristics and traits) are not largely discussed by 
the various models - at least generally not ’outside’ the 
parameters of any given therapeutic techniques per se. From 
within the ’therapeutic tool-box’ of theory, the selection 
of approach/model has ramifications for the manner in which 
therapy is encountered (for both therapist and client) and 
also informs the evaluation of therapy outcome, i.e. what 
has changed (or not) and how. However, regardless of 
theoretical orientation, psychotherapy is a relational 
process where the client and therapist co-constitute and 
actively participate in the process where therapy happens 
between them within the context of the therapeutic 
relationship.
Although the centrality of theory to practice may
appear obvious, I believe that it is necessary to make it
explicit that theories are just that, i.e. that theories
are suppositions and not ’truths’. In recognising this, it
allows an openness to the critical reflection and
appreciation of theory which may demystify as it
deconstructs. Also, it may limit the likelihood of any
blinkered adherence to theoretical dogma, where the
relative benefits and limitations of each theory may be
evaluated in a balanced fashion. Conversely, a process of
deconstructing and demystifying theory has the effect that
it helps to place the client more in the position of
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'expert', i.e. that the client is 'allowed' to maintain a 
position where he/she is the 'narrator' and 'owner' of 
their experiences and difficulties containing a richness 
and depth of meanings within meanings including ones which 
have remained implicit and unrecognised. In other words, 
the client is allowed their 'voice' within therapy where 
their difficulties may be explored and clarified 
within the immediacy of the therapeutic encounter.
The theoretical approach to practice that I find most 
meaningful in conceptualising and understanding clients' 
concerns and which also facilitates integration, is 
informed by existential-phenomenology. This approach to 
psychotherapy evolved through a synthesis of its two 
distinct and complementary philosophies - existentialism 
and phenomenology. Below is a brief outline of each.
Existentialism (from the Danish and German term 
^Existenz^) is the philosophy concerned with the 
subjective, personal dimension of human existence in terms 
of the 'existing individual' (Honderich, 1995). It 
describes the distinctively human mode of being, the 
ontological 'givens' of existence (death, anxiety, 
meaninglessness, isolation, choice, freedom and 
responsibility) and the clarification of what it means to 
be alive (Van Deurzen-Smith, 1995, 1997).
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The philosophy of phenomenology, founded by the German 
philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) refers to the study 
of phenomena (the appearance of things as they present to 
our consciousness). As such, the ’reality’ that each of us 
experiences is a phenomenal one open to a multiplicity of 
interpretations and meanings (Spinelli, 1989). From this 
perspective, there is no ’objective’ and ’true’ reality -
we can only ever have an interpreted reality and one which
is entirely ours' alone (Spinelli, 1996).
In essence, existential-phenomenology regards that all
clients’ difficulties are fundamentally about their
problems with living, and the approach that is taken
towards them. As such, psychological distress (or other
emotions/experiences) is regarded as a consequence
of the particular stance that is taken towards that
experience (Corrie & Milton, 2000). However, distress
becomes particularly problematic when the stance taken is a
’sedimented’ one where other possible interpretations are
not available for reflection (Spinelli, 1989).
^Sedimentation' refers to the ways in which people become
"stuck or fixed in certain beliefs and behaviour patterns
that deposit themselves deep down in our belief systems"
(Strasser & Strasser, 1997, p. 90). By regarding clients’
difficulties in this inherently non-pathologising way, it
helps to preserve their meaningfulness (for both the client
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and myself) and keeps them firmly grounded within the 
client’s experiences and sense of ’reality’. Furthermore, 
it allows for any resonating elements between the client’s 
past and present to be identified and explored further 
without imposing any causal/linear theoretical 
’connections’ which may hinder phenomenological 
clarification. Instead, it focuses upon the client’s way 
of ’being’ and manner of relating to self, others and the 
world. Thus, unlike other models, it does not attribute 
history to clients but instead, remains centred on 
experience in the present as it recognises our selective 
use of memory to construct a past that validates our 
identity in the present/future (Spinelli, 1998).
As such, it captures the relational and co-constituted
nature of human existence, where all forms of human
dilemma, tragedy and suffering are seen to reflect a
person’s attempts to avoid, resist or deny the angst and
uncertainty that ^authentic^ living demands (Spinelli,
1989). The challenge of being ’authentic’ means to be true
to and honest with oneself, to follow one’s own direction
based upon personal ideals and values which includes
acknowledging limitations whilst being responsible for all
choices made and their outcomes (Van Deurzen-Smith, 1988) .
In short, the anxiety that is inherent to the realisation
of ultimate responsibility for self combined with an
acknowledgment of life’s fundamental insecurity and
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uncertainty is regarded as the defining characteristic of 
human existence which may be used as the starting point for 
a full engagement with life or avoided through 
'inauthenticity' or 'bad-faith' (self-deception) (Van 
Deurzen-Smith, 1988).
Paradoxically, the model's lack of a psychosocial 
developmental theory or framework allows it an openness in 
theory which lends itself towards integration. As such, its 
phenomenological and ontological basis may accommodate 
varying interpretations of meaning and expressions of 
humanity without cause to formulate clients' difficulties 
within the pre-set boundaries of a more rigid and/or 
linear theory. However, this is not to suggest that other 
theories do not have a valid contribution to make towards 
my understanding and working with clients. For instance, 
psychodynamic theory provides me with the basis of a 
developmental perspective through proposing images, 
analogies and metaphors of client's experiences which may 
in turn, be used as a reference point for further 
phenomenological exploration grounded firmly within the 
client's meanings and sense of reality. The clinical 
example below will illustrate my point here.
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l.i) INTEGRATING PHENOMENOLOGY WITH PSYCHODYNAMICS
A former client (whom I shall refer to here as ’Jane') 
is a woman in her mid 50's who had been referred by the 
psychotherapy department (considered as "unsuitable for 
treatment") with long-standing anxiety and depression which 
seems to have worsened after her mother died three years 
before. During the time leading up to her death, Jane had 
become her mother's sole care-taker which was both 
"physically and emotionally exhausting", made all the worse 
by her mother's verbally abusive and critical manner.
Throughout our therapy sessions Jane was quietly 
spoken, presenting as very self-conscious and having low 
self-esteem (rarely making eye-contact and looking downward 
when she spoke). She had an overly compliant, nervous and 
'child-like' manner and would constantly apologise for 
herself within sessions with comments like; "I'm sorry that 
I keep getting upset, what must you think of me?" She 
recounted a long history of a difficult and stressful 
relationship with her mother who was emotionally 
inconsistent and "could never be pleased". The client even 
reported that after her birth, a nurse at the hospital 
named her 'Jane' as her mother was expecting a boy and 
(not wanting a daughter) had apparently not thought of any 
girls' names. Jane had only learned of this shortly before
99
her mother's death during one of her "abusive tirades". 
Indeed, Jane had always felt like an outsider within the 
family (having no close attachments to any of her six 
siblings) and had often wondered whether she was adopted.
It was only her father whom she felt close to but it 
appears that he too was not very affectionate. In terms of 
theory, Winnicott's (1965) 'not good-enough-mother' (the 
mother that does not adapt to the infant's needs or allow 
for the infant's illusion of omnipotence, leading the child 
to develop a 'false self) seemed quite apt to this 
client's presentation, almost as if it were a 'text-book 
case'. However, in order to understand this woman's 
'false-self' presentation, my approach was still 
phenomenologically based. The excerpt of therapy dialogue 
below is not a verbatim transcript, although it accurately 
represents my interventions and overall theoretical/ 
therapeutic approach with this client. Each line of the 
client's narrative is prefixed by the letter 'J' and mine 
is prefixed by the letter 'D'.
J1: I just don't know what to do about my brothers
and sisters now...they're so horrible when they 
speak to me, I hate it I really do, its like I 
can't cope with them anymore.
100
D1: I can see just how difficult this is for you
Jane...what is it about speaking to them that you 
hate?
J2: Well, they say nasty things about me or my
family, things that I just don't know how to 
respond to.
D2: Um, can you think of a recent example or the last
time that this happened?
J3: Er...well, no not really but it happens so often
too, its so frustrating and confusing though...I 
just wish that they'd realise what they do to me.
D3: How do you imagine they would act if they did
know?
J4: I'm not sure. I've never told them how I feel, I
just sort of, I don't know, go along with things 
really.
D4: Umm...what do you think would happen if you were
to tell them how you felt or what you thought?
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J5: I don't know, its. I've never been like that,
even when I was younger, you know like they are
D5: Like they are?
J6: Well...er, not very nice I suppose.
At D1 above, I respond to my client's previous 
statement by beginning with an empathie intervention and 
then moving to a phenomenologically framed question aimed 
at clarifying the meaning within her narrative at J1. I 
made this intervention in order to facilitate our mutual 
understanding which would come about through her self­
reflection which may have comprised both elements of 
cognition and affect. J2 and D2 continue with this process 
through my asking her to think about a recent example so 
that we may have explored this in more depth. The dialogue 
between J3 and J4 is significant to our understanding of 
Jane’s approach to her difficulties and how they are being 
maintained, as she clarified at J4 that she avoids 
expressing herself to her brothers and sisters. At D4 I 
continue with this theme through trying to facilitate 
Jane’s reflection upon how things may or may not be 
different if she did express herself. This excerpt 
concludes with Jane clarifying that her reluctance to
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expressing herself is somehow twinned with her beliefs 
around being "nice". The remainder of the session remained 
with exploring her beliefs around being compliant or 
assertive and what it means to be "nasty" or "nice", and 
what the implications may be for her current and future 
functioning and views of the future.
The theoretical integration that I adopted with this 
client comprised Winnicott’s (1965) theory (providing me 
with a developmental perspective of the likely aetiology 
and development of her difficulties) which was grounded 
firmly within her phenomenological interpretations of her 
current functioning and manner of relating.
2) THE THERAPEUTIC RELATIONSHIP AND PROCESS
Before discussing how my theoretical approach informs 
my therapeutic practice, it is necessary to precede it with 
a brief caveat; the client's presentation Is paramount. As
such, the nature of their difficulties, the meaning that 
they have attributed to them, their expectations of the 
therapeutic relationship and process and their stated 
therapeutic aims (whether well specified or not) directly 
inform my practice and style of integration. Thus, my 
approach is not ’set in stone’ but rather, is a direct
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response to my clients’ presentations (informing my 
conceptualisation of their difficulties) which in terms of 
practice, will change according to each individual client. 
This will be clarified and expanded upon below.
In short, I regard the therapeutic relationship as 
collaborative where the client is offered an ’invitation’ 
to confront and clarify the phenomenology of their 
difficulties which, in turn, will determine the manner in 
which the therapy proceeds. In order to assist the client 
in this endeavour, I follow three basic guidelines of the 
existential-phenomenological method which are as follows:
1) Epoche - refers to a ’bracketing’ (or setting aside) of 
my initial assumptions, expectations, biases and prejudices 
within the therapeutic encounter in order to more fully 
engage with the client and their material in a spirit of 
relative naivete and openness; 2) Description - to 
facilitate an in-depth and detailed description of 
the client’s ’stories’, experiences and beliefs so that 
meanings within meanings may be identified and the implicit 
made explicit - this helps to prevent my imposing 
limitations upon the therapeutic encounter through trying 
to explain an experience within the boundaries of a pre­
set, ready-made hypothesis or theory; 3) Horlzontallsatlon 
I regard each descriptive element of an event or 
experience as having equal significance/value so that an
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initial hierarchy of assumptions is avoided as the client’s 
story unfolds and the ’pieces’ are put together (Spinelli, 
1989). Although there are limitations to the degree with 
which 1 am able to fully adhere to each of these ’rules', 
they nonetheless establish some sound basic guidelines for 
my therapeutic practice and facilitate the process of 
integration through not being overly technicalised or 
mechanicalised. In addition, the three core qualities of 
the therapist (genuineness, unconditional positive regard 
and empathy) identified by Rogers (1951) as being essential 
for therapeutic practice are central to my therapeutic 
approach in conjunction with a phenomenological focus.
Through using these three guiding principles and three 
core qualities to assist the client and myself in 
clarifying, exploring and understanding their difficulties, 
different aspects of their experience may become more 
apparent and meaningful at certain times throughout our 
therapeutic sessions. Within the existential-phenomeno­
logical approach these differing aspects are seen to relate 
to four distinct realms of human existence as follows: 1) 
the Umwelt - the physical, biological dimension, our 
embodied existence; 2) the Mitwelt - the social/public 
dimension involving relating and interacting with others;
3) the Elgenwelt - the personal/psychological dimension, 
comprising our sense of identity; 4) the Uberwelt - the
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spiritual dimension referring to our sense of values, 
ideals and purpose (Van Deurzen-Smith, 1988, 1997).
Although these four dimensions exist at once throughout a 
person’s existence, the salience and significance of each 
may become more/less apparent as the client’s difficulties 
are explored and clarified in increasing depth, breadth and 
understanding.
In terms of informing my thinking about theoretical 
and therapeutic integration, Corrie and Milton (2000) have 
discussed how the concept of meaning, is central to both 
cognitive-behavioural and existential-phenomenological 
approaches. As such, cognitive-behavioural formulations 
concerned with the reciprocal interplay between thought, 
emotion, physiology and behaviour, seem to resonate 
with the existential realms of ’being’ discussed above. 
However, although the four concepts of the cognitive model 
and the four existential dimensions of ’being’ do not map 
onto each other precisely, they may be seen to relate to 
each other in the following manner; Umwelt = Physiology; 
Mitwelt = Behaviour; Eigenwelt = Emotion; Uherwelt = 
Thought (Corrie & Milton, 2000) . However, perhaps 
at a more general level, existential-phenomenological ideas 
and concepts can be incorporated into cognitive-behavioural 
models, by highlighting the importance of context and 
relatedness which goes beyond the notion of cognitive
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distortions alone. Conversely, operationalised cognitive 
techniques may also provide the means to a systematic 
exploration of clients’ existential dilemmas (Corrie & 
Milton, 2000). As such, I am able to integrate the two 
models (with their focus upon meaning and its construction) 
theoretically and therapeutically, comprising both aspects 
of ’jbeing’ and ’doing’.
As an extension of my views about the therapeutic
relationship, I regard the therapeutic process as equally
collaborative and inductive in nature, where the client is
assisted in making explicit, certain sedimented beliefs,
views and assumptions which have remained implicit and
unacknowledged in the development and maintenance of
their difficulties. This may also involve some degree of
challenging, where inconsistencies, contradictions and
paradoxes between the client’s thinking, feeling and
behaviour are recognised and explored further. In short, it
involves helping my clients to identify those aspects of
their experience that are foregrounded and those that are
minimised, normalised or disassociated in pursuit of
maintaining their sedimented beliefs about self, others and
the world. In cognitive-behavioural terms, the
complementary phenomenological processes of sedimentation
and dissociation may be seen quite clearly as relating to
the development and operation of ’schema’. Schemas are
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regarded as 'stable mental structures' which comprise 
unconditional, core beliefs about ourselves, others and the 
world around us, which are thought to have developed during 
the course of our early development (Beck et al., 1979). 
Thus, in terms of a 'mental economy' allowing us to 
negotiate our way through the world, they provide us with a 
basis for screening and processing information about 
situations and events that we experience (Beck et al.,
1979). Below is a brief example of how my use of cognitive- 
behavioural theory and techniques retained a 
phenomenological focus throughout the therapeutic process.
2.1) INTEGRATING PHENOMENOLOGY WITH COGNITIVE-BEHAVIOURAL 
THERAPY
A former client whom I shall refer to here as 'Rachel' 
was referred by her GP with "free-floating" anxiety and 
panic-attacks. Within the assessment we clarified the 
phenomenology of her panic-attacks. For Rachel, they were a 
form of external "force" that would overcome her (usually) 
when having to interact with others, even if within 
familiar contexts and situations. We also identified that 
Rachel's aims of therapy were to receive instruction/advice 
on how to control and hopefully eliminate her panic-attacks 
and how to better manage her anxiety. In addition, she had
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received various forms of counselling in the past including
more exploratory, insight-oriented therapies, all of which
she had not found helpful. Thus, through discussion with
Rachel I adopted a fairly standard and structured CBT
approach, explaining the model, its aims and the
therapeutic process to her which she readily agreed to.
Although this approach has strong psycho-educational
elements and is quite didactic in terms of my setting her
'homework' tasks for completion in between sessions, it
was still phenomenologically centred through focussing upon
the idiosyncratic meanings she gave to her experiences of
her panic-attacks and anxiety. Thus, although we had
established an overt structure with clearly identified
therapeutic aims with an accompanying 'objectifiable'
measure of outcome, the focus remained upon Rachel's
phenomenological reality, incorporating the clarification
of meaning, emotion and behaviour and the interplay between
them. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the
approach that I adopted was a direct response to my
client's stated therapeutic aims in accordance with her
beliefs about what would or would not be helpful. As such,
it was both collaborative and phenomenologically based.
Below is a brief extract of dialogue demonstrating the way
in which I worked with this client. Although it is not a
verbatim transcript, it accurately represents my
interventions and overall theoretical/therapeutic approach
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with this client. Each line of the client’s narrative is 
prefixed by the letter ’R’ and mine is prefixed by the 
letter ’D’.
R1: Its really strange, like the other day when I was
leaving the house and the neighbour started 
speaking to me...its like some 'things came over 
me and I felt really panicky for no reason at all 
and I just wanted to get away.
D1: Can you remember what you were thinking at the
time?
R2: Um...yeah, I was thinking, God he must think I'm
a real nutter or something like that.
D2: And what made you think that?
R3: Well, because he's speaking to me and I'm all 
panicky and not saying anything back, just 
standing there and trying to smile, but I could 
tell he thought that something was wrong with me 
and that I was being strange by the way that he 
was looking at me, you know what I mean?
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D3: Ok, well lets imagine that he was thinking that
you were being strange, what would that mean?
R4: Um...that I'm some sort of weirdo or something, I
mean I know that I'm not but he doesn't know that 
though.
D4: Ok, but how do you know that he definitely does
think that you're a weirdo?
R5: Well, yeah OK, I don't, its just that when I get
panicky I feel all flustered and start to blush 
and think what must they be thinking of me and 
its then that I just want to get away from the 
situation.
D5: Right, so what we've worked out is that you don't
have the evidence for the belief that your 
neighbour thinks you're a weirdo and that by 
thinking that, you start to feel even more 
anxious and panicky and want to leave the 
situation.
R6: Yeah that's it. I've never looked at it like that
before though.
I l l
At RI above, Rachel describes an incident involving an 
interaction with her neighbour, when she began to feel the 
beginnings of a panic-attack. In exploring the meaning of 
this experience for her, I asked at D1 if she could 
remember what she was thinking at the time. My aim here was 
to encourage her self-reflection by clarifying the role 
that her cognitions play in the maintenance of her panic- 
attacks, and how in turn, this relates to her levels of 
arousal and behavioural responses. Between R2 and R4, we 
continue with this exploration of the content of her 
cognitions which, at D4, I ask her to reflect upon further, 
i.e. by asking her whether she has any ’evidence’ for her 
beliefs. At R5 she responds by describing how her thoughts 
mediate the ways she feels and in turn, what she wants to 
do in order to alleviate her anxiety. Lastly, at D5 I 
reflect this back to her in the form of a ’micro’ 
formulation which she connects with at R6. The remainder of 
the session continued with discussion of her thoughts and 
thought processes in relation to her panic-attacks and how 
she may begin to challenge her cognitions by obtaining 
evidence which may refute them, through some simple 
behavioural experiments.
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3) THE ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE & RESEARCH
Williams and Irving (1996, p. 6) state that; "there is 
ultimately no way an externally referenced knowledge base 
can be used to inform an internally referenced process". 
Firstly, in theoretical terms they are referring to a clash 
between the nomothetic and the idiographic, the universal 
and the singular, the group and the individual where 
classification and labelling based upon the ’extensive 
design’ (the pre-selection of a classification or group 
whose defining characteristics are statistically averaged) 
is thought to be at odds with highly unique presentations 
which are phenomenological in nature. However, whereas this 
argument has some logical coherence and basis, nomothology 
and idiography are not mutually exclusive, i.e. the 
individual and the group are co-constituted with each 
defining the other. Thus, the separation of the individual 
and the universal is in part rhetorical (Smith, Harre 
& Van Langenhove, 1995). Secondly, in terms of practice, 
they are questioning the validity of the counselling- 
psychologist as 'sclentist-practltloner', i.e. how can 
psychological (’scientific’) ’external’ knowledge inform 
therapeutic practice dealing with an individual’s unique 
’internal’ sense of reality (phenomenology)?
Through demonstration by a case example below, I will
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illustrate how an externally referenced psychological 
knowledge base combined with my own research, informed my 
therapeutic practice which retained a focus upon the 
client's "internally referenced processes", i.e. his 
phenomenological interpretations of himself and 'reality'. 
The research that informed my practice, was a qualitative 
investigation of post-head injury changes to the 
individual's phenomenology of identity.
3.i) INTEGRATING PHENOMENOLOGY WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL 
KNOWLEDGE & RESEARCH
The client whom I shall refer to here as 'Paul' was 
involved in a road-traffic accident (RTA) in November 1996 
causing a closed head-injury classified as 'moderate' (loss 
of consciousness between 15 minutes and 6 hours) 
considerable lacerations and bruising, a fractured right 
tibia and fibula, injury to his right ankle and diminished 
hearing in his left ear. Medical reports confirm that the 
nature and severity of Paul's head-injury produced diffuse 
organic brain-damage to the frontal and temporal lobes.
Paul was referred to the clinical psychology department by 
his GP in July 1997 to assess his cognitive impairments, 
i.e. his subjective reports suggested impaired memory, 
slowed information processing and poor abstract reasoning.
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Through a later more specialised neuropsychological 
assessment, Paul's reports of impaired memory and 
difficulties with his attention and concentration were 
confirmed by the results of neuro-psychometric tests.
In May 1999 Paul was again referred by his GP for 
problems related to his having difficulty "coming to terms 
with the accident". He was experiencing constricted affect, 
a decline in libido and significant irritability and angry 
outbursts which were causing him problems at home with his 
wife (he was married in 1990) and with his two young sons 
(aged 6 and 2). He was worried that he "was losing his 
mind" and did not understand what was happening to him or 
what he could do about it. In addition, the impairments to 
his memory and difficulties with concentration and 
attention were now beginning to cause him concern at work 
(he teaches A-Levels at an academically high achieving 
school). He was however, managing to maintain his level of 
performance but at a cost, i.e. he was caught up in a 
vicious circle where his high expectations of himself and 
attempts to sustain pre-injury levels of performance and 
coping led to anxiety about his performance where he would 
exert even more effort leaving him feeling distressed, 
fatigued and irritable which only served to increase his 
anxiety about his performance leading to more efforts and 
so on. The salient features of Paul's presentation (and
115
indeed with any brain-injured client) are that organic 
brain damage affects both the physical and the non-physical 
aspects of being; "as such, the organic damage and the 
psychological damage are inseparable" (Judd & Wilson, 1999, 
p. 5).
In our early sessions it became clear that although 
Paul could acknowledge the fact that he had sustained a 
head-injury producing some organic brain-damage and no 
longer felt like his "old self", that he knew virtually 
nothing about the sequelae of his injury and the likely 
course of recovery. Through discussions with my supervisor 
I consulted the literature in order to obtain some accurate 
information and neuro-psychological knowledge about 
’Traumatic Brain Injury’ (TBI) for Paul that related to the 
nature and severity of his injury. When working with brain 
injury survivors, it has been recognised that psychological 
interventions require that the therapist has a basic 
understanding of neurological and neuro-psychological 
deficits, combined with a phenomenological approach to 
practice in order to maximize therapeutic gains (Oddy et 
al., 1996; Prigatano & Klonoff, 1988; Prigatano, 1999).
Thus, having consulted the literature, I produced a short 
one page handout (see Appendix I) for Paul which grouped 
the sequelae under three main headings; physical, cognitive 
and emotional. It also included a brief statement about
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recovery or prognosis, i.e. that most 'spontaneous' 
recovery (a return to previous levels of functioning 
requiring no relearning, i.e. 'effortless') following 
brain-injury usually occurs within the first 6 to 12 months 
post-injury. Any gains beyond this period probably reflect 
adaptation to deficits rather than 'recovery' in a 
physiological sense (Levin, 1987; McAllister, 1997; 
Prigatano, 1999). In Paul's case, he was now over three 
years past this period, well beyond the time-frame where it 
has been found that most spontaneous recovery occurs.
Through providing Paul with this externally referenced 
knowledge in a supportive and empathie manner, there were 
several related therapeutic benefits as follows: 1) it 
facilitated his awareness and understanding of the sequelae 
of his injury; 2) it made his experiences more meaningful 
through demystifying his confusion and distress; 3) it 
allowed him a higher degree of empathy with his current 
situation and what had happened to him; 4) it helped to 
pave the way for his acceptance of limitations where he 
could begin to challenge unrealistic expectations; 5) it 
fostered his trust in myself, our therapeutic relationship 
and process and perhaps most importantly; 6) it facilitated 
phenomenological exploration of Paul's post-injury 
sequelae, i.e. what it is like for him to live with these 
limitations, how he now copes with them (or not) and their
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effects upon his relationships with family, friends, 
colleagues and students. Thus, by providing Paul with basic 
information that he was long overdue in receiving, he was 
able to reconfigure the meanings that he had given to his 
post-injury sequelae and clarify his hopes and expectations 
for the future given his limitations. In fact, with regards 
to providing education about the nature of brain-injury, 
Bennett and Raymond (1997) have found that those brain- 
injury survivors who have been informed about the likely 
sequelae of their injury and the course of recovery are 
less likely to have severe psychological reactions than 
those who have received no information about the effects of 
brain-injury one year or more after injury.
Broadly speaking, the therapeutic approach that I
adopted with Paul comprised three distinct but overlapping
phases as follows; a psycho-educational component related
directly to the sequelae of brain injury; a more directive
CBT approach (teaching Paul relaxation and anxiety
management techniques and other behavioural strategies);
and lastly, an overtly exploratory and phenomenological
focus concerning Paul's reflections upon his post-injury
limitations and differences, and the accompanying changes
between his pre and post-injury sense of identity. As
mentioned above, the transition of identity post brain
injury formed the basis of my second year research on the
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PsychD. and it was this research that I referred to 
when addressing these issues with Paul. Briefly, the aim of 
this qualitative research was to explore the relationship 
between identity and brain-injury from an experiential 
perspective in terms of identity transition post-injury.
The participants’ experiences of identity transition were 
contextualised within terms of Breakwell’s (1986, 1996) 
'Identity Process Theory' (IPT). However, the aim was 
not to test the theory itself but rather, to use it in a 
way which informed the analysis of their phenomenology of 
this process. In addition to using a structured interview 
to obtain the data, I adopted Kuhn and McPartland's (1953) 
identity self-completion sheet (see Appendix II). It was 
this phenomenologically focused 'tool' that I used with 
Paul in order to elicit the meanings he now attributes to 
his sense of identity post-injury, how this has changed 
from his pre-injury sense of identity and what this 
continuing process of transition has been like for him.
As the above discussion has illustrated, the form of
therapeutic integration that I adopted with Paul comprised
several inter-linked and complementary features at both
theoretical and practical levels which maintained a
phenomenological focus. As such, the therapeutic process
involved: 1) education about the nature of TBI and
resulting sequelae and Paul's phenomenology of them; 2) a
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structured CBT approach aimed at anxiety and anger 
management (including the meanings that Paul gives to these 
affective responses) and; 3) a research informed 
exploration of Paul’s current phenomenology of identity and 
its post-injury transition, involving exploration and 
clarification of the four existential realms of existence 
as they applied to this process. Thus, the umwelt is a 
primary dimension as the nature of Paul’s injury and 
resulting sequelae are organic in origin; the mitwelt is a 
salient feature as Paul attempts to accommodate his 
deficits when interacting with (or withdrawing from)others; 
the eigenwelt is a prominent realm as Paul’s phenomenology 
of identity has undergone a traumatic and irreversible 
shift post-injury and lastly, the uberwelt underpins the 
other three realms as Paul struggles to find a new sense of 
purpose and values guiding his pursuit of an enriching and 
meaningful way forward, having survived the trauma of the 
injury experience and having to adapt to the life-long 
effects of TBl.
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4) EVALUATION OF PRACTICE
The evaluation of my therapeutic practice is not 
something that I simply 'do’ or reflect upon at the end of 
a contracted piece of therapy, conceptualised solely in 
terms of therapy outcome. Rather, it is an ongoing and 
relational process throughout the course of therapy which 
is facilitated by several inter-linked elements which taken 
as a whole, provide me with a wealth of complementary and 
evaluative feedback about my practice. Thus, evaluation is 
both multi-faceted and temporal, i.e. evaluation comes from 
different sources, addressing different issues at different 
points throughout the course of therapy. However, I am not 
suggesting that outcome is not important but rather, that 
process and outcome are inextricably linked and that their 
separation as discrete entities is somewhat artificial. 
Therefore, my view of evaluation is more comprehensive, 
addressing a wider range of related features within my 
practice.
Thus, I regard that the evaluation of my practice 
involves integrating a triumvirate of: 1) my personal 
reflections (or ’internal’ supervision) about my practice, 
the therapeutic relationship and process both within and 
between sessions; 2) direct feedback from clients within 
(and sometimes between) sessions and 3) regular supervision
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where I may discuss (and receive feedback on)everything 
from my assessment and formulation to the therapeutic 
relationship and process developed to-date, to my 
therapeutic approach taken and justifications of decisions 
made and action taken. In addition, 1 ensure that my 
practice is in accordance with the ’Guidelines for the 
Professional Practice of Counselling Psychology’ "in 
pursuit of best practice" (BPS, DCoP, 1998, p. 2).
This three tiered evaluative process underpinned by 
the guidelines of ethical practice, necessitates appraisals 
of both theory and practice. Thus, the theoretical 
dimension concerns my understandings of the client and 
their difficulties as outlined initially in my assessment 
and formulation, i.e. do my client and myself have a shared 
understanding of the nature of their difficulties, their 
development and maintenance as expressed within the 
client’s phenomenology? In turn, this relates directly to 
practice where evaluative feedback (or ’data’) from the 
client within session will become manifest primarily within 
the context of our therapeutic relationship established to 
date. In other words, the quality of that relationship, the 
strength (or lack of) of our working alliance and how we 
relate within sessions. McLeod (1994) demonstrates how this 
in itself, is one aspect of the scientist-practitioner 
model, i.e. that all aspects of the client’s in-session
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presentation provide me with a wealth of data about how to 
proceed, where I am able to test the validity of my 
understandings through interpretations or other therapeutic 
interventions. In turn, the quality of the therapeutic 
relationship will largely inform the therapeutic process 
but, this does not necessitate in and of itself, a 
’successful’ therapy outcome. Lastly, regular supervision 
is essential for the evaluation of my practice, especially 
given this early stage of my therapeutic career. Thus, an 
experienced therapist/supervisor is able to ’step-back’ and 
look at my work from a different perspective, facilitating 
discussion and reflection upon both theoretical and 
practical levels which in terms of evaluative feedback, 
directly informs my therapeutic practice and in turn, the 
therapeutic process and relationship.
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CONCLUSIONS
Throughout the present discussion I have illustrated 
how my approach to therapeutic practice and integration is 
primarily phenomenological and collaborative in nature. As 
such, this openness to jointly exploring clients’ multiple 
interpretations of their experiences and sense of reality 
is able to incorporate a phenomenological exploration of 
the developmental perspectives proposed by the metaphors 
and analogies of psychodynamic theory and the mediational 
focus of CBT concerned with the central and reciprocal 
relation of meaning to both emotion and behaviour. In 
addition, I have argued that the scientist-practitioner 
model is not mutually exclusive with a phenomenological 
focus by demonstrating how psychological knowledge and 
research have informed my practice whilst not foregrounding 
either to the detriment of identifying and exploring the 
client’s interpretations of meaning and sense of reality.
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APPENDIX I 
COMMON AFTEREFFECTS OF A HEAD-INJURY
PHYSICAL
- Fatigue - tire easily
- Headaches
- Sensitivity to noise
- Sensitivity to light
COGNITIVE
- Impaired Memory
- Fluctuating Concentration & Attention 
Slowed Information Processing
- Poor Abstract Reasoning
EMOTIONAL
- Increased Irritability & Frustration
- Impatience
- Anxiety
- Depression
- Rapid mood changes
- Loss of drive/initiative
- Reduced self-esteem & self-image
* The majority of spontaneous recovery occurs in the 
first 6-12 months following injury. There is a less 
dramatic improvement in the 2nd year post-injury.
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APPENDIX II 
PARTICIPANT'S SELF-COMPLETION SHEET 2 
(Kuhn, M.H. & McPartland, T.S., 1953)
There are twenty numbered spaces on the page below. Using each 
space only once, please write up to twenty answers to the question 'Who 
am I?' Answer as if you were providing the answers to yourself only and 
not to someone else. Please write the answers as quickly as you can as 
they occur to you.
3 .
6. 
t7“
8 7 "
97 “
ÎÔ7 
ÎÎ7
127
îsT
147
157
167
Î77
187
19.
207
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Research Dossier
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Research Dossier
Three research reports are included in this dossier, one from each year. Together 
they constitute a single research programme investigating psychological 
interventions with brain injury survivors. The initial paper reviewed the existing 
literature concerning how sustaining a brain injury affects the survivor’s sense of 
identity. This theme was explored by the second year paper which qualitatively 
investigated the experiences of such individuals. Lastly, the final year’s paper 
examined how therapists perceive the challenges to forming a working alliance 
with brain injury survivors, and how their therapeutic practice is modified in light 
of the challenges identified.
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Identity post brain injury: 
a review of the literature.
Abstract
Objective: It is well established that sustaining a brain injury has significant 
effects upon how the survivor construes their sense of identity. However, 
relatively Httle is known about this post-injury transitional phase and which 
psychological interventions may be best suited to addressing this issue. The aim of 
this article was to present an overview of present understandings.
Design: A literature search of professional journals, books and electronic data 
bases published after 1980.
Results: Most research into identity transition following brain injury has been 
quantitative in nature and the provision and knowledge base of psychotherapy in 
this field is still within its early stages of development.
Conclusion: Identity transition needs to be grounded within a theoretical 
framework which allows for individual variations but which is also guided by 
generic psychological processes. In order to assist the brain injury survivor in this 
process of identity renegotiation, an experiential/phenomenological approach to 
psychotherapy is most appropriate.
Keywords: Identity, Brain injury. Phenomenology, Experiential, Psychotherapy
-135-
INTRODUCTION
Being a trainee in the relatively 'new' field of 
Counselling Psychology, my particular interest and 
enthusiasm in researching changes to identity brought about 
by a brain injury, are rooted in two very personal, and 
highly significant experiences.
Firstly, through working as a nurse or 'care-worker'
with brain injury survivors in both psychiatric and
community settings, 1 have been able to see first hand, the
sometimes devastating and traumatic effects upon the
person's sense of identity, and their daily struggle with
feelings of loss, isolation, anger and resentment, coupled
with their search for meaning and equally, with a search
for understanding from others. Secondly, and no less
importantly, my own severe head injury sustained in
February of this year. This involved an extra-dural
haematoma brought about by a compound fracture of the
skull from which, to my amazement, even now, 1 have made a
full and rapid recovery. Thus, through an interaction of
almost infinite variables, 1 am alive and in good health,
with the experience allowing me a new perspective and
understanding of life. Also, 1 now have the good fortune
brought about by this experience, to be able to relate
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directly and empathise considerably with those who were 
less fortunate than myself. Experientially, in terms of 
research or, my own therapeutic practice, I could certainly 
have come no closer to an understanding of what it may 
actually feel like to ’lose’ my pre-injury sense of 
identity, in such a traumatic, and ’instantaneous’ manner. 
In this sense, perhaps I now have a phenomenological 
advantage over other psychologists and researchers.
Brain injury is one of the most devastating, 
disempowering, and seemingly incomprehensible experiences 
that an individual, as well as their family, can suffer.
Its complex organic, psychological and psychosocial effects 
may be life-long, requiring a careful renegotiation and 
adaptation both of identity for the brain injury survivor, 
as well as the roles and relationships within the family. 
Even the strongest family support systems can be strained 
by the trauma of injury(1). Often, some family members may 
withdraw completely, as they are unable to accept, adapt to 
and deal with the changes and stresses involved(1). 
Following injury, the ’cognitive self’ which is central to 
the phenomenological interpretation of identity and the 
world around us may falter, and along with it both the 
cognitive means to a sense of identity and the resulting 
identity itself(2). As discussed by Lemma(2), organic brain
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damage needs to be conceptualised within a framework which 
acknowledges the effects upon both the physical, and the 
non-physical aspects of being. As such, the organic damage 
and the psychological damage are forever relational and are 
therefore, permanently inseparable. Moreover, the injury 
may be located within the individual, but the changes 
produced by its effects and their implications are 
inextricably linked both with, and in, the social. Thus, 
brain injury is a personal, social and cultural problem 
i.e., personal, as the survivor struggles to accept and 
adapt to their ’new' identity, social, because they are in 
constant relation to others, and cultural, because a 
culture largely determines how its minorities (including 
those with disabilities) are to be perceived and treated 
and defines the socially valued symbols or frameworks 
through which our lives are guided. Furthermore, its 
psychosocial impact may be exacerbated by its relative 
sudden and immediate onset which, unlike other chronic 
conditions, allows the injured and their family less time 
in which to accept, understand, and adapt to such traumatic 
and irrevocable change. Thus, the breadth and severity of 
such change, can often deprive life of its meaning for 
those that are injured(2). Some may question their sense of 
spirituality, as their entire belief systems are shaken as 
the result of the trauma. Having survived the initial
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physiological trauma of injury, there now ensues a 
seemingly endless struggle for the brain injury survivor to 
regain some mastery over those physical, psychological and 
social skills which were previously always taken for 
granted(3). Within this struggle, Harrell and O'Hara (1) 
recognise that the most difficult challenge lies in the 
acceptance of personal losses, where the survivor attempts 
to integrate new aspects of the post-injury 'self, into 
the pre-injury self-concept. Thus, how does the 'new me' 
fit with the 'old me' and, is this possible?
In terms of the relationship between brain injury and 
identity, Tyerman and Humphrey(3) found significant 
reported changes in self-concept as described by their 
brain injured participants. Specifically, 72% of 
participants reported some personality change coupled with 
feelings of being "relatively helpless", "unattractive", 
"worthless" and, particularly self conscious concerning 
their various disabilities. Thus, there was a particularly 
expressed view of a dislike for 'the new me', highlighting 
the personal threat of brain injury. This may be likened to 
the process of mourning, where the individual has to adapt 
to the loss of their former identity, manifest in the range 
of limitations imposed upon them by the organic 
damage to their brain(2).
139
Although Tyerman and Humphrey(3) did not investigate 
the relationship between ’identity’ and brain injury per 
se, their notion of ’self-concept’ may be synonymous with 
identity in that, they both refer to some phenomenological 
or experiential aspects of the ’self’. Thus, any semantic 
differences may be of an arbitrary nature. However, their 
study could have expanded upon the phenomenology of brain 
injury survivors by using more of a qualitative approach. 
This would have allowed for a greater richness of 
expression in the data which, may have been used to revise 
existing theories, suggest new avenues of investigation, 
and not least, to broaden psychology’s understanding from 
an experiential perspective. Such an approach would also 
aid the planning and evaluation of therapeutic 
rehabilitative measures.
Nochi(4) adopted a qualitative and phenomenological
approach to investigate the effects of brain injury upon
the individual's sense of 'self, through examining the
relationship between the ways in which brain injury
survivors understand themselves and their self-produced
narratives (or stories). The analysis of the narratives
suggested that they feel as if they are carrying a 'void'
(or a 'disturbing unknown') in their understandings of
their present 'self and their past (4). This may suggest
that the participants' identities are in a process of
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tentative renegotiation, and that the concept of 'void' 
represents a transitional phase which itself, is uncertain. 
However, this study lacks a clearly specified theoretical 
framework for describing and explaining the 'self, 
resulting in data which are somewhat fragmented and 
disjunctive.
Kravertz et al.(5) investigating the relationship 
between self-concept, marital vulnerability and brain 
damage, utilised the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (6) as a 
tool to assess their participants' evaluations of 'self. 
The confines imposed by their quantitative approach to 
understanding the 'self however, limit the breadth and 
depth of individual expression, inhibiting a comprehensive 
and phenomenological understanding of the 'self.
Before discussing either the concept of 'identity' and 
its relationship with brain injury (with particular 
reference to Breakwell's (7,8) Identity Process Theory) or 
Counselling Psychology's use of psychotherapy as a 
rehabilitative measure, a brief overview of the 
epidemiology of brain injury shall follow. This precedes a 
brief discussion of the methodological problems involved in 
assessing the social, emotional and behavioural sequelae of 
brain injury. These discussions contextualise the remainder 
of this review, enabling a more rounded and comprehensive 
understanding.
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EPIDEMIOLOGY OF BRAIN INJURY
Firstly, there often appears to be a confusing 
synonymous usage of the terms ^brain Injury^ and 'head 
Injury', i.e. head injury used as a term for brain injury. 
In strict definition, a 'head injury' may comprise any 
injury to the face or head either including or excluding 
a brain injury. Although it has been suggested that head 
injury and brain injury should be distinguished at least 
for epidemiological purposes, there is evidence that 
structural damage to the brain can be found even in those 
whose injuries seem to be mild; therefore, it has been 
argued that the concept of non-neurological head injury is 
not justified(9).
The majority of brain injuries are 'closed injuries',
i.e. the skull is not penetrated(10). The ensuing brain
damage is usually caused by processes such as coup,
contrecoup, acceleration, deceleration or rotational
forces(10). Causes include vehicle accidents, assaults and
Falls(10). Apart from traumatic injuries, other forms of
closed damage to the brain can be found through disease
processes such as stroke, seizure disorders, dementia of
the Alzheimer's type (DAT) or, any type of brain damage
which is organic in origin(10). 'Open' injuries are those
where the skull is penetrated, such as through a bullet
142
Wound(lO). Any resulting deficits are dependent upon the 
missle's path within the brain.
The severity of head injury can be classified as 
minor, moderate, severe, or very severe, measured through 
criteria such as the duration of coma or post-traumatic 
amnesia(11). Loss of consciousness of less than 15 minutes 
can be classified as minor, less than six hours as 
moderate, six hours or more as severe, and 48 hours and 
above, as very severe(11). This last category also includes 
injuries where there is evidence of an intracranial 
haematoma or brain contusion(11).
The severity of effects ranges from transient 
disturbances in memory, attention and concentration in 
minor head injury, to possible difficulties in cognitive 
processes, emotional problems, behavioural disorders, 
physical disability, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
and psychiatric problems in severe head injury(12). The 
occurrence and severity of problems varies between 
individuals, as does the extent to which problems resolve 
and the time base over which this takes place. However, the 
time frame for recovery from severe brain injury has to be 
conceptualised in terms of years(13,14).
In the UK, road accidents account for most injuries 
(50 - 60%) followed by falls (20%) assaults (10 - 15%) and
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sports or other recreational related activities (10%) (15) . 
Violence accounts for a higher percentage of injuries from 
studies based within urban areas(15). Alcohol is also an 
important contributory with its influence most represented 
in road accidents. It is also a common feature in victims 
of assaults, falls and suicides(9). There are however, 
national and age related variations in the distribution of 
causes(9). In terms of incidence, males outnumber females 
two or three-to-one, and 15 to 24 year olds, are the most 
frequently injured(9).
Unfortunately, there are substantial limitations 
placed upon the available data on brain injury, with 
reliable and accurate statistics being difficult to 
collate(9). Thus, data from hospitals which are produced 
from the codes of the International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD) are based upon pathological, rather than on 
clinical criteria(9). For instance, intracranial haematoma 
is classified by a criterion which excludes those with a 
skull fracture, whereas 75% of such injuries are associated 
with a skull fracture(9). ICD codes are also an unreliable 
means through which to identify the severity of injury, 
i.e. they do not allow for the duration of impaired 
consciousness to be recorded. Other problems include 
variations in coding between hospitals and inflated figures 
due to the possible double counting of patients transferred
144
between hospitals(9). Clinical reports from neurosurgeons 
are also of limited value as they tend to focus upon the 5% 
10% of severe or complicated injuries(9). Likewise, reports 
from pathologists focus upon selected injury types, with 
those from forensic settings comprising mainly 
instantaneous deaths or those who died shortly after 
injury(9).
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METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN ASSESSING PSYCHOLOGICAL 
RECOVERY FROM BRAIN INJURY
The accurate assessment of the social, emotional and 
behavioural sequelae of brain injury is important, not only 
as it increases our understanding of the injury's effects 
but it also allows measurement of the effects of 
rehabilitative methods and procedures(16). There are 
however, a number of methodological issues to be considered 
in relation to such assessment.
In a recent study comparing the subjective complaints
of a group of 50 traumatically brain injured patients with
the observations of their significant others, Sbordone,
Seyranian and Ruff(17) found that regardless of severity of
injury, the number of subjective complaints of both
emotional and cognitive/behavioural problems by the
patients were significantly fewer than those observed by
their significant others; the differences in the reporting
of somatic complaints however, were not statistically
significant. As all the patients were being assessed as
part of a compensation claim (and were therefore, assumed
if anything, to be liable to over-report their
difficulties) it was concluded that the discrepancy must be
accounted for by poor awareness of their cognitive,
behavioural and emotional problems rather than by denial of
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disabilities. This implies however, that financial 
compensation is of paramount importance. Conversely, it 
could be argued that a renegotiation of identity would be 
far more distressing and pertinent for the head injury 
survivor than a reduction in the level of financial 
compensation.
These findings on the discrepancies between patients’ 
and relatives’ accounts are in accordance with those of 
McKinlay and Brooks (16) who reported high levels of 
agreement between patients and their relatives in reporting 
sensory and motor impairments but less so in reporting 
cognitive, behavioural and emotional changes. They examined 
the relationship between the discrepancy between the 
patients’ and relatives’ accounts (i.e. the ’lack of 
insight’ shown by the patients) and the severity of the 
cognitive deficits from which the patients suffered but 
found no relationship. From this they conceded the 
possibility that not all discrepancies need to be due to 
the patients’ inaccuracies. An assessment of the relatives’ 
personalities using the Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire(18) showed a correlation between neuroticism 
scores and their reports of emotional/behavioural changes 
in the patients and also the degree of stress experienced 
by the relatives. They therefore concluded that the 
personality of the informants may colour the accounts they
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give both of the changes in the patient and the degrees of 
stress they are suffering.
McKinlay and Brooks (16) also noted the difficulties in 
disentangling the psychological effects of the brain injury 
per se from the adverse psychological reactions to being 
injured, having a life threatening experience, being 
hospitalised and so on and advocated studies that make use 
of control groups such as paraplegics. It may however, be 
more difficult to identify an adverse psychological 
reaction than was envisaged. There is often a sense of 
euphoria or manic excitement observed in those who have 
survived a brain injury which is often interpreted as a 
defensive measure against loss; however, whilst this may be 
the case at times, it may also be understood more simply as 
a person's relief about being alive, rather than in terms 
of a pathologised response to trauma(2). In considering the 
effects of brain injury upon the individual, care must be 
taken to consider the possible contributory processes and 
the potential sources of bias in the information and from 
whom it is supplied.
In terms of research into the specific sequelae of
brain injury, a 'catchall' type category based upon the
'extensive' design may compound the problems identified
above through sticking too closely to some criteria for
exclusion/inclusion, whilst overlooking others. This is not
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stating however, that such research cannot be undertaken
but rather, that it is better suited to an idlographic
framework, based upon mass data collection from many
individuals. Here, the analysis of data is 'within person'
where the individual remains central, not subordinated to a
general theoretical position(19). Lamiell(20) proposes that
due to the fragmented nature of the data collected, the
empirical findings generated by individual differences
research cannot possibly be interpreted at the level of the
individual and consequently, cannot inform a theory of
individual behaviour or psychological functioning. Thus,
such research cannot logically establish that something is
the case for each of many individuals and as such, cannot
possibly be suited to the task of establishing 'general
laws' based upon nomothetic epistemologies(20). As
Allport(21) suggests, "starting too soon with analysis and
classification, we run the risk of tearing mental life into
fragments by beginning with false cleavages that
misrepresent the salient organisations and natural
integrations in personal life". It has been argued, that
without a data base formed from the workings of the
'intensive' design, psychology as a science of the
individual cannot, logically, substantively or usefully
proceed(19). As such, idiography is intended to demonstrate
existence, not incidence, the detailed examination of which
cannot be carried out statistically(22). Therefore, in
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relation to future research into the effects of brain 
injury upon identity, effects that have happened only once, 
with just one individual, still require explanation. 
Furthermore, and perhaps most crucially, the sharp decrease 
in mortality from brain injury over the past decade 
intensifies the need for such research and therapeutic 
development, as there are now an increasing number of brain 
injury survivors with chronic neuropsychiatrie 
difficulties(15).
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'IDENTITY
ASSUMPTIONS & DEFINITIONS
'Identity' is a complex, multi-faceted concept which 
has been much conceptualised through varying definitions, 
accompanying features and proposed developmental 
frameworks, which are all underpinned by their own central 
underlying psychological theory with governing assumptions 
and propositions. Thus, its very definition is context 
dependent. Perhaps at the more general level, it can be 
defined as "the internal, subjective concept of oneself as 
an individual"(23). Alternatively, it may be proposed as 
"all things a person may legitimately and reliably say 
about himself (sic) - his status, his name, his 
personality, his past life"(24). Thus, it is a protean 
concept which reflects that "unique syndrome of social, 
psychological and behavioural characteristics"(7) 
differentiating one person from another. As examples of the 
differing theoretical interpretations and applications of 
'identity', the following theorists illustrate the highly 
nebulous nature of the concept.
Erikson(25), working from the psychoanalytic
tradition, proposed identity within a stage model,
regarding it as a resulting structure formed through the
successful resolution of specific developmental tasks at
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specific points across the lifespan. McCall and Simmons(2 6) 
from the symbolic interactionist perspective, assert that 
identity is the result of negotiated social interactions 
where the socially prescribed role of the individual 
determines the identity. As such, each person will have as 
many 'identities’ as they have social roles.
These two brief theoretical descriptions highlight not 
only how identity may be defined but also, how their 
applications within a research context shape the nature of 
the data and any conclusions drawn. As shall be elaborated 
upon below, I feel that Breakwell's (7,8) 'Identity Process 
Theory' is the most theoretically and practically suited 
theory through which to frame the effects of brain injury 
upon identity. This is because of its highly adaptive 
nature across situations, its inherent fluidity within 
situations and, not least of all, its comparative 
parsimony, focus, and clarity of expression. As such, it 
lacks the restrictive theoretical confines of stage models, 
focuses upon the individual as well as the social (allowing 
for phenomenological expression) and is also culturally 
adaptable which is reflected in its capacity to accommodate 
different individual, social, cultural and political 
circumstances. Furthermore, and most importantly, it not 
only provides a more rigorous and comprehensive reconcept­
ualisation of identity, but also proposes a systematic
examination of 'threats' to identity, and the subsequent
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coping strategies that are employed. This is all the more 
highly relevant when contextualised within the area of 
brain injury specifically, as it necessitates a thorough 
renegotiation of identity which may require a multiplicity 
of coping strategies with varying degrees of effectiveness,
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BREAKWELL'S(7,8) IDENTITY PROCESS 
THEORY
Breakwell(7) proposes that identity should be 
construed as an integrated, dynamic social product of the 
interaction between psychological processes and surrounding 
social context. Thus, it can only be understood in relation 
to its embeddedness within a particular social and 
historical context. Furthermore, identity is couched within 
psychological processes but becomes manifest through 
thought, action and affect. Therefore, it is regarded as a 
social-psychological entity, linking intrapsychic and 
socio-political processes, demonstrating how both inform 
the workings of identity. As such, it may be described in 
terms of its structural components and underlying 
processes. These are discussed in full below.
It must be noted that following injury to the brain, 
the psychological processes in which identity resides and 
through which it is manifested may be subject to disruption 
or damage. However, the relationship between cognitive 
processes and identity processes requires "considerable 
conceptual clarification before empirical studies would 
prove fruitful"(7).
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IDENTITY STRUCTURE
Breakwell(7) describes the structure of identity as 
comprising two planes: the 'Content’ dimension and the 
'Value' dimension.
THE CONTENT DIMENSION
This is concerned with the defining properties of the 
individual's identity, i.e., the characteristics through 
which the individual describes him/herself which, taken 
collectively as a syndrome, distinguish him or her from all 
others. Although many of the elements comprising the 
content dimension may be shared by many others, their 
specific grouping and expression will be unique to that 
individual. Thus, the content dimension comprises features 
originally attributed both to 'personal' identity (values, 
attitudes, beliefs etc.) and 'social' identity (social 
roles, group memberships etc.). The dichotomy between 
personal and social identity is refuted by this model 
because, when regarded across the context of an 
individual's biography, 'social' identity is seen to become 
'personal' identity, i.e., any distinction is temporal. 
Thus, the emphasis is upon the organisation of the 
constituent parts rather than whether they construe two 
different levels or types of identity.
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THE VALUE DIMENSION
This concerns the value that is attributed to each 
element within the content dimension. This may be either 
positive or negative, depending upon the interaction 
between socially prescribed beliefs and values and 
previously established personal values. However, the values 
that are attributed to the self-defining characteristics 
(the content) are under constant revision and appraisal, as 
a consequence of changes within social value systems and 
the individual’s position in relation to them. As such, 
this entails that the overall value of identity is in a 
state of perpetual flux (although to the individual 
concerned it may not be experienced in this way). Thus, in 
terms of both content and value, the structure of identity 
is regarded as a dynamic entity responsive to the 
surrounding social context.
IDENTITY PROCESSES
The structure of identity as outlined above in the 
content and value dimensions, is said to be governed and 
regulated by the "universal psychological processes" (7) of 
’assimilation - accommodation’ and ’evaluation’. 
Assimilation and accommodation are distinguishable 
processes but are also highly interdependent. Assimilation
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refers to the absorption of new components into the 
identity structure, whilst accommodation refers to the 
adaptation of the existing structure in order to integrate 
the new elements. Evaluation refers to the attribution of 
value and meaning to the identity content both pre and post 
assimilation, i.e., it determines what is assimilated and 
the degree of accommodation necessary. The processes of 
assimilation and accommodation establish the values 
incorporated into the identity structure against which 
evaluation must take place.
IDENTITY PRINCIPLES
The principles outlined here specify the fundamental
criteria by which the processes discussed above are guided.
In short, the principles define the end states which are
desirable for the identity structure. However, they are
also temporally and culturally specific. In Western
industrialised cultures, there are said to be four primary
guiding principles which are as follows; distinctiveness
(the person’s desire to be unique), continuity (the
person’s desire to give a consistent account of themselves
across time), self-esteem (the person’s desire to be
evaluated positively) and self-efficacy (the person’s
striving to be competent)(7,8,27). These principles may
vary in their prominence over time and across situations
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and are also historically and socially defined. They will 
also vary developmentally, as cognitive development 
parallels changes in social understanding and the 
accompanying processes of socialisation (especially in 
relation to the development of morality(28).
THE ORIGIN OF
THREATS TO IDENTITY
A threat to identity can be defined as occurring when 
identity processes are unable to comply with identity 
principles(7). It is the reason underlying this disruption 
of the identity processes which constitutes the threat(7). 
The origin of the threat can be regarded as either internal 
or external. Internally, it results when the individual 
alters his or her position in relation to the social matrix 
in accordance with one specific identity principle only to 
find that this contravenes another. An external threat 
occurs when some change in the social context itself, 
requires identity changes that are not compatible with one 
or more of the identity principles. In this latter origin 
of threat, the individual does not move within the social 
matrix but rather, it moves around the individual, changing
the meaning of the position that he or she occupies (7) .
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This is particularly prominent for brain injury, as the 
survivor finds themself ’transported’ to a new, ’foreign’, 
uncertain, and perhaps frightening social matrix, such as 
an acute rehabilitation setting. However, not all changes 
are threatening, only those which challenge the principles 
fixing the integrity of identity(7). Thus, on the content 
dimension, threats challenge either the continuity or 
distinctiveness of self definition and on the value 
dimension, threats challenge self-esteem.
In relation to brain injury, both dimensions will be 
affronted simultaneously, i.e. the sense of continuity of 
self definition may be broken (as in regards to the 
individual’s occupation, for example) and any deficits 
brought about by injury (whether of a cognitive or more 
personal, relationship nature) may impair self-esteem. 
Again, this illustrates the reciprocal interplay between 
organic and psychological damage, specifically in relation 
to how, and through what ways the brain injury affects the 
survivor’s sense of identity. The personal meaning that is 
attributed by the brain injury survivor will depend upon 
their belief systems and values assimilated into their 
sense of identity throughout life. This will also have an 
effect upon the coping strategies employed, i.e. the degree 
to which the individual is located within a specific 
identity (located within their content and value dimensions
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and related to their personal beliefs and values) will 
partly determine their ability through which they are able 
to accept, adapt to and cope with the changes imposed 
upon them. In predicting coping strategies, both the 
personal and social significance of the injury needs to be 
considered. However, any ’threat’ is of a temporal nature 
and may be short lived. Given the irreversible nature of 
organic brain damage, the effects here are life-long. This 
does not mean, however, that the brain injury survivor 
cannot adapt to such intensive personal and social changes 
and reconfigure their sense of identity accordingly. 
However, ’’where the threat so disrupts the processes of 
identity that very central and highly salient elements in 
the content and value dimensions of identity are 
challenged, coping strategies cam be mere palliatives’’(7) . 
Thus, a brain injury can be regarded as a form of ’chronic 
threat’. The energy devoted by the individual to keep it in 
check and to control its implications can be such a drain, 
that there is little time or life left over, for anything 
else (7). In situations of this type, such a struggle takes 
over the individual’s whole life(7). These issues of 
coping, acceptance and adaptation in relation to identity 
shall be discussed in the following section on 
psychotherapy with brain injury survivors.
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PSYCHOTHERAPY IN THE
REHABILITATION OF BRAIN INJURY SURVIVORS
Historically, psychotherapy has not been considered 
useful for the rehabilitation of brain injured persons(29). 
It was Goldstein(30) who established the first modern, 
psychosocially oriented rehabilitation programme for 
traumatically brain injured (TBI) soldiers in Frankfurt 
Germany, in 1917. Here, the emphasis was placed upon 
psychological testing and graded work experiences as 
rehabilitative measures(30). He did not however, promote 
the role of psychotherapy.
Several factors appear to have contributed to the
potential role of psychotherapy as a rehabilitative feature
in the care of brain injury survivors being overlooked. To
begin with, there existed a gross presumption that brain
injury survivors could not benefit from psychotherapy
because of permanent cognitive, linguistic and affective
disturbances(29). This is largely due to psychology’s long
standing relationship with the natural sciences model of
the ’logical positivistic’ paradigm, i.e. concerned with
the generation of universal laws based on causal relations
between variables, which ignores both the search for
phenomenological meaning and the knowledge of particulars.
Given the dominance of this framework within mainstream
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psychology, it appears that brain injury has been an
excluding variable for psychotherapy because it may not fit
well with existing models of cognition, language and
emotion based upon the ’universal' non-brain injured
person. This is exacerbated by the vagueness in defining
psychotherapy itself and the purposes of its interventions,
especially in relation to brain injury. Lastly, neuro-
logically oriented clinicians have found it difficult to
combine their more ’concrete’ language of brain function
and structure, with the more ’nebulous’ language and
principles of psychotherapy(29). Consequently, and to their
possible detriment, many brain injury survivors have not
had the opportunity to be offered psychotherapy as a
central feature of their post-acute rehabilitation.
Furthermore, many therapists often overestimate the
differences between neurologically impaired and neuro-
logically ’normal’ individuals and underestimate the extent
to which brain injury survivors struggle with the same
psychosocial issues as everyone else(31). This is related
to another misconception on part of therapists, that brain
damage is a monolithic entity preventing the brain damaged
person from engaging in the processes of psychotherapy(31).
Another important aspect related to therapists’ reluctance
to work with brain injury survivors, discussed by Gans(32),
is the ubiquitous and reciprocal phenomenon of "hate"
within rehabilitative processes and settings. Gans(32)
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concludes that therapists often retreat from brain injured 
clients in order to evade their own feelings of guilt, 
anxiety and insecurity associated with their "hatred" of 
the client’s disability and conversely, there is the 
client’s "hatred" of the therapist for being able bodied 
and able minded. Thus, the client may be all too aware that 
their therapist has not ’lost’ his/her identity through 
sustaining a brain injury.
Therefore, given the complex interaction of variables
within and between client and therapist, brain injury
survivors should not be excluded from psychotherapy because
they are not considered ’psychologically minded’(29). It is
the responsibility of the therapist to find ways in which
to engage with such clients, so that their cognitive
functioning can be better understood. Thus, the task is to
determine how information should be presented in order to
provide a maximal learning experience(29). Prigatano(29)
states that music, art, literature and stories (even fairy
tales and childhood stories) may help certain brain injured
clients learn to behave in their own best self interest and
to find for themselves, a meaning in their lives in the
face of, and not despite, their injury. Therefore, keeping
it simple may also keep it meaningful. As such, it is not
therapeutic to force survivors of brain injury to move at
the therapist’s pace or the pace that the therapist feels
is appropriate(1). As with other types of healing, persons
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make changes and take risks when it feels safe to do so. As 
such, problems occur in rehabilitation when clients 
feel out of control (1).
At its most simple, the practice and aim of psycho­
therapy can be understood as a means through which a 
troubled individual is helped to reduce their distress and 
enjoy greater life satisfaction through changing their 
thoughts, feelings and behaviour(33). This is achieved 
through the therapeutic relationship between therapist and 
client. Ideally, clients enter psychotherapy with 
attributes and attitudes conducive to the formation and 
development of a sound working alliance(31). These comprise 
an open approach to the therapist, an interest in working 
collaboratively with the therapist in order to effect 
change in him/herself and the willingness to think and 
speak about thoughts and feelings both in and outside of 
the therapy sessions(31). These are features defining 
aspects of the therapeutic alliance which have been shown 
to be correlated with positive treatment outcomes(34). 
Consequently, the individual is enabled to live a more 
self-reliant and autonomous existence(29). Thus, psycho­
therapy is about self-empowerment and not happiness(35). 
Happiness, when it occurs, is a by-product of various 
interrelated events which psychotherapy cannot and does not 
promise to deliver(29).
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There are however, a variety of differing psycho­
therapeutic theories and models with each comprising its 
own assumptions of the aetiology of the individual's 
difficulties and with each proposing its own theoretical 
and therapeutic course of redress. Nevertheless, any and 
all forms of psychotherapy are aimed at improving the 
individual’s quality of life and personal sense of 
empowerment through the therapeutic relationship formed 
between therapist and client.
WHEN SHOULD PSYCHOTHERAPY BE INCLUDED
IN BRAIN INJURY REHABILITATION?
Every person who has sustained a brain injury should 
not be routinely referred to psychotherapeutic services. 
Individuals in rehabilitation who are having difficulties 
engaging with it but who also appear to have the potential 
to establish a productive lifestyle should be referred. 
However, those who are actively involved in their 
rehabilitation or who are focusing on an aspect which does 
not explicitly involve issues of interpersonal relation­
ships or productivity, should not be routinely referred. 
Thus, it should not be automatically assumed that
individuals should be talked with concerning their
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emotional, personal and motivational problems(29). This 
applies as much to those who are not brain injured and 
subsequently 'drop-out’ of therapy because discussion and 
reflection upon painful emotions and experiences proves to 
be beyond the range of their inner resources and coping 
abilities. However, this does not mean that the opportunity 
of engaging with such services should not be made available 
to those who have sustained a brain injury. On this theme 
of the ’appropriateness’ or the potential efficacy of 
therapy. Van Deurzen-Smith(3 6) working from an existential 
framework states that, "this quest can only be undertaken 
if the client is ready to examine the crucial issues and 
question his/her own basic assumptions". Conversely, "those 
who run from their inner anxieties will experience the 
stalled anxiety even more acutely later"(36). As such, 
those people who try their hardest to deny the realities of 
life will also be those same people who will be most 
forcefully reminded of their own limitations. Therefore, in 
relation to brain injury specifically, the timing of 
psychotherapy is extremely important and is an area needing 
to be further researched if a comprehensive understanding 
of therapeutic issues with brain injury survivors is to be 
achieved(29).
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I shall now discuss Lewis's(31) framework for 
developing a psychotherapy treatment plan with brain 
injured clients which, combined with Breakwell’s (7,8) model 
of identity, provides a theoretically structured and 
therapeutically facultative means through which to 
address the effects upon identity of a brain injury.
A FRAMEWORK FOR PSYCHOTHERAPY WITH
BRAIN INJURED CLIENTS
Lewis(31) proposes four interrelated issues which 
collectively shape the brain injured client’s attitudes 
towards and experience of, psychotherapy. A careful 
assessment of these factors can aid the therapist in 
anticipating how each client will relate during psycho­
therapy and therefore, how to structure the therapy so as 
to maximize the client’s opportunity to make it an 
enriching and meaningful experience(31). Lewis’s (31) four 
identified issues are as follows: 1) the neurological 
disorder and resultant cognitive deficits; 2) the psycho­
logical meaning and impact of the deficit on the client; 3) 
the salient psychological factors that exist independent of 
the brain injury and; 4) the (client’s) broader social 
context.
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1) ASSESSING THE NEUROLOGICAL SYNDROME
In essence, Lewis refers to a neuro-psychological 
assessment. She regards this as necessary so that any 
deficits which may impinge upon the psychotherapeutic 
process can be identified and addressed accordingly. 
Deficits may comprise difficulties with memory, dis- 
inhibited behaviour (often aggressive or sexual in nature), 
and aphasie disorders (37,38). From this assessment, the 
therapist is able to modify the psychotherapy so that the 
burden placed upon the client’s deficit areas may be 
eased(31). In doing so, the therapist and the therapeutic 
environment initially perform the functions lost to the 
damaged area of the client’s brain(39). In this sense, the 
therapist may function as an "auxiliary cortex", loaning 
the client intact cortical functions thereby placating the 
client’s experience of deficiency and burden(38,40). 
However, in order to perform this function, the therapist 
must be aware both of the client's severity of deficits and 
their preserved abilities so that predictions concerning 
the likely impact on the psychotherapeutic process can be 
made(31). This may also give some indication of the 
possible impact of the psychotherapeutic process upon the 
client.
Depending upon the specific nature of the client’s
deficits, the therapist may ease the burden in several
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ways. This may include altering the frequency of sessions, 
allowing for a greater use of facial expressions and 
gestures, focussing upon one or two important life topics 
and recapping what has been discussed in the hour and any 
progress made to date(31). The client may also bring along 
their partner or significant other(s) so that he/she may 
help them recall any insights or developments made both in 
and between sessions(31).
The assessment of the neurological syndrome should not 
only comprise the therapist's evaluation of the client's 
abilities and deficits but, should also allow for the 
client's phenomenology of their injury and its deficits to 
be expressed. As discussed in the Introduction, the organic 
damage and the psychological damage are forever relational 
and permanently inseparable. Therefore, they are 
inextricably linked with the individual’s current sense of 
identity, i.e. what meaning have they attributed to their 
injury and resulting deficits and how has this impacted 
upon their perception and understanding of themselves? This 
issue is explicitly addressed within the next step in 
formulating a psychotherapeutic treatment plan, although it 
could also have been specifically acknowledged within the 
assessment of the neurological syndrome itself.
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2) PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF THE INJURY
The second step in formulating a psychotherapeutic 
treatment plan is to determine the psychological meaning 
and impact of the deficits(41), i.e. the individual’s 
phenomenology of their identity, their deficits, their 
hopes and expectations of the future, their current context 
and also their psychotherapy. Thus, it seems that Lewis’s 
intention here is to assess how, and in what ways, the 
person’s deficits affect their day-to-day functioning i.e., 
their approach taken in relation to them. In doing so, it 
may transpire that the client must be carefully and 
sensitively challenged on the ways in which they relate to 
their deficits and the meaning they have given them. This 
requires the client to engage in much thoughtful self­
reflection and clarification of both their abilities and 
limitations. Thus, in terms of its content and value 
dimensions, what identity does the individual now possess 
and have they allowed themselves any room for its 
renegotiation? As Sartre(42) claims, choice and 
responsibility are the root of all trouble thus, it is 
possible to temporarily eliminate the anxiety of living by 
pretending that choice and responsibility do not exist.
This self-deception he called ’bad faith’ (42) . This may be 
a prominent feature in those who are brain injured, as they 
are confronted with the seemingly never-ending task of
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reassembling their lives and restructuring their now 
fragile sense of identity. Therefore, pretending that all 
is lost and that choices are no longer possible may allow 
for a quick respite to the anxiety of the awesome personal 
challenges that lie ahead.
Thus, it is always possible to turn a situation to 
one’s advantage or disadvantage. The way in which a person 
perceives a situation will determine his or her sense of 
freedom to respond. However, freedom can only be assumed to 
the extent that one is aware of the necessary, the 
impossible and the desirable(36), prominent concepts in the 
rehabilitation of brain injury. Thus, notions of personal 
responsibility and choice produce anxiety for those of us 
who are not brain injured, let alone for those whose daily 
existential struggles are compounded by their efforts to 
develop and maintain some personally valued sense of 
identity.
3) PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTEXT INDEPENDENT OF INJURY
It is unclear here exactly what Lewis is proposing by
a psychological context which is "independent" of injury.
It appears as though she refers to aspects of ’personality’
or ’character’ which exclude the injury. Thus, the
implication is that there are pre-injury personality
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characteristics remaining experientially undisturbed post­
injury, which continue to exert influence in an unaltered 
way. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether she refers to 
the therapist’s or the client’s phenomenology of this 
context. Either way, her proposition is logically flawed 
since you cannot undo the fact of the injury having 
happened, either organically or psychologically.
As discussed above, the organic damage and the 
psychological damage are forever relational and permanently 
inseparable. Therefore, whether the brain injured client 
now perceives themselves as shy, outgoing, confident, or 
vulnerable, their current phenomenology of themselves and 
the meaning they have attributed to their current 
identity and life context Includes their brain injury. It 
cannot possibly be conceptualised as existing separate or 
distinct from injury. However, the extent to which the 
sequelae of their injury becomes foregrounded within their 
day-to-day experience may vary between situations and 
contexts. Furthermore, Lishman(43) considers that the 
evidence for pre-morbid personality influencing post-injury 
disability is "impressionistic and hampered by lack of 
opportunity for objective assessments before injury 
occurred". In addition, Tate (44) concluded from two 
empirical studies, that only severity of injury and not 
pre-morbid personality traits, was related to psychological
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functioning post-injury.
It appears as though this part of the treatment plan 
is especially indicative of the logical-positivistic 
paradigm of mainstream psychology. As such, it proposes 
that brain injury is one variable which can be excluded 
when attempting to understand and explain this person's 
experiences of themselves within their current life 
context. However, the brain injury survivor’s ’Jbeingr’, does 
not operate in such a reductionistic and compartmentalised 
fashion. Like everybody else (including those without brain 
injury) their experience of themselves and their life 
context comprises their totality of ’being’, attributed its 
unique phenomenological meanings. Thus, for those that are 
brain damaged, their ’personality’ or ’character make-up’ 
cannot possibly exist "independent" of their brain injury. 
Their injury is part of them, and they are experientially 
(to varying degrees of awareness across situations) in 
constant relation to it. Suggesting or implying otherwise 
may very well be offensive to those who are injured. As 
such, it risks minimising and negating their current living 
experience as a brain injury survivor.
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4) THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF INJURY
The final step in formulating a psychotherapeutic 
treatment plan is to assess the brain injured person's 
broader social context, i.e. where they live, who with, 
relationships with their partner, family, friends, previous 
employment and so on. Thus, a brain injury does not occur 
in a vacuum(1). Rather, it is one event in a long continuum 
of life events and its significance must be determined 
within the survivor’s social sphere(1). Obviously, this 
information about the client’s context is related to their 
age and their current position within their life course 
development, e.g. if they are in adolescence, then it is 
expected that they are still living with their parents and 
are fairly dependent upon them for help and support. 
However, regardless of age, in terms of the client’s family 
situation it is important to investigate the ways in which 
the family respond to and deal with, not only the client’s 
deficits, but also their whole presentation when inter­
acting as a family member(37). Thus, the impact of the 
injury upon the family should be considered in relation to 
its effects upon marital/sexual relationships, parental 
functioning and relationships, role reversals and economic 
stability(10). Also, what are the emotional styles of the 
family members? What is their capacity for empathy and 
sensitivity? Do they have a tendency to be over-protective
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or are they overly critical and demanding? It may transpire 
that the level of family distress is sufficient for a 
referral to family therapy or for some periodic involvement 
of one or more of the family members within the client's 
individual psychological therapy(31).
Therefore, the individual's sense of identity post­
injury and the ways in which it is expressed will affect 
their relationships with family members and others with 
whom they are involved. This illustrates the systemic and 
relational nature of identity within a social context. Put 
simply, how the individual behaves with others (manifest 
through their identity) will largely affect the ways in 
which others perceive and relate to them. As Breakwell(7,8) 
states, identity is a social-psychological entity.
In enhancing Lewis's model by suggesting a revision 
which is theoretically, therapeutically, and logically 
sound, I propose that the third step (assessing the psycho­
logical context independent of injury) be removed. This 
modification is based upon my above argument and that the 
three remaining steps provide a comprehensive and 
therapeutically facultative treatment plan. Thus, the 
completion of the revised three part assessment procedure 
for each client prior to a period of ongoing psychotherapy
will enable the therapist (and client) a great therapeutic
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advantage. Specifically, the period of psychotherapy can 
focus upon the client’s central issues and will have been 
modified to accommodate their unique set of abilities and 
Deficits(31). The therapist is now able to anticipate the 
client’s attitude towards their therapy and use this as an 
arena for personal development and growth(31). Thus, the 
assessment has laid the groundwork for the development of a 
therapeutic working alliance. More importantly for the 
purposes of this paper, it allows the therapist access to 
three interrelated areas of the client’s life through which 
his/her identity, its structure, processes and manifest­
ations may be examined. Thus, the therapist is able to 
assess the client’s phenomenology of the neurological 
syndrome, evaluate other related psychological consequences 
of the injury and assess the social context of injury 
whilst, relating each to the client’s current sense of 
identity from within the framework provided by 
Breakwell’s (7,8) model.
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CONCLUSIONS
As a structured and yet fluid model of identity 
comprising central guiding processes, Breakwell’s (7,8) 
model provides a highly adaptive and applicable 
theoretical, methodological and therapeutic template 
through which psychotherapeutic practice concerning the 
brain injury survivor’s sense of identity may be informed. 
Thus, through an acknowledgement of the individual’s life 
context (e.g. age, gender, background, relationships, 
occupation etc.) the model provides an ’assessment guide’ 
through which the effects upon the person’s identity may be 
investigated, i.e. by examining the current content and 
value dimensions, through understanding the ’outcomes’ of 
the processes of accommodation-assimilation, and evaluation 
and through super-imposing this against the severity of 
their organic brain damage contained within the 
individual’s total life context. This allows for a 
structured and ’holistic’ approach through which to under­
stand how this particular person’s identity has been 
affected by this particular injury at this particular point 
in time within their particular life context.
Through combining Breakwell’s (7,8) model of identity
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with the above revision to Lewis’s (31) framework of a 
psychotherapeutic treatment plan, the identity of those who 
have been brain damaged can be methodologically, system­
atically and therapeutically investigated. This theoretical 
’synthesis’ comprises inherent advantages. Firstly, brain 
injury survivors have an opportunity through which the 
effects upon their identity and the processes involved can 
be conceptualised and understood by their counselling 
psychologist. Secondly, it expands psychology’s 
understanding from an experiential and phenomenological 
perspective which can further aid the development of 
existing rehabilitation strategies and the formulation of 
new ones. Thirdly, and most importantly, it has great 
rehabilitative and therapeutic potential for those who are 
injured as well as their families through providing a 
theoretical and therapeutic ’package’ in which the brain 
injury survivor’s identity (and its processes) can be 
conceptualised, understood and therapeutically assisted in 
its continuing renegotiation.
Thus, the re-assimilation of identity does not have an
’end-point’ as such, but rather, is a life-long adaptive
process whether brain damaged or not. In the rehabilitation
of brain injury survivors specifically, it is an area where
the therapeutic endeavours of Counselling Psychology may be
of much needed life enhancing value. It is vital however,
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that counselling psychologists working with a brain injured 
individual, ensure that they collaborate with other 
professionals involved in the survivor’s care, in 
particular neuropsychologists and/or clinical 
psychologists, so that they will gain the best possible 
understanding of the sequelae of brain injury (and how this 
may affect the rehabilitation process) with regard to the 
individual concerned.
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A qualitative approach to understanding the experiential 
renegotiation of identity post-brain injury.
Abstract
Objective: The majority of research concerning identity transition following brain 
injury has been quantitative in nature. As such, it has not allowed for a more 
experientially informative type of data. The aim of this research was to expand 
upon the understandings gained in this area by investigating the survivors’ 
experiences and perceptions of this transitional process.
Design: A qualitative analysis of interviews with 5 brain injury survivors.
Results: The participants’ perceptions of their identities had changed through; the 
loss of occupational roles, feelings of vulnerability, diminished independence and 
feelings of inadequacy and lowered self-esteem.
Conclusion: The influence of dominant Western values and symbols and their 
importance for the evaluation of a valued identity, are suggested as likely putative 
psychosocial factors contributing towards the effects found. Tentative 
recommendations for actions and approaches that the authors believe will enable 
more pertinent psychological interventions, are made.
Keywords: Identity, Brain Injury, Phenomenology, Experiential, Psychotherapy
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INTRODUCTION
Brain injury is "one of the most devastating, 
disempowering and seemingly incomprehensible experiences 
that an individual, as well as their family, can suffer.
Its complex organic, psychological and psychosocial effects 
may be life-long, requiring a careful renegotiation and 
adaptation both of 'identity' for the brain injury 
survivor, as well as the roles and relationships within the 
family" (Judd & Wilson, 1999, p. 6). Thus, within the 
social and relational world, how does the brain injury 
survivor now perceive and construe their identity, how does 
it become manifest in their relationships with others, and 
what are the implications for that person's 'being' in a 
'with others' world?
After the initial trauma of injury, there now ensues
the brain injury survivor's daily struggle to regain some
mastery over those physical, psychological and social
skills which were previously always taken for granted
(Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984). However, within this process
there exists a more demanding and complex struggle. Here,
Harrell and O'Hara (1991) recognise that the most difficult
challenge lies in the acceptance of personal losses, where
the survivor attempts to integrate new aspects of the post-
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injury 'self', into the pre-injury 'self-concept'. Thus, 
how does the 'new me' fit with the 'old me' and if not, 
then who is the 'new me'? This is a particularly 
distressing, frightening, anxious and emotive transition, 
where the psychotherapeutic endeavours of Counselling 
Psychology can greatly assist the brain injury survivor, 
not only to accept and adapt to the variety of irrevocable 
and interrelated changes imposed upon their sense of 
identity, but to find a meaningful and enriching way 
forward.
In terms of the relationship between brain injury and 
identity, Tyerman and Humphrey (1984) found significant 
reported changes in 'self-concept' as described by their 
brain injured participants. Specifically, 72% of 
participants reported some personality change coupled with 
feelings of being "relatively helpless", "unattractive", 
"worthless" and, particularly self conscious concerning 
their various disabilities. This may be likened to the 
process of mourning, where the individual has to adapt to 
the loss of their former identity, manifest in the range of 
limitations imposed upon them by the damage to their brain 
(Lemma, 1997).
Although their study did not investigate the 
relationship between 'identity' and brain injury per se,
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their notion of ’self-concept’ may be synonymous with 
identity in that, they both refer to some phenomenological 
or experiential aspects of the ’self’. However, their study 
could have expanded upon the phenomenology of brain injury 
survivors by using a qualitative approach. This would 
have allowed for a greater richness of expression in the 
data which may have been used to revise existing theories, 
suggest new avenues of investigation, propose new 
approaches to post-acute rehabilitation and not least, to 
broaden psychology’s understanding from an experiential 
perspective (Judd & Wilson, 1999).
Adopting a qualitative and phenomenological approach
to investigate the effects of brain injury upon the
individual’s sense of 'self', a recent study by Nochi
(1997) examined the relationship between the ways in which
brain injury survivors understand themselves and their
self-produced narratives (or stories). The pivotal
epistemological assumption centres around the claim that an
understanding of ’self’ becomes manifest through stories in
which one’s life events are sequenced through establishing
a chain of causal links. Nochi (1997) argues that the
narratives assist the person to interpret his or her
present experience, and organise his or her future actions.
However, the analysis of the participants’ self-narratives
suggest that they feel as if they are carrying a ’void’ (or
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a "disturbing unknown") in their understandings of their 
present ’self’ and their past (Nochi, 1997). Therefore, if 
the narratives contain a ’void’ or unknowing within the 
present ’self’, then what are the implications upon the 
understanding and meaning given to the present ’self’ and 
what are its implications when relating to others?
Although Nochi’s (1997) research has provided a sound 
phenomenological, therapeutic and rehabilitative 
’springboard’ through which other related areas may be 
investigated, it suffers from two central and related 
limitations. Firstly, and most crucially, it lacks a 
clearly specified theoretical framework for defining the 
concept of ’self’. This is further compounded by the 
affirmation that the participants’ narratives are closely 
associated with this same ’self’ - but what ’self’ and 
within which contexts or is it presumed to be a fixed 
entity? This somewhat circular definition of the self is 
reminiscent of the problems inherent to Cartesian dualism, 
i.e. we have an understanding of what ’void’ means and how 
it may become manifest, but just exactly what is the ’self’ 
in which the ’void’ is located and how is it to be defined 
and theoretically structured? It would appear as though it 
is presented as a continuous entity, although we are not 
told what (or when) it is or is not! As such. Nochi’s 
section on ’A Void Within the Present Self’ is fraught with
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this same conceptual ambiguity and contradiction. Secondly, 
the findings as a whole have a somewhat fragmented and 
disjunctive nature due to the epistemological 
inconsistencies associated with this unclear notion of the 
’ self .
Kravertz et al. (1995) investigating the relationship
between ’self concept, marital vulnerability and brain
damage’ utilised the ’Tennessee Self-concept scale’ as a
theoretically and methodologically structured tool to
assess their participants’ evaluations of ’self’. However,
the theoretical and methodological confines imposed by
their quantitative approach to understanding the ’self’
limits the breadth, depth and 'freedom' of individual
expression, inhibiting phenomenological understanding of
the ’self’. Therefore, when researching a seemingly
substantive yet amorphous concept such as ’self’, ’self-
concept’ or ’identity’, it is imperative that not only, is
it based within a clearly defined and rationalised
theoretical framework which establishes and ensures
cohesive and congruent epistemological consistency but
also, that it is directly concerned with the individual’s
phenomenology of their experience. As such, who knows
’better’ or more about their identity and how they
experience and understand themselves than the individual
concerned? Moreover, a phenomenological approach to
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understanding identity allows for multiple meanings and 
understandings to be recognised and explored, including 
those which appear inconsistent or contradictory. These are 
interrelated conceptual, practical and epistemological 
issues which the present study explicitly addresses both 
theoretically and methodologically.
In terms of an appropriate theoretical framework 
concerning identity which ensures the above criteria are 
met, Breakwell's (1986, 1996) ’Identity Process Theory’
(IPT) is the most theoretically and practically suited 
theory through which to frame the effects of brain injury 
upon identity. As such, it lacks the restrictive 
theoretical and practical confines of stage models, focuses 
upon the individual as well as the social (allowing for 
phenomenological expression of identity and its 
relatedness across contexts) and is also culturally 
adaptable, reflected in its capacity to accommodate 
different individual, social, cultural and political 
circumstances (Judd & Wilson, 1999). Below is a brief 
outline of IPT.
Identity is conceptualised as an integrated, dynamic 
social product of the interaction between psychological 
processes and surrounding social context (Breakwell, 1986). 
As such, any identity can only be understood in relation to
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its embeddedness within a particular social and historical 
context. It is defined in terms of its structural 
components (the content and value dimensions), under­
lying processes {assimilation-accommodation and 
evaluation), and governing principles {distinctiveness, 
continuityf self-esteem and self-efficacy) .
The content dimension refers to the individual's 
defining identity properties, i.e., the characteristics 
through which the person describes him/herself which, taken 
collectively as a syndrome, distinguish him or her from all 
others. The value dimension concerns either the positive 
or negative value that is attributed to each element within 
the 'content' dimension, and is determined by the 
interaction between socially prescribed beliefs and values 
and previously established personal values (Breakwell,
1986).
The identity processes of assimilation-accommodation 
are distinguishable yet highly interdependent. Assimilation 
refers to the absorption of new components into the 
identity structure whilst accommodation refers to the 
adaptation of the existing structure in order to integrate 
the new elements (Breakwell, 1986). Evaluation refers to 
what is assimilated and the degree of accommodation 
necessary.
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The identity principles (which guide the above 
processes) define the end states which are desirable for 
the identity structure. In Western industrialised cultures 
they are claimed to be the following: 1.) distinctiveness 
(the person's desire to be unique); 2.) continuity (the 
person's desire to give a consistent account of 
themselves across time); 3.) self-esteem (the person's 
desire to be evaluated positively) and; 4.) self-efficacy 
(the person's striving to be competent) (Breakwell, 1986, 
1996) .
The present study explores the participants' current 
phenomenology of identity and how this has changed post­
injury using a qualitative approach, aimed at furthering 
the understanding of the relationship between identity and 
brain-injury from an experiential perspective. The 
participants' experiences of identity transition are 
contextualised within terms of IPT. However, the aim was 
not to test the theory itself but rather, to use it in a 
way which informed the analysis whilst remaining open to 
the possibilities that not all aspects of IPT would be 
addressed by each participant and/or that novel elements or 
principles may have become evident.
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METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Attempts were made to recruit brain injury survivors 
within the following inclusion criteria: individuals who 
have sustained a head injury classified within the 
boundaries of severe head injury(McMillan & Greenwood,
1993) who possess adequate communicative and reflective 
abilities in order to ensure a meaningful data set with 
sufficient depth for analysis. Severe head injury was 
chosen as this is the group most likely to have experienced 
significant phenomenological changes to their post-injury 
sense of identity whilst being able to note any pre to 
post-injury differences. Recruiting participants who met 
with the inclusion criteria proved to be a difficult 
process, as many brain injury services that were approached 
refused to allow the researcher access to their clients 
for research purposes. Five participants were recruited 
from the Northampton branch of 'Headway' after the 
management had identified potential participants based upon 
the inclusion criteria. When discussing the research aims 
with the participants, the study was described as being 
interested in the experiences of how and in what kinds of
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ways, their head injury has affected them and whether the 
manner in which they now perceive and feel about themselves 
has changed since before the time of their injury (see 
appendix IV). In order to preserve the anonymity of 
participants, they have each been given a pseudonym by the 
researcher. Ryan (aged 17) sustained a severe head-injury 
aged 13 after being hit by a car whilst completing his 
paper round before going to school - he sustained frontal 
and temporal lobe damage. Kate (aged 37) was 2 6 at the time 
of her severe head injury, sustained after being involved 
in a road-traffic accident (RTA) whilst driving to work - 
she sustained frontal lobe damage having impacted her head 
upon the windscreen of her car. Lisa (aged 37) sustained a 
severe head injury aged 23 also in an RTA - the mechanics 
of injury (likely coup, contrecoup, acceleration and 
decelerational forces) producing frontal lobe damage after 
hitting her head on the steering wheel of her car. Craig 
(aged 32) sustained his severe head injury aged 28, after a 
lathe he was working with exploded in his face - an open 
head injury producing frontal lobe damage. Brian (aged 52) 
was involved in an RTA aged 2 6 where his car impacted 
against a ditch at the roadside resulting in him smashing 
through the windscreen (he was not wearing a seatbelt at 
the time) - frontal lobe damage produced by the mechanics 
of injury.
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
The interview process comprised three distinct phases. 
Firstly, the participants were asked to complete 'Self- 
Completion Sheet 1' (see appendix I) detailing demographic 
data. Secondly, the participants were asked to complete 
'Self-Completion Sheet 2' (see appendix II) which was 
adapted from Kuhn and McPartland's (1953) study of self­
attitudes amongst American undergraduates. This was an 
appropriate tool for the present study because it allowed 
access to the participants' range of identity domains which 
in terms of IPT, is synonymous with the content dimension 
of identity. This completed sheet then formed the basis for 
the exploration and discussion of the participants' 
identities which was facilitated through a semi-structured 
interview grounded in the questions of the 'Interview 
Schedule' (see appendix III). The semi-structured interview 
was the third and final part of the interview process. The 
interview schedule begins with questions concerning the 
details of the injury, followed by questions about self­
appraisal, pre to post-injury differences, the effects of 
injury upon relationships, locus of control, social 
comparison, the perceptions of others and the participants' 
prognosis of identity. Thus, the schedule was structured so 
that the questions allowed for the participants'
phenomenological exploration and clarification of identity,
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whilst being compatible with the theoretical framework of 
IPT. As such, the participants' responses could be related 
to the structure, processes and principles of IPT where 
they were clearly evident in their narrative accounts and 
contributed to the analysis and phenomenological focus. Due 
to the sensitive nature of the research topic, all 
interviews were conducted within the style and format of 
the 'Counselling Interview' (Coyle & Wright, 1996) . This 
provided instructive guidelines on how to collect data on 
sensitive topics, and suggested ways in which this may be 
therapeutically and constructively addressed. In addition, 
a thorough debriefing was provided at the end of each 
interview allowing the participant to ask any questions, 
make comments, or provide any feedback they wished 
concerning the interview process and what this was like for 
them. All interviews lasted no longer than one hour in 
duration. Each was audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
The audio-cassettes of each interview were destroyed after 
transcription had been completed.
ANALYTIC STRATEGY
The data were analyzed through Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) (Smith, 1996a; Smith et 
al., 1997, 1999). This method of qualitative analysis
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allows the participants’ experiences, emotions, cognitions 
and meanings to be explored in a structured and systematic 
fashion. Thus, with its search for participants' meanings 
within the narrative or text, IPA is based firmly within 
the hermeneutic model of social science concerned with 
generating knowledge of particulars, favouring qualitative 
research methods and related to non-positivistic 
philosophies of science (Van Langenhove, 1995). Thus, the 
final analysis that is produced is the result of the 
interaction between the participant's narrative and the 
researcher's interpretative processes aimed at 
approximating as closely as possible, an 'insider's' view 
of the research topic. Thus, its epistemology is very close 
to what is known as critical realism, i.e. its assumptions 
concerning the reality of the participants' accounts are 
tempered by a recognition of the researcher's interpret­
ative processes and how this affects both the form and 
nature of the analysis (Pilgrim & Rogers, 1997). In short, 
there is a relationship between the data and reality 
although we are not sure of its exact nature.
Smith (1996b) has argued that good qualitative 
research should be transparent not only about its 
underlying epistemological assumptions, but also its 
analytic process. Therefore, a brief outline of the step- 
by-step analytic procedure follows below.
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DATA ANALYSIS
Firstly, having transcribed the interviews and read
them through several times, notes were made in the left
margin of each transcript about anything which appeared
significant or interesting about what the participant had
said. These notes comprised summaries of content,
connections between different issues, existing theory
(including IPT) process and so on. This was completed for
each transcript in turn. Secondly, having read all of the
preliminary notes in the left margin, emerging theme titles
were written in the right margin aimed at encapsulating in
a few words, the core issues/ideas/processes being
discussed based upon the notes in the left margin. Care was
taken that the theme titles were representative of and
illustrated by the data. Thirdly, the themes were written
on a separate page where connections or patterns between
them could be identified. This involved referring back to
the participants' transcripts in order to verify that the
connections were evident and grounded in the data.
Fourthly, when this process had been completed for each
transcript, a total list of themes for all five
participants was examined in order to identify common
salient issues and concerns, producing a final set
of superordinate themes. Finally, from this set of
superordinate themes, a list of themes was produced and
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structured in a coherent order so that it presented a 
progressive and 'flowing* research narrative. The themes 
chosen represented the participants' most salient concerns 
and issues of the current phenomenology of their identities 
post brain injury as well as illustrating aspects of their 
experience of identity transition and how this process has 
affected them in a number of interrelated ways. Thus, they 
were centrally relevant to the research question, 
highlighted and expanded upon previous research findings, 
suggested tentative revisions to existing theory (IPT) and 
illustrated aspects of IPT as it related to the 
phenomenology of identity post brain injury.
DATA EVALUATION
Due to the high degree of subjectivity throughout the 
interpretative process, a potential criticism of the 
present study may be that the analysis is skewed by the 
researcher's idiosyncratic interpretations. However, it was 
felt that the interpretative process would be balanced by 
the researchers' respective positions as a head injury 
survivor with considerable empathy and understanding of the 
participants' concerns, a health/neuropsychologist with 
wide ranging experience of working with brain injury 
survivors and a psychologist with particular expertise and
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experience of conducting qualitative research using a 
variety of methods.
The interpretative and phenomenological nature of this 
study’s research findings means that traditional 
positivistic methods of evaluation (such as validity and 
reliability) are both inappropriate and nonsensical. 
Therefore, the evaluation of the data has been facilitated 
through two main methods: internal coherence, i.e., 
whether the analysis presents a coherent argument which is 
identifiable to the reader within the data presented and; 
the presentation of evidence, i.e. that there should be a 
sufficient amount of raw data allowing another to follow 
and to interrogate the interpretations (Smith, 1996a). In 
the present study, interpretations are provided through 
excerpts from the data set which illustrate the themes 
presented. Each excerpt is preceded by a brief descriptive 
passage explaining the central issues/ideas of the theme 
and what the reader can expect from the participant’s 
narrative. This is to ensure that the analysis is presented 
in an understandable and cohesive form. In these extracts, 
ellipsis points (...) indicate a pause in the participant's 
narrative.
The presentation of data in the form of excerpts of
narrative coupled with references to previous findings and
theory means that the traditional structure of a research
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paper into separate results and discussion sections is 
inappropriate. Instead, this paper has an analysis section 
where the themes and their accompanying narrative excerpts 
are presented, followed by an overview section where 
consideration is given to the study's implications for 
psychological theory and practice.
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ANALYSIS
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
The mean age of participants was 35 (range 17-52; SD 
11.24). In terms of their highest educational 
qualifications, one participant had a Higher National 
Diploma (HND) the rest with qualifications equivalent to 
GCSEs/O-Levels. Only one participant was a full-time 
student at the time of sustaining his brain-injury, the 
rest were in full-time employment. The time elapsed since 
sustaining their head injuries ranged from 4 to 27 years. 
All participants were unemployed at the time of interview 
and lived in urban areas in and around Northamptonshire.
A POST-INJURY BREAK IN CONTINUITY
The narratives of all five participants provided ample 
and meaningful data concerning the phenomenology of their 
pre to post-injury identity changes. As such, their 
narratives illustrated that sustaining a head-injury 
classified as severe (McMillan & Greenwood, 1993) results
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in an experiential shift and phenomenological restructuring 
of identity. The data comprised descriptions of the 
participants' experiences of identity transition, what this 
process has been like for them and the ways in which they
now perceive and feel about themselves through
acknowledging their restructured identities. In terms of 
IPT this can be conceptualised in terms of an infraction of- 
the survivor's sense of continuity (the person's desire to 
give a consistent account of themselves across time). The 
themes presented below are manifestations of an assault 
upon this identity principle with each having a particular 
meaning and salience for each participant. However, all of 
the participants were able to describe in a general sense,
how the phenomenology of their identity had altered greatly
post-injury illustrating how their experience of continuity 
had been destroyed.
"It (his brain injury) totally changed me, when I came 
out of hospital I was just totally different, it's 
like waking up and being born again. . .it's like 
literally changed me into a different person just like 
that." (Ryan)
In this excerpt Ryan emphasises how the changes
brought about by his head injury were sudden and violent to
the extent that he experiences his current identity as
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unrelated to his pre-injury identity, i.e. "it's like 
waking up and being born again." He continues with this 
theme of a recreated identity via brain injury through 
asserting that, "it's like literally changed me into a 
different person just like that." Ryan's descriptions 
capture the traumatic and irrevocable nature of brain 
injury upon identity whilst highlighting its impact and 
consequences as being almost instantaneous. This is 
consistent with the findings of Tyerman and Humphrey 
(1984) where brain injury survivors expressed unresolved 
loss with respect to the person they were combined with a 
dislike or unfamiliarity with the new me. This is best 
understood with respect to the enormous losses which 
survivors often experience in terms of self-image, 
vocation, role function, body function and social network 
(McAllister, 1997). This sense of an infraction upon the 
continuity of identity post-injury was for all 
participants, twinned with a sense of loss and a desire to 
return to their pre-injury identity.
"I really wish that I was the person I was before my 
accident, I used to be very determined and capable in 
what I was doing. " (Kate)
In the above extract, Kate's experience of losing
her pre-injury identity is directly related to the loss of
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her former determination, efficiency and competency. Her 
sense of a restructured identity post-injury is consonant 
with Persinger’s (1993) findings, i.e. that brain injury 
survivors experience a grief response due to the alteration 
of their premorbid identities, resulting in a type of 
identity crisis. This is related to the loss of 
opportunities, freedoms or activities by which their 
identity is defined (Persinger, 1993). In relation to the 
phenomenological changes in identity post-injury, Janoff- 
Bulman (1992) has argued that a person's psychological 
trauma reactions constitute a shattering of assumptions 
regarding their perceptions of self and the world around 
them. As such, it has been suggested that the events which 
cause a head injury can be significantly traumatic to 
precipitate a challenging of assumptions about the self and 
reality (Wright & Telford, 1996). In the following section, 
the participants' accounts of an infraction to their sense 
of continuity centre around their post-injury loss of 
occupational role and how this affects their present 
phenomenology of identity.
1.) THE LOSS OF OCCUPATIONAL ROLE
The loss of occupational role was a salient feature of 
4 participants' accounts of their identities and (in terms
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of IPT) was inextricably linked to their impaired sense of 
self-esteem (the person's desire to be evaluated 
positively) and self-efficacy (the person's striving to be 
competent) as well as their diminished self-esteem in terms 
of their self-evaluation. Lacking an occupational 
role post-injury also led to the participants feeling less 
productive and subsequently less able to be competitive - 
salient aspects of identity within Western industrialised 
culture. This loss of occupational role was closely linked 
to the ways in which the participants evaluated and 
perceived their identities.
"...so now I'm not a lab technician I don't work. I'm 
not a guide leader anymore I can't take the 
responsibility of running a guide company which makes 
me feel pretty useless and inadequate." (Lisa)
In the above excerpt, Lisa begins by acknowledging the 
pre to post-injury differences to her identity's content 
dimension. Specifically, she focuses upon her loss of an 
occupational role and her social recreational role as a 
guide leader. The loss of these roles is underpinned by a 
sense of her feeling incapable which has resulted in an 
impaired sense of self-esteem {"which makes me feel 
pretty useless"). This is consistent with the findings of
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Wright and Telford (1996) where the greater the difference 
between past and present self was significantly associated 
with increased emotional distress. Her loss of occupational 
role also captures the social and relational nature of 
identity - to have an occupation involves working with and 
for others with mutual aims and goals. The changes to the 
survivors' content dimensions due to the loss of 
occupational roles was closely (and to a degree causally) 
related to their identities' diminished sense of self- 
efficacy.
"I used to work as a credit controller so my memory 
isn't of being a housewife because I wasn't a 
housewife I worked in an office... I could never be 
back at work again, I could never hold a job down, no 
way. " (Kate)
Above, Kate begins by recognising her loss of 
occupational role and how this has been replaced post­
injury by the role of 'housewife'. Thus, the restructuring 
of her identity through this change in roles is related to 
her impaired sense of self-efficacy in particular - "J 
could never be back at work again, I could never hold 
a job down, no way." Here, she expresses a sense of feeling 
unable to be competent and efficient enough in an
occupational role and setting. The participants' diminished
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self-efficacy through the loss of occupational roles was 
inextricably linked to a feeling that they have been 
removed from the public arena coupled with a diminished 
sense of self-empowerment.
"I felt like I weren't a proper person, I felt like I 
weren't a man, coz I weren't looking after things and 
I weren ' t going out to work and earning money. " 
(Craig)
In this excerpt Craig describes how his loss of
occupational role diminished his sense of self-esteem (in
terms of IPT) and notions of masculinity in particular - "I
felt like I weren't a proper person, I felt like I weren't
a man." In elaborating this theme, Craig explains how this
was the result of his diminished sense of self-efficacy -
"coz I weren't looking after things and I weren't going out
to work and earning money." In short, the loss of his
occupational role is related to his diminished sense of
self-efficacy (because he is not competent enough to 'look
after things') which in turn, impinged upon his sense of
self-esteem and notions of masculinity. Thus, Craig felt
that he was no longer a capable, competent and productive
member of society. In contextualising Craig's sense of a
threatened identity within a broader realm of reference,
his sense of loss may have been exacerbated by dominant
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Western cultural beliefs and values which have historically 
regarded the man of the household as the main 
'breadwinner*. Furthermore, being competitive and 
productive within a capitalist socio-political culture are 
central and normative features of a Western identity. For 
the brain-injury survivor, such dominant values serve to 
reinforce their diminished sense of self-esteem and self- 
efficacy through their loss of occupational role and the 
sense of purpose it allows. Feeling removed from the public 
arena coupled with a diminished sense of self-empowerment 
was linked to the participants' sense of an impaired 
ability to compete and to be supreme within the dominant 
and over-arching value system of Western culture.
"I'm not very good at accepting things under than what 
I want, if you're in a race you want to be first don't 
you." (Kate)
In this excerpt Kate expresses how she aspires to 
'higher' identity goals (as opposed to "accepting things 
under") in order to preserve and maintain her diminished 
sense of self-esteem and self-efficacy - "if you're in a 
race you want to be first don't you." Thus, Kate's loss of 
occupational role and restructured identity may not allow 
her to be as competitive as she was before her accident
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which is directly related to her impaired self-efficacy. As 
Bernstein, Miller and Van Schoor (1989) concluded, 
difficulties performing at pre-injury levels often lead to 
a diminished sense of self-esteem. The participants’ loss 
of occupational roles and the consequent effects upon their 
identities can also be conceptualised within terms of 
Prigatano's and Klonoff's (1988) model of 'Work', i.e. the 
four basic elements of work comprise cooperation, 
reliability, efficiency and effectiveness. Thus, a brain 
injury survivor's neuropsychological strengths and 
limitations can be related to these four factors 
(Prigatano, 1989). For the participants of the present 
study, it appears that being able to cooperate whilst 
ensuring reliability, efficiency and effectiveness within a 
work setting (at least in terms of pre-injury occupation) 
are beyond the reach of their current abilities, skills and 
coping mechanisms. In terms of IPT, this is most closely 
related to their diminished sense of self-efficacy, i.e. 
striving to be competent at work involves these four 
factors which appear to have been impaired significantly 
post-injury.
The participants' diminished sense of self-efficacy 
and self-esteem due to the loss of occupational roles are 
related in a broader sense, to their feeling vulnerable in 
a world where their restructured identities do not allow
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them the feeling of security they had pre-injury.
2.) A 'VULNERABLE' IDENTITY
Throughout all five participants’ narratives they 
express a marked sense of vulnerability whether this is 
through being exposed to (or a fear of) a direct physical 
assault, criticism, manipulation, exploitation or (as with 
their head injury itself) a destructive act of fate. It is 
hardly surprising that a head injury survivor (including 
myself shortly after my accident) feels vulnerable in such 
a marked way given the trauma of the injury experience, the 
accompanying feelings of loss, disbelief, anger, confusion 
and frustration and the subsequent struggle with adaptation 
and acceptance of their post-injury identity. All five 
participants expressed an acute sense of anticipatory 
anxiety in relation to feeling vulnerable about a possible 
future distressing/destructive event. Having experienced 
the trauma of a life-threatening accident, the 
participants’ feelings of vulnerability about their 'being- 
In-the-world' highlights the survivors’ increased awareness 
of life’s fragility and impermanence.
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"you know something else is gonna come along and spoil 
it sometime, I think of it like you could be in a boat 
and floating along and then every so often a big wave 
comes over and washes you overboard and you have to 
try and get back in the boat." (Craig)
In the above excerpt, Craig begins by confirming his 
fatalistic belief that some unknown impending event will 
disrupt or ruin any period of peace, stability and security 
"something else is gonna come along and spoil it some­
time." He illustrates this theme of life’s instability 
coupled with a conviction that things inevitably go wrong 
through a sailing analogy - "you could be in a boat and 
floating along and then every so often a big wave comes 
over and washes you overboard." Here, Craig provides a 
metaphor for how life’s distressing periods {"big waves") 
are unavoidable and how he subsequently feels ’exposed’ and 
vulnerable through a lack of control {"washes you 
overboard"). Craig continues with this analogy by 
describing in metaphor how he has struggled with adaptation 
and acceptance following his accident {"you have to try and 
get back in the boat") and the implications this has for 
his post-injury identity. As Lemma (1997) argues, the 
experience of a life-threatening accident leaves invisible 
yet indelible scars giving the individual an enhanced
appreciation of human vulnerability. Bennett (1987) has
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also argued that the experience of a head injury allows 
the survivor a greater respect for life’s fragility. From 
an existential perspective. Van Deurzen-Smith (1997, p.Ill 
concludes, "only to the extent that we are aware of our 
fragility and mortality are we capable of savouring the 
life that we have". This shift in the survivor’s 
ontological perspective, highlights how the organic damage 
and the psychological damage are forever relational and 
permanently inseparable. Thus, "when the mystery of birth 
or death does touch us, we are inevitably altered in 
this process" (Van Deurzen-Smith, 1997, p. 105). The 
participants’ sense of anxiety and vulnerability about a 
future event is also illustrated through their immediate 
concerns about being physically injured through an assault
"younger people sometimes take the piss out of me or 
they could even beat me up if they wanted and 
obviously I don't want to bang my head you see so I 
try and avoid certain situations or places." (Ryan)
In the above excerpt, Ryan describes how others 
sometimes make derisory remarks about him {"take the piss 
out of me") which seems to be underpinned by a sense of 
threat and menace {"they could even beat me up if they 
wanted"). Ryan's fear of being physically assaulted
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is specifically related to a fear of sustaining a further 
head injury. As such, he is aware of the effects of his 
injury and as a self-preservatory tactic, avoids certain 
areas where he feels vulnerable to being physically 
attacked. This extract illustrates an anticipatory anxiety 
and sense of vulnerability about the actual physicality of 
'being', and how our embodied existence is the centre 
point of reference of our 'being-in-the-world'. As 
Breakwell (1986) contends, the physical being dictates the 
content of identity because it not only provides the means 
of information processing but also has a form which is 
subject to the processes of social evaluation, i.e. visible 
aspects such as gender, race, being able-bodied or disabled 
etc. The participants’ sense of vulnerability about being 
physically harmed was also coupled with their feeling 
vulnerable to being manipulated or exploited through their 
social interactions.
"J never really let myself sort of go like when I'm 
speaking to someone, there's always a shield between 
us, I sort of build a wall up and hide behind it. . .you 
can't be fully open with anyone because in my 
experiences after the accident, you get it thrown 
back in your face and taken advantage of. " (Brian)
In the above excerpt, Brian describes how he is
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cautious and reserved when interacting with others ("J 
never really let myself sort of go”) and how this serves as 
a protective measure {"there's always a shield between 
us"). Thus, it appears that ’being-with-others’ does not 
feel completely safe and comfortable for Brian which 
is rooted in his lack of trust {"you can't be fully open 
with anyone"). This seems to be the result of his 
experiences following his accident where he has been 
manipulated/exploited by others ("you get it thrown back in 
your face and taken advantage of"). Thus, for the 
participants of the present study, the world of others 
appears to be a more threatening and perilous world than it 
seemed to them previously. Thus, to live with the paradoxes 
of togetherness and aloneness, belonging and isolation, 
proximity and distance and dominance and submission is a 
whole world in itself (Van Deurzen-Smith, 1997). Indeed, 
from the participants' accounts above, it also appears to 
be a world where the brain injury survivor's identity lacks 
certain adaptive skills/abilities making the negotiation of 
this relational world feel safer.
The participants' feelings of vulnerability twinned 
with a heightened awareness of life's fragility are related 
to their loss (or impaired sense of) independence, i.e. 
post-injury they have an increased need for relying upon 
others, which places them in a less empowered, more
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vulnerable position.
3.) DIMINISHED INDEPENDENCE
The participants' experiences of an impaired sense of 
independence (i.e. an infraction upon their abilities and 
skills related to being self-governing) was a salient 
feature of their post-injury identities which comprised a 
strong behavioural component. As such, the data provided 
varied examples of what the participants are no longer able 
to do, how this has consequently affected their sense of 
independence and the phenomenology of their current 
identities. Within all the participants' narratives they 
expressed a loss of freedom to act spontaneously due to 
cognitive or memory deficits which have restricted their 
capacity to act freely and autonomously.
"Its difficult now coz whereas before I'd just leave 
the house and not tell anybody, now I have to try and 
find someone and tell em where I 'm going in case I get 
lost. " (Craig)
In the above excerpt, Craig begins by describing how 
(pre-injury) he was able to act with a high degree of 
freedom {"I'd just leave the house and not tell anybody")
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and how post-injury this has been restrained due to 
cognitive and memory impairments which have made it 
difficult for him to negotiate his way through his 
surroundings ("tell em where I'm going in case I get 
lost"). As McAllister (1997) concludes, brain injury 
survivors are often placed back into a helpless dependent 
role where they may require ongoing support and nurturing 
indefinitely. In relation to an impairment to act 
spontaneously and freely, the participants expressed a loss 
of specific abilities or functions which have directly 
diminished their sense of independence in their day-to-day 
activities.
"I can't drive anymore and so I'm dependent upon 
either the buses or catching a taxi or asking (her 
husband) to take me here and there which makes me feel 
very resentful and pissed-off (Lisa)
In the above extract, Lisa acknowledges her loss of 
ability to drive and how she is now dependent upon either 
public transport or her partner - "I'm dependent upon 
either the buses or catching a taxi or asking (her 
husband)". As Tyerman (1996) has stated, brain injury 
survivors' diminished independence and reduced role often 
leads to other family members assuming additional roles and
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responsibilities in providing further support.
Consequently, Lisa's loss of ability impeding her sense of 
independence has led to her feeling frustrated and angry 
{"which makes me feel very resentful and pissed-off"). The 
participants’ losses of abilities/functions caused by 
memory and/or cognitive deficits was linked with overall 
difficulties in planning and decision making which has also 
resulted in a diminished sense of independence.
"It takes me time to think things out now and to 
realise whether it's a good decision or a bad decision 
and that's why I have to ask everybody else their 
opinion and never seem to get anywhere," (Kate)
In the above excerpt, Kate describes how she
experiences greater difficulty in making an informed
judgment about the merits of her decisions ("to realise
whether it's a good decision or a bad decision") and how
this leads her to seek assistance from others in reaching a
conclusion {"that's why I ask everybody else their
opinion"). Thus, the wide range of the brain injury
survivor's cognitive deficits/impairments imposes
restrictions upon the resumption of their leisure, social
and occupational activities (Najenson et al., 1980;
Lundholm et al., 1975; Hpay, 1971) with a corresponding
impairment to their sense of independence related to these
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restrictions.
The final theme below, focuses upon how the 
participants compare their restructured identities with 
other brain injury survivors and how this process affects 
the manner in which they evaluate the phenomenology of 
their current identities.
4 . ) COMPARING IDENTITIES WITH OTHER BRAIN-INJURY SURVIVORS
Throughout each participant’s narrative they express a 
sense of relief and ’luck’ mixed with affirmations of their 
own relative strengths, abilities and health when comparing 
themselves with other brain injury survivors. As such, the 
end result of these comparisons are that the current 
phenomenology of their post-injury identities are perceived 
as being relatively 'superior' or more 'advantageous' than 
those whose injuries have created greater deficits or more 
damaging and distressing sequelae. In short, the comparison 
in each case is with a brain injury survivor who they feel 
is comparatively worse-off. In turn, this process allows 
them to preserve their sense of self-esteem despite 
instances where this has been impaired such as with the 
loss of occupational role.
In terms of IPT, this illustrates an intra-psychic
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level of self-protection which is based on the process of
evaluation. In short, the value of identity is relative not 
absolute and thus, the value of all identities is 
interdependent (Breakwell, 1986). Therefore, comparisons 
can be made with others where self-esteem can be preserved 
(Breakwell, 1986). This process reflects aspects of 
Festinger’s (1954) 'Social Comparison Theory', i.e. that we 
have a drive to validate our opinions and abilities (and 
thus, in a sense, ourselves) through comparing ourselves 
with similar others. However, the salient aspect of the 
participants’ comparisons with other brain injury survivors 
is that they centre around the differences between them in 
terms of the severity of post-injury deficits and 
limitations. This concisely reflects what has become known 
as the ’ego-or self-enhancement function of social 
comparison’, i.e. that we seek out comparisons with others 
who we feel are inferior on the relevant dimension in order 
to foster self-enhancement (Latane, 1966). This process 
also illustrates how the participants recognise that brain 
injury is not a ’monolithic entity’, demonstrating that 
they are able to make evaluative judgments concerning the 
relative severity and consequences of injury and how this 
impacts upon the survivor’s post-injury identity.
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"I think Jesus, there are others worse off than me I'm 
doing well, so I try and look at it that way rather 
than what I haven’t got, which makes me feel good." 
(Brian)
In the above excerpt, Brian acknowledges in a general 
sense that other brain injury survivors are not as 
fortunate as he is post-injury ("there are others worse off 
than me") and that this perspective allows him to preserve 
his sense of self-esteem and relative well-being ("J look 
at it that way rather than what I haven't got"). Thus, this 
comparison allows Brian a positive evaluation of his 
current identity {"which makes me feel good"). In being 
more specific about the nature of this positive comparison, 
some participants illustrated their sense of fortune and 
health through pinpointing others’ post-injury deficits or 
limitations that they do not have to contend with.
"I feel quite lucky in some respects, some of the 
other members here (at Headway) have got severe 
disabilities like they have epileptic fits a lot or 
they may even be in a wheelchair." (Kate)
In the above extract, Kate describes how she feels
fortunate through not having to experience and deal with
some of the post-injury sequelae that others do {"they have
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epileptic fits a lot or they may even be in a wheelchair so 
I'm quite lucky"). As with Brian above, this seems to have 
implications for the way in which she evaluates her 
identity and sense of self-esteem, i.e. she is not one of 
the Headway members who has to live with such post-injury 
sequelae and in this sense, is comparatively ’well-off’. As 
well as recognising the differences between themselves and 
less fortunate brain injury survivors, the participants 
also acknowledged the unique nature of each brain injury, 
the differing contexts in which it occurs and how (by 
implication) this relates to post-injury identity.
"Suref there's people in here who are worse off than 
me but everyone's been affected in different ways with 
different levels of head injury so everyone's 
situation is like unique to them." (Ryan)
In the above excerpt, Ryan begins by recognising that 
others are "worse off" than he is but also, that each 
survivor’s type and severity of injury is unique 
{"everyone's been affected in different ways") and in turn, 
so is each survivor’s post-injury identity {"so everyone's 
situation is like unique to them"). In terms of IPT, this 
reflects the principle of distinctiveness (the person’s 
desire to be unique) and that even within a group of 
Headway members, Ryan is able to identify and emphasise the
individual differences between brain injury survivors.
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OVERVIEW
Due to the small sample size, any conclusions made are 
related solely to the participants of the present study and 
cannot be applied to brain injury survivors generally. 
However given these limitations, the findings suggest that 
sustaining a head injury classified as severe, assaults the 
survivor’s sense of identity 'continuity' and that the 
accompanying phenomenological alterations between the pre 
and post-injury identity are manifestations of this 
infraction. Thus, the findings support previous empirical 
research concerning post-injury alterations to the 
survivor’s experiential sense of ’self’ (e.g. Tyerman & 
Humphrey, 1984; Prigatano, 1989; Wright & Telford, 1996; 
Nochi, 1997). However, its distinguishing features are its 
phenomenological focus combined with its incorporation of 
IPT as a clearly specified and structured theoretical and 
methodological tool through which to frame the effects of 
brain injury upon identity.
A potential criticism of this study may be that the
findings represent a form of research self-fulfilling
prophecy, i.e. that the research questions’ focus upon
post-injury difference and change has been primarily
responsible for the salient themes produced in the
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analysis. However, it has been well established within the 
neuropsychological and therapeutic literature (e.g. Miller, 
1993; Rose & Johnson, 1995; Prigatano, 1999) that acquired 
brain injury significantly affects the survivor’s post­
injury phenomenological sense of identity. Therefore, the 
aim of this study was to explicitly address and explore in 
more depth, brain injury survivors’ possible post-injury 
differences and changes from an experientially focused, 
phenomenological perspective. As such, the experiential 
themes identified within the data were provided by the 
participants through a process of their self-reflection 
both on cognitive and emotional levels. Thus, the 
participants were not asked directly to answer questions 
concerning their identity per se but rather, questions that 
centred around possible post-injury identity transition and 
related issues. As such, the participants discussed their 
most salient concerns freely and expressively, providing a 
high degree of meaningful narrative which comprised both 
considerable overlap and notable differences.
As acknowledged above, a central limitation of this
study is its comparatively small sample size. However, 5
participants in a qualitative study enabling a group
analysis is regarded as the minimal number required (Turpin
et al., 1997). Paradoxically, the main virtue of the
present study is its relatively small sample size, i.e. the
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small numbers involved have facilitated a more in-depth 
analysis of themes allowing for greater phenomenological 
exploration and understanding which would not have been 
possible with a larger sample, although at the same time, 
the findings are not presented as idiographic. In short, 
within the context of the present findings, less is more. 
Thus, although concerns can be expressed about the sample, 
this study has provided a seminal phenomenological 
exploration of identity transition post brain injury 
through which future research can draw upon and expand.
The data-set comprised retrospective accounts of the 
participants’ experiences of identity pre-injury and its 
subsequent post-injury transition. Thus, it could be argued 
that the retrospective nature of some accounts coupled with 
the participants’ cognitive and memory deficits/impairments 
has resulted in inaccurate representations of their life- 
events and experiences. However, for all persons, memory is 
a reconstructive process involving selective and inter­
pretative processes (Baddeley, 1990). Therefore, all 
memories are phenomenological in nature. The participants’ 
recall of events leading up to sustaining their injury was 
particularly detailed and any instances of retrograde 
amnesia did not appear to be evident. For events occurring 
after their injury, their memory was at times somewhat
fragmented, illustrating instances of anterograde amnesia.
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Thus, although their memory for some events post-injury 
contains certain 'gaps’, their current phenomenology of 
identity comprises these ’gaps’ and as such, plays an 
integral part in the ways in which the participants 
evaluate and feel about themselves. Therefore, the accuracy 
per se of their accounts is not the central issue but 
rather, that the ’loss’ of certain memories, roles and 
abilities constitute the experiential nature of their 
current identity which they have been able to reflect upon 
and discuss in detail.
The participants’ key issues which the present study 
identified are that the loss of occupational roles (for 4 
participants) a heightened sense of vulnerability and a 
diminished sense of independence, are interrelated aspects 
of their identities affecting their sense of self-esteem 
and self-efficacy which in turn, have implications for 
their social interactions. Also, the participants’ 
consistent downward comparisons with other brain injury 
survivors indicates the self-enhancement function of social 
comparison and how this serves to maintain some sense of 
self-esteem despite other losses. Future research may 
investigate whether this process is evident with those 
whose post-injury deficits are more debilitating than those 
interviewed in the present study.
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In light of the present study’s findings, a possible 
revision to IPT centres around the theme 'Diminished 
Independence'. Thus, given the participants’ descriptions 
of how their autonomy has been impaired post-injury and how 
this is related to a decrease in their self-esteem, a new 
identity principle of 'Self-Dependence' (the person’s 
desire to be self-governing) may provide a revision which 
encapsulates a central aspect of identity in Western 
culture. As such, independence may be equated both with 
liberty and (to an extent) democracy, through its focus 
upon the individual as a self-governing ’being’ with the 
capacity to make choices and act upon them. As the data 
illustrate, the participants’ range of choices available to 
them has been restricted as well as their abilities 
involved in enacting them. However, such a revision 
requires further empirical support and could focus upon 
other non-brain injured groups in order to collect a wider 
and more diverse database. Also, future studies with larger 
samples may focus upon different time-periods following 
injury in order to investigate the temporal nature of 
identity transition post-injury and how this may relate to 
the participants’ experiences of the themes identified in 
the present study and others that may become evident.
In terms of therapeutic interventions, the findings
suggest that the exploration of the survivor’s current
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phenomenology of identity, its pre to post-injury 
transition, accompanying losses and emotional responses 
would comprise core issues of the therapeutic process. An 
important aspect therefore, may be to explore the extent to 
which the survivor has adapted to and accepted their 
restructured identity and its implications for their 
'being-in-the-world' with others. This would involve a 
recognition of their limitations as well as their retained 
abilities and possibly, their newly acquired ones. In 
addition, the survivor’s use of intra-psychic coping 
mechanisms and their effects upon post-injury self-esteem 
would also need to be explored by the therapist in order to 
gauge the likely effects upon the therapeutic process and 
possible outcome. Also, in more practical terms, 
therapeutic interventions need to take account of the 
social support network available to the survivor and even 
suggest other sources of support (such as 'Headway') if 
these appear to be lacking. From the findings of the 
present study, it appears that the amount and quality of 
social support received from Headway has been vital for the 
brain injury survivor’s ongoing sense of well-being, 
providing warmth, empathy, genuineness, understanding and 
assistance in their range of daily struggles post-injury.
As a structured and yet fluid model of identity, the
present study has demonstrated how IPT can provide a highly
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adaptive and applicable theoretical, methodological and 
therapeutic template through which psychotherapeutic 
practice concerning the brain-injury survivor’s identity 
may be informed. As such, the model provides an ’assessment 
guide’ through which the effects upon the person’s identity 
may be investigated, i.e. by examining the current content 
and value dimensions, through understanding the effects 
upon the identity principles (facilitated through the 
processes of accommodation-assimilation and evaluation) and 
through super-imposing this against the severity of their 
organic brain damage contained within, the individual’s 
total life context.
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APPENDIX I
PARTICIPANT'S SELF-COMPLETION SHEET 1
PARTICIPANT NO.
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
Please complete the section below by responding to each of 
the eight items. Simply write your answer beside each one.
Age
2 .
3.
Sex
Nationality
4.) Current Occupation
5.) Pre-Injury Occupation
6.) Age at time of injury
7.) How long has it been since your injury?
Highest Educational Qualification
9.) Town/City of Residence
10.) Who do you currently live with?
11.) Who did you live with just prior to your accident?
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APPENDIX II 
PARTICIPANT'S SELF-COMPLETION SHEET 2 
(Kuhn, M.H. & McPartland, T.S., 1953)
There are twenty numbered spaces on the page below. Using each 
space only once, please write up to twenty answers to the question 'Who 
am I?' Answer as if you were providing the answers to yourself only and 
not to someone else. Please write the answers as quickly as you can as 
they occur to you.
_
_
_
T
5"
6"
y
8”
9".
ÏÔ1
TT.
_ _
T3~.
14~.
Ï5I 
16l 
ÏT.
Yq~.
Ï91 
2 0 ~.
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APPENDIX I I I
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
1) Can you remember your accident?
If yes, can you describe to me the details of your 
injury in as much depth as possible? This may 
include information on when it happened, where, who 
you were with, what you felt at the time and what 
happened immediately afterwards.
Is this your memory of events only, or has it been 
explained to you by someone else?
If your answer to question 1 is no, what story about
your accident have you been told?
2) See participant's self-completion sheet No. 2
3) Looking at your responses to sheet No. 2, can you tell 
me which is the most important in terms of how you see 
yourself?
Looking at your responses to sheet No. 2, can you 
say which ones make you feel good about yourself?
- Why?
Looking at your responses to sheet No. 2, can you 
say which ones do not make you feel good about 
yourself?
- Why?
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4) If I had asked you to complete sheet No. 2 just prior 
to your accident, how do you feel your answers would 
have been different?
- How much of a difference do you feel there is?
- What do you think or feel about these differences?
5) The changes you have experienced following your injury 
may not be the result of the accident itself, but may 
be due to other things in your life. Considering the 
changes you have undergone since your injury, which 
ones do you feel have been easier to deal with?
- Why?
- Which of these changes do you feel have been more 
difficult to deal with?
- Why?
6) Do you feel that having a head injury has affected 
your relationships?
- If yes, in what ways?
- How does that make you feel?
7) Sometimes people who have experienced a bad accident 
are left feeling that they don't have much control 
over their lives. Was that true for yourself, or did 
the accident not really affect how much you felt in 
control of what happened to you?
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- How much do you feel in control of your life now?
- If this has become lessened, in what ways do you 
feel you have less control?
- How has this come about?
- How does that make you feel?
8) In social situations people can build up a picture of 
themselves by comparing themselves with other people and 
by seeing how other people behave towards them. Which 
individuals or groups of people do you tend to compare 
yourself with?
- How do you see yourself in relation to these 
individuals or groups of people?
- If this comparison is positive, what do you think 
makes it positive?
- If this comparison is negative, what do you think 
makes it negative?
9) How do you see yourself compared to other brain-injury 
survivors?
- What makes you say that?
- How does that make you feel?
10) How do you think other people who don't know about 
head injury see you?
- What makes you say that?
- How does that make you feel?
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- How do you think other people who know about head 
injury see you?
- What makes you say that?
- How does that make you feel?
11) When you think of yourself in the future, what do you 
imagine?
- What makes you say that?
- How does that make you feel?
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APPENDIX IV
INFORMATION SHEET
HOW MY HEAD INJURY HAS AFFECTED ME:
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE SURVIVOR'S PERSPECTIVE
The research in which you have been asked to take part, 
concerns how you feel your brain injury has affected your 
sense of identity, i.e. how do you now perceive yourself 
and how does this feel? At its most simple, it is asking 
you to answer the question 'Who am J?'. It also asks you to 
consider whether there are any differences between how you 
perceive yourself now and how you felt about yourself 
before the injury. If you feel that there are any 
differences, what are they, how do you think they have come 
about, and how do they affect the ways you perceive and 
feel about yourself now?
Research of this kind, which asks for your perspective is 
extremely scarce. Therefore, the importance of this 
research is that it gives you a 'voice' to express what you 
think and feel about yourself and how this may have changed 
since your injury. This has great potential to influence 
the nature of brain injury rehabilitation programmes and 
allows professionals, friends and family members to under­
stand more fully, what it is like to experience a head 
injury. It is hoped that this research will be published in
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a widely read journal where your views will be read by a 
wide range of professionals. 1 will ensure that your 
anonymity is preserved. This research has the potential to 
make positive changes to the ways in which brain injury 
survivors are perceived and treated by professionals and 
'lay-people'.
This research is not concerned with the views or opinions 
about how others see you but simply^ with the ways in which 
you perceive and feel about yourself.
In order to answer this research question, 1 would like to 
interview you about your experiences and how you see 
yourself. You will also be asked to complete two short 
forms of personal details. The interview (lasting no longer 
than 1 hour) will be tape recorded and transcribed later. 
The interview will be conducted at Headway House at a pre­
arranged date and time. The manager of Headway will inform 
you about these details nearer the time. After the 
interview has been transcribed the audio cassette will be 
destroyed. The details will remain confidential and no-one 
will know that the transcribed interview relates to your­
self. It will remain completely anonymous.
Discussing how you see yourself may be uncomfortable for 
you and it is possible that you might feel upset at some 
point during the interview. If you do, you can end the
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interview at any time you choose and do not have to explain 
your decision. If you feel distressed you may also wish to
discuss this with me and 1 will be happy to do so. The tape
recorder will be stopped immediately if you become 
distressed. 1 will provide a full de-briefing at the end of 
the interview, where you will have the opportunity to ask 
any questions you wish or to make any comments on the 
interview process and what it was like for you.
For your further information, 1 am a Counselling 
Psychologist in training at the University of Surrey. 1 
have worked for several years as a nurse or care worker 
with brain injury survivors in both hospital and community 
settings. A year ago 1 suffered my own severe head injury 
which has left me feeling better able to relate to and 
empathise with those whose head injuries have had more 
severe consequences. My research supervisor (Dr. Sarah 
Wilson) is a neuropsychologist with long experience of 
working with individuals who have suffered very severe head 
injuries. She has also researched similar areas looking at 
how families adapt to a head injured member. This research 
has gained approval from the University of Surrey's 
Advisory Committee on Ethics.
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APPENDIX V
CONSENT FORM
I the undersigned voluntarily agree to take part in the 
study on the experiences of brain injury survivors.
I have read and understood the Information Sheet provided.
I have been given a full explanation by the investigator of 
the nature, purpose, location and likely duration of the 
study, and of what I will be expected to do. I have been 
advised about any discomfort that I may feel as a result. I 
have been given the opportunity to ask questions on all 
aspects of the study and have understood the information 
given as a result.
I agree to comply with any instruction given to me during 
the study and to co-operate fully with the investigator. I 
shall inform him immediately if I feel distressed.
I understand that all documentation held on a volunteer is 
in the strictest confidence and complies with the Data 
Protection Act (1984). I agree that I will not seek to 
restrict the use of the results of the study on the 
understanding that my anonymity is preserved.
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at
any time without needing to justify my decision and without
252
prejudice.
I confirm that I have read and understood the above and 
freely consent to participating in this study. I have been 
given adequate time to consider my participation and agree 
to comply with the instructions and restrictions of the 
study.
Name of Volunteer _____________  Name of Witness
(BLOCK CAPITALS) (BLOCK CAPITALS]
Signed   Signed
Date Date
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APPENDIX V I
CONSENT FORM
I the undersigned have agreed to invite Mr. Dale Judd of the University 
of Surrey to collect data via interviews on the experiences of brain 
injury survivors. This is subject to consent being given by the 
interviewee in which case, I have no objections to the research being 
conducted. I have read and understood the Information Sheet which is to 
be provided to the interviewees. I have been given a full explanation 
by Mr. Judd of the nature, purpose, location and likely duration of the 
study, and of what the interviewee is expected to do. I have been 
advised about any possible discomfort that the interviewee may feel as 
a result. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions on all 
aspects of the study and have understood the information given as a 
result.
I understand that all documentation held on a volunteer is in the 
strictest confidence and complies with the Data Protection Act (1984).
I agree that I will not seek to restrict the use of the results of the 
study on the understanding that the participants' anonymity is 
preserved.
Name of Manager 
(BLOCK CAPITALS)
Name of Witness 
(BLOCK c a p i t a l s;
Signed Signed
Date Date
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